University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014

1-1-1975

Gregory Bateson and a language for psychotherapy.
Frederick Alexander Blount
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
Recommended Citation
Blount, Frederick Alexander, "Gregory Bateson and a language for psychotherapy." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 4595.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/4595

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

GREGORY BATESON AND A LANGUAGE FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY

A Dissertation Presented
By
FREDERICK ALEXANDER BLOUNT, JR.

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree ot
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
December

1975

School of Education

@

1976

FREDERICK ALEXANDER BLOUNT, JR.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ill

GREGORY BATESON AND A LANGUAGE FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY

A Dissertation Presented
By
FREDERICK ALEXANDER BLOUNT, JR.

Approved as to style and content by:

John W. Wideman, Ed.D., Chairperson of Committee

)0»t
Susan M.

'iUC

[arold L.

/'

L

Campbell, Ph.D., Member

Raush,

• »

Member

Dea'h, School of Education

iv

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Francesca
Maltese.

Her endurance and support while this work was in

progress made its completion possible and accounted for the
joy and wonder in relating which are the basis for any
insight achieved.

V

ABSTRACT

Gregory Bateson and a Language for Psychotherapy
(December 1975)
F.

Alexander Blount, B.A., Wesleyan University
Ed.D,, University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

John W. Wideman, Ed.D.

In Chapter I the difficulties which the "scientific"
approach has with psychotherapy are discussed.

"Science"

attempts to find knowledge which is independent of the knower
and tries to reduce phenomena to component bits which can be
measured in the service of gaining this knowledge.
is not meant a particular branch of science.

By "science"

Rather, we are

speaking of a general approach, widely accepted in the behavioral
sciences, which is the method generally used by the critics of
the "ineffectiveness" of psychotherapy.

Also discussed in

Chapter I is the contention of many therapists that something
is happening in psychotherapy, but that the most important
aspects of the process elude isolation and quantification.
With only the language of science, i.e., the language of
entities and forces, at our disposal, we could describe psycho¬
therapy only as a sham or a mystery.
In Chapter Two is offered an alternative to the language
of entities (e.g.

"knowledge", "variables") which might be

demystifying of the process of psychotheraoy.

For our lan, ua.

Vi
we have used the work of Gregory Bateson to help us speak
clearly in terms of form rather than substance, of processes
rather than entities.

From Bateson we get the notion of con¬

text and hierarchies of contexts in communication.

These

notions help us clarify the systemic or interactive nature of
perception and knowing.

Bateson’s use of Russell and Whitehead's

Theory of Logical Types as an explicative model gives us a way
of applying some of the truths of systems theory to human
beings in their systemic interaction with their environments.
When applied to the specific interaction known as psychotherapy,
Bateson's language allows us to discuss the relationship
between individual perception and learning on one hand and
the form of the interaction as a whole on the other.

We can

say that abstract form of the psychotherapy relationship
offers a corrective change in the way the client punctuates,
i.e,, gives form to or understands relating and experience
generally.

We call these changes Learning II and Learning III

respectively using Bateson's terms.

Learning II is a change

in Level II premises about interaction which are manifested
in the way a person participates in any specific relationship
and Learning III is a change In Level III premises about relat¬
ing which are manifested in a person's stance toward relating
and experiencing generally.
The third chapter attempts to show that using Bateson s
way of thought, much of Freud’s work becomes available and
useful from a "systems theory" or "cybernetic" point of view.

vli
Freudian concepts such as "transference,” "primary process,"
and "unconscious" are completely at home in a Batesonian
language, though the processes which they describe are thought
about in ways very different from Freud's.

Many of Freud's

descriptions of his technique, such as his early descriptions
of free association, the treatment of compulsives and the evolu¬
tion of his approach to transference exhibit the formal charac¬
teristics described by Bateson and his colleagues as the
"therapeutic double bind."
The fourth chapter is entitled, "Freud, Binswanger,
and Learning III".

In his article, "Freud's Conception of Man

in the Light of Anthropology," Ludwig Binswanger puts forward
an excellent assessment of Freud's work from the point of view
of an existentialist.

In the terms of this paper, he says

that Freud's language cannot deal adequately with certain
human experiences.

This chapter offers a comparison of Freud's,

Binswanger's and Bateson's languages which involves an attempt
to come to a clear understanding and statement of Bateson's
crucial concept of Learning III.

In the context of the develop¬

ment of Bateson's thought and the outlining of Binswanger's
understanding of how a language must deal with "Homo existential!s
Learning III is, hopefully, made understandable.
The fifth chapter involves using the language to talk
about other therapies.

The "how" of cure in Network Therapy,

and the therapies of Jessie Taft, Fritz Peris and John F.osen..are
discussed in Bateson's terms.

This makes systems whose

vlii

terminologies and emphases seem hardly to intersect, available
for easy comparison as to what they are attempting to accomplish
and how helpful change using each approach is effected.
In the last chapter a brief summary of the language as
it has been developed is offered to give the reader a better
sense of the unity and form of the work as a whole.

Finally,

there is a brief discussion of the relation of the language to
the act of writing the thesis.

This offers a final reminder

of the interactive nature of all the processes touched upon
in the work including the writing of the study itself.
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THE NEED FOR A LANGUAGE

One of the testimonies to the importance of psycho¬
therapy to Western people’s understanding of themselves and
their possible ways of being is the great breadth of interest
in it and the universal lack of concensus on almost any aspect
of the process one might want to consider.

Theories, metho¬

dologies, and "schools" of theraoy continue to proliferate.
People with an incredibly wide diversity of formal training
consider the practice of psychotherapy a logical and fruitful
way of bringing their training to bear on the world around
them.
One would think that as different therapies were tried
and compared, ways that were "better" would have come to be
generally agreed upon and "results" would have become more
assured and predictable.

Diagnosis would become, in this way

of understanding, ever more accurate and finely matched to an
appropriate method of treatment.

This has not been the case.

As new therapies, theories, and terminologies have arisen, it
has been the people who had hoped for a refinement and elimi¬
nation of theories,

leading to the identification of the "best

methods, yielding predictable and demonstrable results, who
have been most disappointed and critical of psychotherapy as
it was being practiced.

In the last twenty years or so many

articles have called the effectiveness of psychotherapy

1
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severely into question.

(92, 186, 98)

Unfortunately the studies which are most emphatic in
their assertion that psychotherapy is "ineffective" seem generally
to be the studies most limited to the "effective" vs.
dichotomy.

"ineffective"

When a field of the extended history, the multitude

of formal approaches and the myriad of personal therapeutic
styles which are incorporated under the term "psychotherapy"
is reduced to a single dichotomy, it is obvious that most of
the complexities of the experience involved must be screened
out by the language used.
Psychotherapists as well as their critics tend to be
grounded in a faith in "science".

Even though they may be

successful in terms of relieving the suffering of their patients,
most therapists are uneasy when they cannot say why they are
successful in "provable" scientific language.

Frieda Fromm-

Reichmann, one of the most successful (in the terms used above)
and influential therapists of recent times, in agreeing with
Zilboorg that one is unable to say satisfactorily why one is
successful puts her hope in science to provide the explanatory
system which would make her successes repeatable by others.
She says that, "'our aim is to replace intuition with under¬
standing'

and to convert the intuitive truths with which all

psychotherapy works by necessity, into scientific truths, s.
that they may become

'public property

.

.

.

ready to be used,

tested, questioned, probed, and experimented with by anyone
else who is interested in science.’"

(lW
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There are two fundamental problems with the approach
Fromm-Retchmann would like to be able to follow.

One is the

assumption that there Is knowledge to be had which, when
properly catagorized and specified, can be known and used
equally by "anyone else who is interested in science."

With

the proper formulations, supposedly, one can have a body of
"true" knowledge which allows the knowers to be interchangeable.
This separating of knowledge from the knower isolates a part
of an interdependent process, and is then by its nature
incomplete, a skewed picture of what is in fact a larger whole.
This is the subject/object separation.
which fosters,

for example, the investigation of "consciousness"

rather than "consciousness of .
not a "thing".
who is

It is an approach

.

Yet, consciousness is

It is a process in which there is always one

conscious and "something" of which one is conscious.

Everywhere the "scientific" approach makes "things" where
there are only processes.
into studiable bits,

Generally this involves subdividing

"isolating variables

•

In the practice of isolating variables is the second
problem of the "scientific" approach in the behavioral sciences.
In the application, this method seems to let the essence of
an interaction or process slip through its methodological fingers.
It is almost axiomatic in psychotherapy research that

crucial aLtgeneranyenotWacces3ible'tonmea»urement and yield
low reliability among observers.
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While there is a movement in the sciences back to study¬
ing whole entities as processes, this approach which promises
so much for our understanding is still relatively new and has
had little impact on the mainstream of the behavioral sciences.
Barry Commoner, a noted biologist, describes clearly the need
for holistic ways of seeing.
If we consider all the forms of matter that we know
about, only in regard to a narrow spectrum [nuclear physics]
is there a possibility of what might be called the "atomis¬
tic approximation" succeeding.
Everything else is necessarily
holistic, so that what has appeared to be a universal basic
approach to science since the Greeks —atomism—is really a
special case, which only worked where it has worked and is
not going to work anywhere else, up or down.
It’s a narrow
window, a special case; but, because of the enormous conse¬
quences of understanding the atom, it has misled everyone
into believing that atomism is synonomous with science.
I
think this is the great evil of Western science today. (93)
From a beginning with whole processes one is able to,
and should, work toward an understanding of component parts.
The minute is as important as ever.
dealing with systems

However, whenever or.e is

(which, as we shall see, is most of the

time), the whole is more than, and different from, the sum of
its parts.

One cannot build from an understanding of the

small to an adequate description of the large though this is
what is usually attempted in research on psychotherapy.
Though the peoole trying to explain psychotherapeutic
change "scientifically” have had little success, that does not
mean that change which is helpful to a client does not occur
or that it occurs randomly.

Some therapists, in all probability,

are better for particular clients than others.

Some clients
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are more likely to improve than others.

Something certainly

happens for some people (though change may in some cases be
more significant for the therapist than for the client).

C1P2)

*

One is, however, looking in the wrong way when one seeks to
correlate client gain with the "school" of psychotherapy adhered
to be the therapist.

(99)

There are many theories of psychotherapy, but is impres¬
sive how often the therapist’s technique is more an expression
of his personality than an adherence to any particular school
of thought.
Various studies have established that competent
psychotherapists of different schools agree more closely
with each other regarding the most important elements in
therapy than do not-as-competent therapists belonging to the
same theoretic school.
In addition, the competent therapists,
regardless of their theoretic persuasion, agree more closely
with the patient’s appraisal of the important elements in
his therapy than do the not-as-competent therapists.
The
patients who feel they have undergone a significant change
as a result of psychotherapy uniformly place their response
to the therapist ahead of "insight." (173)
We are left here in a very "unscientific" position.

We

can say that there are some "elements" of therapy more important
than others.

At the same time no specific technique can be

prescribed as most successful, therapists seem to use a technique
which is uniquely a product of their own personalities.
In reporting on an extensive study of two groups of
therapists, one with a seventy-five per cent improvement rate
and one with a twenty-seven per cent improvement rate in their
work with schizophrenic people, Whitehorne says the difference

KSiss'.?: ss/ssss srs

rr.s*ss,rrsp:s-.;:2.Es.1"srr;.2 a r........

on the basis of their questionnaires and behavior rating data
that the differences among therapists were "°re evi ent *
the therapists thought than in how they or the patients behavec.
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in effectiveness between the two groups seemed to be attri¬
butable to:
...the differences found among physicians in the extent
to which they were able to approach their patient’s prob¬
lems in a personal way, gain a trusted, confidential rela¬
tionship and Darticipate in an active personal way in the
patient’s reorientation to personal relationships.
Tech¬
niques of passive permissiveness or efforts to develop
insight by interpretation appear to have much less thera¬
peutic value.
(231)
A therapist has to ’’participate in an active personal
way."

He has to "invest" personally in the therapeutic process.
There is

evidence that this same sort of investment is

required, at some level, of the patient.

In a study restrict* d

to factors "in" the patient which influenced their continuing
in psychotherapy in an outpatient clinic in Chicago, Heine and
Trosman had interesting results.

The presenting complaint

(whether it was emotional or somatic)

and the degree of convic¬

tion on the part of the patient that treatment would be helpful
proved not to be significant as factors in whether or not they
continued in psychotherapy beyond a very brief time.

The

significant factors proved to be the "active collaboration
the therapeutic process by the patient as opposed to

in

passive

cooperation", and whether the patient was seeking "help in
changing behavior" or simply expecting medicine or diagnostic
information.
Though we can say that "active investment" on the part
of both people in individual psychotherapy (therapist and
patient) is a very important element in a "helpful" therapy.
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and that in such therapy there will be substantial agreement
between the therapist and patient on what are the important
elements of the therapy, we have not begun to say how any
element in the therapy is productive of helpful change.
In fact the language mostly used to talk about psycho¬
therapy, and therefore that which is available for "naturalis¬
tic"

(nonquantative) research, is riddled, according to Gregory

Bateson, with:
...a number of imperfectly defined explanatory notions
which are commonly used in the behavioral sciences—"ego,"
"anxiety," "instinct," "purpose," "mind," "self," "fixed
action pattern," "intelligence," "stupidity," "maturity,"
and the like.
For the sake of politeness, I call these
"heuristic" concepts; but, in truth, most of them are so
loosely derived and so mutually irrelevant that they mix
together to make a sort of conceptual fog which does much
to delay the progress of science. (64)
Given the,lack of specificity of "process oriented"
language and the general inadequacy of the usual atomistic
(reductionist)

scientific approaches, it is no wonder that a

therapist and a patient find themselves in the situation which
Bateson describes so well:
The patient and the therapist are both virtually unable
to tell you what happened that led to psychotherapeutic
change. ... I do not know of any school of psychotherapy
that, as yet, has enough language for talking about these
levels to even attempt to give insight at these levels.
We need a language which can speak rigorously about
the whole of the process of psychotherapy, not just about what
is happening "in" the patient or what is done by the therapist.
In order to accomplish this goal a language and the concomitant
way of understanding mus t be able to deal with the system of
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of therapist-patient, with that in the process which is more
than the sum of the parts.
In the work of Gregory Bateson, I believe, there is a
way of thinking about phenomena which could allow for the
development of a language which could speak rigorously about
the process of psychotherapy in a holistic way.

Since Bateson

himself has never attempted such a project in a systematic
fashion, it will be the work of this study to develop such a
language.
The language when developed should be able to speak
coherently and in the same general set of understandings and
terms about all the phenomena surrounding a field as general
as "psychotherapy."

While it may not offer a theory in all

areas adequate to the phenomena, it should allow one to dis¬
cuss and understand, and therefore do further work in, areas
which up to now have had very different approaches and termino¬
logies.

Examples of the phenomena.which should be accessible

to the language are:

human learning, human development, fami¬

lies, psychopathology, bits of interaction (usually called
"stimulus," "response," and "reinforcement"), profound inter¬
relating (the "I-thou relationship"), communication generally,
and "intra-psychic" processes.
A language is an approach to phenomena which embodies
in itself a way of sorting and assigning meaning, an epistomology.
A change in language, in epistomology, does not necess¬
arily imply a change in behavior (as it usually understood).
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In this case, it does not necessarily imply that a new form
of psychotherapy will result from using a new language to
understand this process.

However, a change in ways of under¬

standing does imply a change in possibilities.

In a different

epistomological context, the evolution of psychotherapy as a
formal interactive process will, in all likelihood, be modified.
So, while a "Batesonian language" does not imply a "Batesonian
therapy", it is probable that if many therapists began to think
about therapy as a whole and to perceive the "bits" of thera¬
peutic interaction in Batesonian terms, the therapy which they
practiced would gradually modify

(evolve) in the direction of

more fully and clearly embodying these understandings.

As we

will see over and over in the course of the study, basic
premises involved in how one understands interactions, the con¬
text of meanings or "punctuations" in which an interaction
occurs, tend to be self-validating.

We will also see that the

more one's abstract epistomological premises are adequate to
the complexity of the phenomena under consideration, the more
one is able to give form and meaning to aspects of the pheno¬
mena which otherwise would seem random and of no consequence.
Our goal, then, is to develop a language which can give
formal expression, i.e. expression in a coherent form, to a
greater complexity of aspects of the psychotherapeutic process
than are presently available to the languages commonly used.
It should be remembered In reading this work that a
language is a different sort of an enterprise than a specific
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theory or experiment.

It cannot be stated In any short com¬

pact form which can then \ be discussed or proved.

It exists

only in its use, and that is the only way it can be learned.
In the title of the next chapter, the term "beginnings" is
meant to imply that the language is in the process of develop¬
ment and explication throughout the entire work.

Where the

reader encounters a part that seems unclear or that does not
conform immediately to his experience, he is asked to continue
reading.

The point will, in all likelihood, be discussed again

in a different context

later in the work.

Through the use of

the language in serveral different contexts, it is hoped that
this study will enable the reader to utilize the language in
the contexts of his own experience.
Perhaps a brief description of the form which the study
as a whole will take will better prenare the reader for his
encounter with our language.
listed below.

The study will have the chapters

In the explanation of each of the succeeding

chapters should be apparent the scope, methodology and limita¬
tions of the work.
GREGORY BATESON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A LANGUAGE
In this section of the paper the attempt will be made
to present Bateson’s thought as it has developed over the years
so that the reader will experience the formal elegance inherent
in the whole as well as
the particulars.
as

coming to understand concepts which are

The individual concepts will be developed

fully as possible using some of the different ways of
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approaching them and different language in which they have
been couched at different points in Bateson's career.

Only

when ideas have been explained and have been set forth in
their interrelationship which makes for the coherence of a
language or approach will the study attempt to come back to
any sort of a "shorthand” or a set of terms which can be taken
conveniently along when talking about other people's thought
or therapy.
Though several different ways of talking about a concept
used by Bateson at different times may be offered, the general
approach to his thought will not be historical.

Only when an

account of the different forms that a theory or concept took
over the years seems to be the best way to show the present
concept in its full resonance will such an account be under¬
taken.

The history of the "double bind" theory in its trans¬

formation from "binder versus victim" to "schizophrenic (i.e.,
bound) family" will be such a case.
Though much of this section will be quite abstract,
dealing with the orderedness of contexts, the nature of differ¬
ence, and so forth, there will also be discussion of the pheno¬
mena out of which these patterns are drawn.

Hopefully, the

language which is developed will be demonstrably convenient
when speaking about therapy, families, and the like.
FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS:

PARALLELS AND PARADOXES

There is a remarkable correspondence between the ordered
levels of the contexts of learning which Bateson talks about

and the levels of intra-psychic process which Freud described.
The study will show that using Bateson’s way of thought, much
of Freud’s work becomes available and useful from an "informa¬
tion theory” or "cybernetic" point of view.

Freudian concents

such as "transference," "primary process," and "unconscious"
are completely at home in a Batesonian language, though the
processes which they describe are thought about in ways very
different from Freud’s.

Many of Freud's descriptions of his

technique, such as his early descriptions of free association,
the treatment of compulsives and the evolution of his approach
to transference exhibit the formal characteristics described
by Bateson and his colleagues as the "therapeutic double bind."
In working as fully and concretely as possible with a
language as broad and rich as that of Freud, the application
of Bateson's language can be demonstrated and refined.

FREUD, BINSWANGER, AND LEARNING III
In his article,

"Freud’s Conception of Man in the Light

of Anthropology," Ludwig Binswanger puts forward an excellent
assessment of Freud's work from the point of view of an exis¬
tentialist.

While giving Freud great respect for illuminating

the patterns of functioning of human beings, Binswanger finds
Freud's basic concept of people as "Homo Natura", as organism,
fails to take into account people in their existential being.
The being who can say "my organism," "my history," "my growth"
is a being unrepresented in Freudian thought, according to
Binswanger.
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Binswanger's argument, when followed In a much more
careful way than the sketch presented here, Is quite forceful.
In the terms of this paper, he says that Freud's language
cannot deal adequately with certain human experiences.

If,

In the parts of the study up to this point, the parallel
between Bateson's language and Freud's has been convincingly
drawn, it seems likely that some examination or comparison of
Bateson with Binswanger will be In order.
This comparison will involve an attempt to come to a
clear understanding and statement of Bateson's concept of
Learning III.

In the context of the development of Bateson's

thought and the outlining of Binswanger’s understanding of how
a language must deal with "Homo existentialis" Learning III
will, hopefully, be understandable.

The concept of Learning III

will enable us in our language to discuss a. given therapy's
approach to the most fundamental aspects of human existence.

THE LANGUAGE AND OTHER THERAPIES
By this point in the study the language will have been
set out in Its

full scope and resonance.

This chapter will

involve using the language to talk about other therapies.

ibe

"how" of cure in such therapies as Network Therapy, and the
therapies of Jessie Taft, Fritz Peris and John Rosen will be
discussed in Bateson's terms.

This should make systems whose

terminologies and emphases seem hardly to intersect, available
for easy comparison as to what they are attempting to accomplish
and how helpful change using each approach is effected.

It is

for this purpose that the study is undertaken and the language
constructed.

SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS
This section will attempt to knit together the loose
ends left in the study up to this point,
A brief summary of the language as it has been developed
will be offered to give the reader a better sense of the unity
and form of the work as a whole.

Finally, we will very briefly

discuss the relation of the language to the act of writing
this thesis.

This will offer a final reminder of the inter¬

active nature of all the processes touched upon in this work
including the writing of the study itself.

GREGORY BATESON AND THE BEGINNINGS OF A LANGUAGE

In this chapter we will attempt to develop the language
of this study and give the reader an initial sense of its use¬
fulness.

We will begin by trying to make a connection between

the language and the experience of the reader.
on common ground.

We must begin

We then hope to show that the connection

we have chosen to make with the reader’s experience and the
subsequent development of our way of describing experience is
neither capricious nor arbitrary.

By discussing the

basic

form of human experiencing and learning we hope to show that
the language we want to use embodies this same basic form.
The two are "isomorphic", to use a term which will be used
several times in this work.

As we develop our language into

more rigorous clarity, the same clarity should be available
for describing human experiencing and learning.

We will use

the mathematical theory of Logical Types to help give clarity
to our language, and then we will try to apply the theory to
human learning.

In both of these processes we will be retrac¬

ing the steps of Bateson.

The last two sections of this chap¬

ter will use the description of human learning we develop to
talk about how this process can go awry (pathology)
can be done about it

(therapy).

and what

It is the language for dis¬

cussing psychotherapy toward which we are building.

Hopefully,

the steps we take in working toward this goal will ultimately

each prove themselves necessary, helping the reader to have
a fuller sense of the size and complexity of the task we are
undertaking.
In allbthis task we will be using the work of Gregory
Bateson.

While some of the specific points in this chapter

are original to the present author, the thinking is so deeply
rooted in Bateson’s thought that separating the original from
paraphrase of Bateson has become impossible.

Only the organi¬

zation of the chapter as a whole and some of the examples of
various points are clearly original.

The additions and refine¬

ments of the language in subsequent chapters will to a much
greater degree be the work of the present author.

Unfortunately,

any confusion or unnecessary complexity involved In our language
and its use is original with the present author and cannot be
attributed to Bateson.
Having set out the plan for this chapter and our debt
to Bateson, we will begin in our attempt to establish a. meeting
place between our language and the experience of the reader.
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CONTEXT
A certain mother habitually rewards her small son
with ice cream after he eats his spinach.
What additional
information would you need to be able to predict whether
the child will:
a. Come to love or hate spinach; b. Love
or hate ice cream, or c. Love or hate Mother? (6s)
This is

an example Bateson uses to convey the importance

of the notion of "context."

It is, hopefully, a good entry

point into his way of thinking, a way of thinking by no means
unique to him, but which is in his work presented through a
range of subjects and with a clarity and depth which is truly
unique.
Take a moment with the example above.

Consider what

information or what kinds of information you would need to make
the predictions involved.
The question is explosive in its implications. Each bit
of information one gets increases one's sense of how much infor¬
mation is needed.

Consider the change in the meaning of the

situation any one of the following pieces of information would
effect:

The child is diabetic and ice cream is dangerous.

The exoense of ice cream greatly taxes the family budget.

The

mother learned her eating habits in exactly the same or a very
different way.

The father considers this bribing the child.

The other children don't get ice cream for eating spinach.
The other children get ice cream and cake while this child
gets only ice cream.

The father raises spinach for a.living.

Each possibility completely modifies the situation and
each begs

further clarification and modification.

The contextual
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information one would need to confidently predict the outcomes
in question is potentially infinite.

Knowing only what one

knows in the example, one knows nothing.

Or, more properly,

without the context, what one knows has no meaning.
no meaning to an observer.

This point must always be under¬

stood in talking of meaning.
meaning.

It has

Meaning is always perceived

Information is only information to a perceiving entity.

Differences only makes a difference when it is in some sense
(or by some sense) perceived.
Explanation involving context is always hierarchical.
Every context has a context.

The unit of meaning is the pheno¬

menon as perceived in its context.

As one focuses on the con¬

text, however, a new context appears.
A phoneme exists as such only in combination with other
phonemes which make up a word.
The word is the context of
the phoneme.
But the word exists as such—only has ''meaning" —
in the larger context of the utterance, which again has
meaning only in a relationship. (36)
Context is a difficult sort of notion.

One can never

locate "a context."

It is the greater set of nhenomena which

in-forms a sub-set.

In the relationship between the sub-set

and the greater set is the demarcation of the sub-set, the out¬
line.

The outline is necessary so that there can be a relation¬

ship.

"It is this

know what this
(context)."
a difference.

and not that (outline)," and, "You don't

(sub-set) means until you relate it to that

Because there Is a perceived outline, there is
Because there is a perceived difference, there

is relationship.

Because there is relationship, there can be
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perceived meaning.
Is this actually how people perceive?
his

Watzlawick and

colleagues say it definitely is.
Sensory and brain research has proved conclusively
that only relationships and patterns of relationships^ can
be perceived and these are the essence of experience. (222)
Some examples of what this statement means In actual

perception may make its implications more immediate.

Consider

that the eye does not "look" in the sense of pointing at a
thing and taking it in; the eye scans.
differences.

It moves picking up

A star is not a beam of light to the eye.

It

is a beam of light which is different from its dark background.
Stare directly at a star without moving your eyes
and it disappears.

(if you can)

Pribram describes an experiment conducted

in Moscow by Eugene Sakolov which demonstrates the same process
happening with auditory perception.
A tone beep of specified intensity and duration was
presented at irregular Intervals to a subject whose
electroencephalogram, galvanic skin response and plethysmographic record were traced.
At the onset of such an experi¬
ment characteristic changes in these traces are observed.
These accompany behavioral alerting and are known as the
orienting reaction.
As the experiment proceeds, these
Indices of orienting become progressively more attenuated
until the beep of the tone no longer seems to have any effect.
This is habituation.
At this point Sokolov reduced the In¬
tensity of the tone without changing any of its other char¬
acteristics.
Immediately the electrical traces from the
subject signalled an orienting reaction.
Sokolov reasoned,
therefore, that habituation could not be simply some type
of fatiguing of sensory and neural elements.
Rather, a
process must be set up In the central nervous system against
which Incoming sensory signals are matched.
Any change in
signal would result in the orienting reaction.
He tested
his Idea by habituating his subjects anew and then shorten¬
ing the tone beep.
Now the orienting reaction occurred at
the moment the shortened beep ended.
The electrical traces
showed the alerting reactions to the period of silence.
(Pribram’s emphasis) (195)
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When one considers the perception of differences over
time, the notion of context falls more comfortably into place.
Each event is part of the perceptual context of an immediately
subsequent event.

At the simplest level, the tone is the

context for the silence that follows and vice versa.

It is

the event against which a difference appears when the subsequent
event is perceived.
text, in this

At the next level up the hierarchy of con¬

case, we find the first order of pattern forma¬

tion in perception, of "redundancy”.

The original patterns of

tone and silence are the context against which a later pattern
of softer tone and silence or shorter tone and silence can make
a difference.

This difference is certainly of a more abstract

or higher order than the difference between tone and silence.
This difference is perceivable only when the original differ¬
ence between tone and silence no longer evokes the orienting
reaction, i.e,

is no longer a difference which makes a differ¬

ence .
It would appear that the organism had made a generali¬
zation about the pattern of tone and silence which allowed it
no longer to expend its attention in reacting to each individual
tone and silence.

Only when this pattern was changed was the

orienting reaction, the person’s awareness that something
different was happening, evoked.
A difference-perceiving or relationship-perceivin^ entity
which can be described as learning or adapting will preceive
redundancy or pattern.

Redundancy is the sort of relationship
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discussed above in the notion of context when this relation¬
ship is perceived over time.

In Bateson’s language the terms

"redundancy,” "pattern," and "information" are used almost
interchangeably in his description of the phenomena involved
in perception and learning.
Any aggregrate of events or objects (e.g. a sequence
of phonemes, a painting, or a frog, or a culture) shall be
said to contain "redundancy" or "pattern" if the aggregrate
can be divided in any way by a "slash mark," such that an
observer perceiving only what is one side of the slash mark
can guess , with better than random success, what is on the
other side of the slash mark.
We may say that what is on
one side of the slash mark contains information or has mean¬
ing about what is on the other side.
Or in engineer's lan¬
guage, the aggregrate contains "redundancy."
Or, again,
from the point of view of a cybernetic observer, the infor¬
mation available on one side of the slash mark will restrain
(i.e. reduce the probability of) wrong guessing. (^7)
In Pribram's example of the tone/silence, when redundancy
was perceived, i.e. when a pattern of tone and silence was
perceived, the context for change in pattern was established.
As there is a hierarchy of contexts, so there is a hierarchy
of redundancies perceivable.

One can perceive a change in a

pattern, a change in a pattern of patterns, etc.
Organisms are thrust into the perceptual/communicational
world of redundancy and context and the hierarchies of both
by the most basic nature of perception.
relationship by perceiving difference.

Organisms perceive
Yet when we are faced

with an object/event (if only difference can be perceived,
the use of the word "object" must be carefully modified), the
perception of a book,
of differences

for example, there is an infinite number

(contexts) possible which could be perceived.
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There are the differences between the book and the Brooklyn
bridge, a Bach concerto, a humming bird, another book, Planck’s
constant, ad nauseum.
and some are not.

Somehow some differences are perceived

If this were not so, the perceiving entity

would be faced with much more information than it could possibly
take in.

Somehow a sorting or screening must occur.

This mean?

that while "objects of perception" may fall in one's path in
a random manner, what is oerceived of those objects will be
sorted or screened in a non-random fashion.
redundancy in the act of perception.

There must be

And, if this is true,

the hierarchical nature of redundancy and context must be re¬
flected in or be a reflection of the basic form of human percep¬
tion.
What we have been describing so far are some of the
basic characteristics of the world of information and percep¬
tion, the world of form.
meaning.

This is the world of learning and

It Is a world of interaction, always Involving a

perceiver and a perceived.

Both are necessary for meaning,

redundancy, context or learning to exist.
The first major contribution Bateson made to the
investigation of the world of form was his using the mathe¬
matical theory of Logical Types, originally advanced by
Whitehead and Russell in 1910 as a formal explicative tool
in describing the hierarchical nature of patterns of meaning
as they are manifested in human learning and interaction.
Hopefully the groundwork has been laid showing that this world
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and its laws are basic to all human activities.

Now we shall

proceed to the more formal and rigorous descriptions of this
world involved in the Theory of Logical Types.

LOGICAL TYPES
In looking for an explanation to the Theory of Logical
Types in Bateson’s work, one can turn to almost any article
to find the theory set forth.
is a bit different.

Yet each time the description

In each case the part on Logical Types comes

near the beginning of the essay and is a part of the context of
understanding Bateson is trying to construct.

Though the main

theme of the essay may be primitive art, animal play, learning,
alcoholism, schizophrenia, somatic change in evolution or oomparative cultural anthropology, an understanding of logical
types, when presented in a way appropriate to the subject, seems
crucial to understanding Bateson’s thinking on that particular
subject.

Here is the explanation of the theory which preceeds

a discussion of "The Logical Categories of Learning and Communi¬
cation . ”
First, it is appropriate to indicate the subject matter
of the Theory of Logical Tyoes:
the theory asserts that no
class can, in formal logical or mathematical discourse, be
a member of Itself; that a class of classes cannot be one
of the classes which are its members; that a name is not the
thing named; that "John Bateson" is the class of which that
boy is the unique member; and so forth.
These assertions
may seem trivial and even obvious, but we shall see later
that it is not at all unusual for theorists of behavioral
science to commit errors which are precisely analogous to
the error of classifying the name with the thing named—or
eating the menu card instead of the dinner—and error of
-Somewhat*"^ess obvious is the further assertion of the
theory:
that a class cannot be one of those items which
are correctly classified as Its nonmembers.
If we classify
chairs together to constitute the class of chairs, we can
go on to note that tables and lamp shades are members o,
of "nonchairs," but we shall commit an error
in formal discourse if we count the class of chairs among

! line oils*
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the items within the class of nonchairs.
In as much as no class can be a member of itself, the
class of nonchairs clearly cannot be a nonchair.
Simple
considerations of symmetry may suffice to convince the
nonmathematical reader:
(a) that the class of chairs is
of the same order of abstraction (i.e., the same logical
type) as the class of nonchairs; and further, (b) that if
the class of chairs is not a chair, then, correspondingly,
the class of nonchairs is not a nonchair.
Lastly the theory asserts that if these simple rules
of formal discourse are contravened, paradox will be gener¬
ated and the discourse vitiated. (Bateson’s emphasis) (^9)
Mathematics can make the structure of logical types very
clear because of the different languages available to It.

Con¬

sider the statement, "The addition of two positive real numbers
will always result in a positive real number".

This is obviously

of a different logical type from, a meta-statement to, the
statement,

"4+6=10."

It is unlikely that one would confuse the

two levels because one is stated in discursive language while
the other is in mathematical symbols.

However, once one begins

to make statements of a higher logical type than the two examples
here, only discursive language remains, and paradox is more
likely.

The statement, "All mathematical propositions must be

proved before they can be used," embodies such a paradox.

It

is a proposition about all propositions, a member of a class
which also encompasses the class as a whole.
In the study of digital communication the Theory of
Logical Types can be almost rigorously applied.

Digital Commun¬

ication is that in which the messages bear no formal relation
to the things

for which they stand.

The word "chair" does not

look or sound like the object for which it stands, and you can't
sit in it.

This is analogous to the digit "4" which bears an

26
arbitrary relation to the quantity for which it stands and
is not in itself particularly larger or smaller than any other
digit.

In digital communication difference of Logical Type

is indicated when one message describes or types another.

Th®

message, "What are we talking about?" is of a different logical
type than whatever messages made up the discussion which one
can imagine to have preceeded it.
message about a class of messages.

It is a meta-message; a
Unfortunately for rigor,

there is no such thing as a purely digital message.

All spoken

language is accompanied by analogic communication such as ges¬
ture,

facial expression, tone of voice, etc.

An analogic

message is one in which there is a formal relation between the
message and its referent.

How broadly you smile tells me how

happy you are or how happy you want me to think you are.
Usually the aspects of analogic communication which accompany
a digital spoken message can be said to be of a higher logical
type to the digital message.

They establish a context by tell¬

ing the receiver how the message is to be understood.

They are

statements about the relationship between the speakers while
digital information is being exchanged.

In written as well

as spoken digital communication the importance of context
remains true.

There are statements about how one is to under¬

stand a message in the structure of the message itself as well
as in all the other sorts of contexts in which any message is
conveyed.

These are of a higher'.logical type, but here the

ladder of the hierarchy begins to seem more like an ascending
net.

The Theory of Logical Types has become a formal description
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rather than a rigorous mathematical theorem.
In the study of living organisms, the Theory of Logical
Types Is helpful In understanding the inevitable hierarchy In
the communication among these organisms.

Still, there are

certain other differences besides those already ennumerated
between the logical types involved in a logical system and the
phenomena occurring in communication which we can use logical
types to understand.

In a logical system, if it can be proven

that a certain combination of premises leads to a paradox or
untenable conclusion, the whole structure of premises and para¬
doxes can be discarded.

It is as if they never existed.

Organ¬

isms, however, existing In time, must embody their premises in
some form before a paradox can occur.

At the point of the

paradox, the experience of the organism in its embodiment of
ultimately paradoxical premises does not cease to exist.
An example of this phenomenon is

found in the experiments

described by Bateson in which dogs have been taught to discrimi¬
nate between a circle and an elipse.

Gradually the elipse is

rounded and the circle is flattened.

At the point where the

two look so much alike that discrimination is impossible, the
trained dogs consistently begin to exhibit bizarre behavior.
They cease eating, bite their handlers, or demonstrate vabicus
other behavior which seems to indicate a mistrust for '-heir
environment.

A naive dog facing the indistinguishable circle

and elipse will simply guess, accepting his reward as he gets it
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In this experiment a dog not only learns that he will
be rewarded for picking a circle, he learns the meta-nremise,
"This is a context for discrimination,"

Bateson theorizes

that gradually the smell of the laboratory or the harness In
the experiment comes to be a "context market" which can sig¬
nify to the dog that the patterns of learning which he
encountered there before are again in effect.

has

Yet faced with

indistinguishable configurations, he is in paradox.

His

"experience" in trying to discriminate is in fact a comment on
the class of activities involved in discrimination.

In trying

to discriminate, his experience is, "discrimination is impossible."
Because he is unable to change meta-premises from "I should
discriminate" to "Discrimination is impossible, I should guess,"
the dog seems to embody the paradox as it becomes pained and
disoriented.

It’s communicational pattern dls-integrates.

The fact that an organism cannot quickly cease to operate
on certain premises, or to perceive in certain patterns when
those premises or patterns lead to nain or paradox is one aspect
of the economics of the adaptation of organisms.

It is the

difficult aspect of what is still a necessary process.

Bateson

uses logical types to explain the way in which an organism
"sinks" certain abstract premises in order to retain flexibility
in immediate sorts of interaction.

The process which we saw

in the experiment where people became habituated to a specific
tone/silence pattern can be seen as happening universally among
organisms

(or any system of a certain complexity).

Once the
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pattern of tone/silence is perceived or generalized, the person
stops responding with the orienting reaction.

The person then

can save the attention involved in the orienting reaction for
new and refined perceptions.
flexibility of perception.

The generalization gives new
Any premise which can be acted upon

in a more general or abstract form (at a higher logical type)
allows the organism this flexibility of immediate perception
and action.
Some types of knowledge can conveniently be sunk to
unconscious levels, but other types must be kept on the
surface.
Broadly, we can afford to sink those sorts of
knowledge which continue to be true regardless of changes
in the environment, but we must maintain in an accessible
place all those controls of behavior which must be modified
for every instance.
The lion can sink into his unconscious
the proposition that zebras are his natural prey,but in
dealing with any particular zebra he must be able to modify
the movements of his attack to fit with the particular terrain
and the particular evasive tactics of the particular zebra.
The economics of the system, in fact, pushes organisms
toward sinking into the unconscious those generalities of
relationship which remain premanently true and toward keep¬
ing within the conscious the pragmatics of particular
instances.
The premises may, economically, be sunk but particular
conclusions must be conscious.
But the "sinking," though
economical, is still done at a price—the price of inaccess¬
ibility.
Since the level to which things are sunk is charac¬
terized by iconic algorithms and metaphor, it becomes difficult
for the organism to examine the matrix out of which his
conscious conclusions spring. (^B)
The formal description of the "sinking" of premises
continues to be useful even as one moves out of areas which
could in any way be conceived of as involving learning or
adaptation on the part of the individual organism.

It is a

natural systems phenomenon of the process called "evolution .
In the human being and other land mammals the presence of air
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around the nose is certain enough so that the control of breath¬
ing can be sunk into the more primitive or autonomic portions
of the brain only to be overridden when immediate conscious
control of breathing is necessary.

Though we can breathe in

many different patterns which we consciously choose, rendered
unconscious, we continue to breathe just as our hearts continue
to beat.

A porpoise, on the other hand, cannot count on air

being around the blow hole at any given time.

For that reason

control of its breathing is located in the highest, most complex,
most

conscious part of its brain.

The difference this makes

was tragically learned during early experiments with dolphins.
When for one reason or another they were anesthetized and be¬
came unconscious, they stopped breathing and died.
So far we have described what might be called the "evolu¬
tionary purpose" of the sinking of premises from one perspective.
The process of generalizing and sinking premises allows flexi¬
bility at the level of immediate resoonse.
evolutionary purpose equally important.
allows

for stability of general premises.

There is another

Flexibility of response
This is every bit

as important for an organism or any system capable of adaptation.
The most general or abstract premises must change slowly, if
the system is to maintain its coherence.

Bateson describes

how this works in a finite system such as the human brain.
Gestalt perception—the perception of pattern—enables
the brain to'discard details and to name complex unities.
It is necessary, however, to consider in somewhat more
detail the role of pattern in the economics of circuitry.
The brain is finite and,while the possible linkings of
neurons must be astronomically numerous, there is still
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a. problem of accomplishing what must be accomplished with
the
finite means available.
Where Freud envisaged an
economics of psychic.energy, the engineer of today would
argue for an economics of circuitry.
If the same way of
thought can be appled to two separate problems, this is a
saving of circuitry.
At the highest level, this sort of
economy is practiced by scientists who use the differential
calculus both for the computation of trajectories and analysis
of chemical processes.
The basic analysis of this economics has been begun by
Ross Ashby, whose Design for a Brain must be regarded as an
important landmark in both psychiatry and communications
theory.
Ashby’s primary thesis concerns the interdependence
of variables within complex systems, where every variable
is directly or indirectly linked with each other.
He points
out that when such systems have adaptive characteristics,
that is, when they tend to seek a steady state, there is
a necessary relationship between those variables which change
their values rapidly and those others in which change is
comparatively slow.
Broadly, when the system encounters
load or stress, the rapidly changing variables act to main¬
tain the stability of the slowly changing variables.
The
general idea may be illustrated by considering an acrobat
with his balance pole.
The acrobat maintains the ongoing
truth of the proposition, "I am on the high wire," by vary¬
ing the position and angle of his balancing pole.
The
effect of pegging the rapidly changing variable—fixing the
relationship between the pole and the acrobat’s body—will
result in rapid disruption of the more lasting proposition:
the acrobat will fall. (33)
It is In the interest of the organism to have the more
changeable premises vary so that more abstract^ more deeply sunk
premises can remain stable.

If an organism learns certain

abstract premises in a certain defineable context, when it
again finds itself in what seems to be the same context, it will
endeavor to operate on the previously learned premises even if
it has to manipulate Its perception of immediate data to do this.
The necessary redundancy in the act of immediate perception
acts in service of maintaining more abstract patterns of perception.
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CATEGORIES OP LEARNING AMD COMMUNICATION

Bateson has formalized his descriptions of the processes
discussed here in the article, "Logical Categories of Learning
and Communication."

In this article (which we will follow

rather closely in this explanation) he discusses the different
"levels of learning."

Using his numbered levels of learning

may give us a more useful set of terms for talking about such
processes as "sinking" than we have had to this point.*
Bateson describes the simple receipt of a message with
a specific response as "Zero Learning."

The message received

in a Zero Learning situation may be of any logical type.

While

other levels of learning may be characterized by the level or
logical type of "error" to be corrected by trial and error,
Zero Learning does not involve trial and error at all.
mostly a concept to help in definition.

It Is

The likelihood is small

that anything occurs in the lives of organisms which is completely
this simple.

Bateson offers the following list of "phenomena

which approach this degree of simplicity:"
(a)

In experimental settings, when "learning" is complete
and the animal gives approximately 100 per cent correct
responses to the repeated stimulus.
(b) In cases of habituation, where the animal has ceased to
give overt response to what was formerly a disturbing
stimulus.
,
. ,
(c) In cases where the pattern of the response is minimally
determined by experience and maximally determined by

•Bateson is'rsther casual with his use of the terms "learning
and
"level” in this article.
For the sake of clarity we can say that
change of premises of a certain numbered level shall be called
"learning" of that number.
So change In premises of punctuation whic.
are at level II we would call Learning II.
Usually this distinction
Is not necessary, or is supplied by the context.
In such cases
the abbreviation "L II " will be used.
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genetic factors.
(d) In cases where the response is now highly stereotyped.
(e) In simple electronic circuits, where the circuit struc¬
ture is not itself subject to change resulting from the
passage of impulses within the circuit—i.e., where the
causal links between ’’stimulus" and "response" are as
the engineers say "soldered in."
(Bateson’s emphasis)
(50)
Learning I is a change of response in a given context
when both responses are from the same "set of alternatives."
This is the learning usually talked about and experimented with
by psychologists who work in laboratories with animals.

Bateson

offers the following examples of that which could be considered
Learning I;
(a)

(b)

(c)
(d)

(e)

There is the phenomenon of habituation—the change from
responding to each occurrence of a repeated event to not
overtly responding.
There is also the extinction or loss
of habituation, which may occur as a result of a more or
less long gap or other interruption In the sequence of
repetitions of the stimulus event.
The most familiar and perhaps most studied case is that
of the classical Pavlovian conditioning.
At Time 2 the
dog salivates in response to the buzzer; he did not do
this at Time 1.
There is the "learning" which occurs in contexts of
instrumental reward and instrumental avoidance.
There is the phenomenon of rote learning, in which an
Item in the behavior of the organism becomes a stimulus
for another item of behavior.
There is the disruption, extinction, or inhibition of
"completed" learning which nay follow change or absence
of reinforcement. (51)
It is important to note that the notion of repeatable

context,(redundancy of perception)

is absolutely essential

for all levels of learning above Zero Learning.

If repeatable

context is not a valid description of how an organism organizes
its perceptual world, then all learning is Zero learning.

If

the context at time B when the dog salivates in response to a
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bell is the same to the dog as time A when it did not salivate,
'

\

then it can be said that "learning" has occurred.

If the con¬

text is not the same, then we can only say that the dog’s
experience is somehow a discrimination between the events of
time A and the events of time A plus time B which caused it
to salivate in response to the bell.
follow that all questions of the type,
"learned" or "innate"?*

"It would logically
’Is this behavior

should be answered in favor of

genetics."
We would argue that without the assumption of repeat¬
able context, our thesis falls to the ground, together
with the whole general concept of "learning."
If, on the
other hand, the assumption of repeatable context is accepted
as somehow true of the organisms which we study, then the
case for logical typing of the phenomena of learning necess¬
arily stands, because the notion "context" is Itself subject
to logical typing. (52)
The idea of certain events functioning as "context markers"
which was mentioned briefly earlier is here helpful in under¬
standing how an organism knows from which set of alternatives
it must pick a response to a given stimulus.

(The word "stimulus"

i s used here with the understanding that in the flow of an inter¬
action any event may be regarded as "stimulus," "response,'
or "reinforcement" depending of one's point of view, i.e. how
one punctuates or gives order to the sequence.)

The harness

tells the dog that- he is back in the experimental context
with all that that implies.

When context markers are not

readily apparent, an organism will often spend its energy
trying to find one.

It cannot settle into operating within

the set of alternatives implied by the context until the context
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is established.

Questions like, "What is this course all about?"

or, "Is this serious?" are verbalized examples of organisms in
search of context markers.
understood.

Usually the markers are clear and

A classroom with a blackboard, being seated by

a maitre d’, a white flag, a cow’s stall in the milking barn,
the opening or closing of the elevator doors—all these can
easily be understood in the way in which they might function to
tell an organism from what set of alternatives it was choosing
its behavior at a given time.
A change in the set of alternatives elicited by a given
context marker is an example of Learning II.

Any change in the

set of alternatives in a context or in the pattern of punctuat¬
ing events into contexts or of identifying context markers would
be Learning II,

The dog who,went into "experimental neurosis"

as a result of no longer being able to discriminate between the
elipse and the circle did so because of being put in the wrong
at the Level II.
found that all his

In Hull’s experiments with rote learning he
subjects gradually improved in their ability

to memorize meaningless syllables even though the specific
syllables learned one day were of no help in remembering the
syllables on subsequent days.
that context.

They learned to learn within

This is Learning II.

In talking about Learning II we will be using the term
"punctuation" a great deal. Punctuation is the act o
perceived phenomena into meaningful units.
from Watzlawick, et.

ordering

An example drawn

al., may help to make the conceDt clearer.
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Suppose a husband and wife interact according to a pattern in
which he is withdrawn and she is a nag.

Each person’s behavior

in the pattern can seem perfectly logical, depending on how you
punctuate the series of interaction, i.e., where you choose to
start a "cause and effect" explanation of what is happening.
He may punctuate the series as

follows:

"When she nags me,

all I can do is withdraw, and then she nags me more—She is
never satisfied."

She may punctuate the same series differently

and therefore draw a very different conclusion as to what the
whole interaction means:

"He is withdrawn so I nag him to get

some interaction going, but he only withdraws more
to get any response from him."
withdraw-nag:

It Is impossible

Withdraw—nag-withdraw, or nag-

the only difference'is punctuation.

One's habits of punctuating events are of a higher
logical type than the stream of events in an interaction which
one perceives.

They are one's Level II premises about inter¬

action in action.

These habits are commonly enumerated when

talking about an individual by adjectives which are meant to
describe a person’s "character."

Descriptive terms such as

"dependent," "morose," "competitive," "reasonable," etc., are
all ways of naming a person's habits of organizing experiencof interactions and therefore of contributing to the type of
interaction which occurs.

For example, a person who constantly

suspects other people of talking *out him will probably act in
a manner which will cause other people to talk about him.
Seen from the point of view of the person being described,
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the adjectives above name habits of punctuation.

Seen from

the point of view of an observer, these abstract patterns,
as Bateson reminds us, are ways of interacting: and do not exist
in a vacuum.
The critical reader will have observed that . . . adjec¬
tives . , . which purport to describe individual character
are really not strictly applicable to the individual but
rather describe transactions between the individual and his
material and human environment.
No man is "resourceful" or
"dependent" or "fatalistic" in a vacuum.
His characteristic,
whatever it be, is not his but is rather a characteristic of
what goes on between him and something* (somebody) else.
(Bateson's emphasis)
(53)
The reader may have noticed that in the study so far the
terms "premise" and "pattern" have been used almost interchange¬
ably,

The above quotation helps to explain why this is so.

A "habit of punctuation" is effectively the same thing as a
"premise about interaction" which, in the only place where this
premise may be observed in operation, i.e., in interaction, is
the same as a "pattern of interacting."
important point.

This is an extremely

It means that what at first may seem to be

a laziness or lack of precision in our language is actually an
embodying of a phenomenological truth which is denied in the
structure of one's usual thinking and speaking.
think about phenomena in spacial terms.

We tend to

A "premise about inter¬

action" would exist "in" someone's head while a pattern of
interacting would exist "outside" of the person.

The premise

"flows through" the intermediate realm of the body or is trans¬
lated by the body into action and "in" the action is the pattern.
It is very hard to think in terms or images other than those of
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space and substances.

Yet here we are talking about forms of

communication which are distinguishable only by the different
perspectives of the observer in relation to each.

The act

of giving form to one's perceptions of interactions and the
act of participating in interactions are transforms of what
is inevitably one inseparable overall activity.

They are

thought of as different acts only because one is observable
to an outside observer (patterns of interaction) and one is
not (habits of punctuation).

These terms ("premise" and

"pattern") will continue to be used interchangeably.

Where

one is more helpful as an explanatory term in a certain con¬
text, it will be used, though always a minor change of word¬
ing would make another of the terms as appropriate.
Patterns of the level of abstraction of Learning II,
those which can be named by descriptions of "character," are
those patterns or characteristics which one seeks to be able
to know or comment upon when one is engaged in a "search for
identity."

It is this kind of pattern which one will almost

inevitably name in answer to the question:
person are you?"

"What kind of a

j

Premises of Learning II are enduring enough to be
terms part of one's identity because they are of a high level
of abstraction.

Abstract premises are less modifiable by day

to day interaction and learning.
We suggest that what is learned in Learning II is a way
of punctuating events^.
But a way ojT punctuating is nc.
ru~
or false.
TEere is nothing contained in the propositions of
the learning that can be tested against reality.
It is like

39
a picture seen in an inkblot; it has neither correctness
nor incorrectness.
It is only a way of seeing the inkblot.
(Bateson’s emphasis)
(5*0
r,

..

The premises of Learning II do not. In fact supply a
base from which the details of experience can be deduced.
The actual details which the subject encounters can commonly
be found to fit the orocrustean bed of whatever premises
he has learned. (34)
This means that Learning II premises, because of their
abstraction, are inevitably self-validating.
In fact, the propositions which govern punctuation
have the general characteristic of being self-validating.
What we term "context’' includes the subject's behavior
as well as the external events.
But this behavior is
controlled by former Learning II and therefore it will
be of such a kind as to mold the total context to fit the
expected punctuation.
In sum, this self-validating charac¬
teristic of the content of Learning II has the effect that
such learning Is almost ineradicable.
It follows that
Learning II acquired in infancy is likely to persist
through life.
Conversely, we must expect many of the im¬
portant characteristics of an adult's punctuation to have
their roots in early infancy.
(55)
One further characteristic of Level II premises is that
because they are abstract premises:' learned in Infancy and more
deeply sunk than the premises of Learning I, they tend to be
unconscious.

A person, given clear reflections of bis actions

by those around him, may be able to see the results of his Level
II premises.

For example, "I am foolish, loving, up-tight,

dependent," or whatever.

It Is still very difficult for a

person to be conscious of the actual patterns of punctuation
which go into these statements,

Bateson points out in several

places that the economics of sinking premises makes the unconscious
evolutionarily necessary for human beings.

To be continually

conscious of how one structures one’s perception would overload

one with information while greatly limiting the attention one
could pay to one’s environment.
one perceives is impossible.

In fact full awareness of how

A television set, to use Bateson’s

example, could never be made to report on the screen both «-he
picture it received and all the electronic processes that went
into putting that oicture on the screen.

To do this would take

additional circuitry whose functioning could not be reported on
the screen without additional circuitry .

.

.

The interactional manifestation of Learning II premises
are called "emotions.”

These pre-verbal "signals of state"

are the same precise algorithms* of punctuation which we have
been discussing.

Poets have known for years that the division

between "intellectual" and "emotional" is an arbitrary cutting
of an organic continuum,

Blake said, "A tear Is an intellectual

thing," and Pascal makes the same point (which Bateson maintains
the French as a culture understand better than Americans),
"Le coeur a ses raisons que le raison ne connait point."

(The

heart has its reasons of which the reason knows nothing.)
Describing the emotions as "signals of state" in their
interactional significance, Bateson says:
Signals of state in the language of psychology thus
become either reinforcements or signals about the contingincies of reinforcement in the language which would
describe relationship ...
^
. . , .
Next, I think I should underline the fact which Is

*An ”alg'oVitKm" is "any particular procedure for solving a
certain type of problem" according to the Random House Die,-onary
of the English Language:
Unabridged Edition, Random House,
Hew“7ork,

familiar to all of us:
these signals of state which func¬
tion to define the contingencies of relationship are usually
nonverbal, often unconsciously emitted, and often uncon¬
sciously received.
We do not stop to analyse the structure
and grammar of our relationships while we are participating
in them.
Instead, we trust to the fact that we ere all
members of a culture and have therefore been trained in
expectations regarding the contingencies of relationship.
This training, of course, involves a more abstract order
of learning - learning of a higher logical type - than that
which I was talking about in discussing the triads of stimulus,
response, and reinforcement.
I call it a "higher" type of
learning because the Gestalten with which it deals are larger,
but this is learning about contingencies of relationship
is In general more archaic and more unconscious than the
learning of a single adaptive act.
(my emphasis) (29)
Premises or expressions about patterns of relationship,
whenever they are manifest, involve Learning II.
us with another example of this.

Dreams orovide

Most dreams, according to

Bateson, are pure expressions of relationship with the "true"
relata often exchanged of others.

He gives the example of a

dream about a small man in the desert and a spring on top of
a high mountain.

This dream expresses one possible set of the

contingencies of relationship between a man and his mother.
Like nonhuman mammalian communication, dreams are about rela¬
tionship with no way of designating the true relata and with
no way of expressing tense (time)

or the negative.

They can

only say "doing", never "did" or "will do", and they can say
"this Is happening" but not "this is not happening".

Dreams

often deal with material from very early in life, as they are
expressing patterns of relationship learned early in life of
which the dreamer is often unconscious.
The pattern we are developing here will be used again and

again when we come to try to understand different forms of
psychotherapy in Bateson’s terms.
of a "calculus of personality".
"characteristic" of

It is the crudest beginnings
The more "fundamental" the

person - the higher the logical type of

the interactional premises involved - the earlier in life these
premises were learned - the less available these premises/patterns
are to consciousness.

Using the designations of the different

levels of learning, we can talk specifically about what order
of premise a therapy is trying to correct and what "correcting"
means to that therapy.

But we still have another level of learn¬

ing to discuss.
It may be helpful to recapitulate the levels of learning
out of which the above generalization comes.

This recapitulation

should also be helpful as we move on the Learning III.
Zero learning is characterized by specificity of response,
which—right or wrong—is not subject to correction.
Learning I is change in specificity of response by correc¬
tion of errors or choice wTthin a set of alternatives.
Learning II is change in the process of Learning I> e.g. ,
a corrective change in the set of alternatives from which
choice is made, or it is a change in how the sequence of
experience is punctuated.
Learning III is change in the process of Learning II, e.g.,
a cor re cti ve change in the system of sets' of alternatives
from which choice is made. ...
Learning IV would be change in Learning III, but probably
does not occur in any adult living organism on this earth.
Evolutionary process has, however, created organisms whose
ontogeny brings them to Level III.
The combination o
phylogenesis with ontogenesis, in fact, achieves Level I/.
(Bateson’s emphasis)
(56)
In talking about Learning III we are in areas of experience
where words are inevitably Inadequate and even misleading. We
are trying to describe by conscious use of words a corrective

43
change in the sets of premises of Learning II, when the Learning
II premises are the abstract, archaic and mostly unconscious
premises which make up one's "identity" or "character".

Whst.

Bateson achieves with the help of the Theory of Logical Types
is a clear exposition of the formal outlines, though not the
actual experience, of Learning III.
Bateson points out first that it is possible to exchange
premises of a certain logical type without necessarily learning
any premises of a higher logical type.

It is possible to change

a response learned as a result of Learning I for the opposite
response, also Learning I, without necessarily learning anything
about the pattern of reversal of learning (Learning II).

By

the same token, it is possible to exchange one way of punctuat¬
ing experience for another without increasing one's facility
to make such corrective changes or being able to understand
the pattern involved in the exchange.

Achieving new Learning II

premises does not require Learning III.
The following is Bateson's list of the sorts of changes
he would be willing to call Learning III
(a) The individual might learn to form more readily those
habits the forming of which we call Learning II.
(b) He might learn to close for himself the "loopholes" which
could allow him to avoid Learning III.
II
(c) He might learn to change the habits acquired by Learning
(d) He might learn that he is a creature which can and does
unconsciously achieve Learning II.
(e) He might learn to limit or direct his Learning II.
(f) If Learning II is a learning of the contexts of Learning
then Learning III should be a learning of the contexts of
those contexts.
(57)
Consider again the economics described in the "sinking

of premises.

An abstraction at a higher level gives flexibility

at a lower level.

We must be describing in the term "Learning III"

some abstraction which will give flexibility in the premises in¬
volved in one's identity, or "freedom from their bondage," as
Bateson puts it.
But any freedom from the bondage of habit must also de¬
note a profound redefinition of the self.
If I stop at the
level of Learning II, "I" am the aggregate of those charac¬
teristics which I call my "character."
"I" am my habits of
acting in context and shaping and perceiving the contexts
in which I act.
Selfhood is a product or aggregate of Learning
II.
To the degree that a man [sic.] achieves Learning III,
and learns to perceive and act in terms of the contexts of
contexts, his "self" will no longer function as a nodal argu¬
ment in the punctuation of expression.
(58)
Learning III can be the resolution of the paradoxes
which must develop when one tries self improvement.
says,

When one

for example, "I should not be so dependent," one Is put

in a paradoxical position In which the aim,(being less dependent)
is precluded.

In making the statement, one is moving to a posi¬

tion which is of a higher logical type than that of being
dependent, yet one is still a dependent person.

A member of

the class being described, a dependent person, seeks to comment
on the class as a whole, "I should not be dependent."

One is

in the same paradox as when one Is told to be "spontaneous.
(Being spontaneous on request is the opposite of spontaneity.)
The only difference Is that here one is both the teller and the
told, the commander and the follower, the strong one and the
dependent one.

One car never tell one's "self" what to do.

The split inevitably generates paradox and makes accomplishment
impossible.

It should be obvious, however, that this paradoxical

position is one which most of us are in a great deal of the
time.
Learning III would involve what Bateson calls a "burst¬
ing open" of the categories which made up one's dependency.
Events and interactions which formerly were punctuated similarly,
forming the pattern of dependency would take on a new particu¬
larity as the old unifying pattern of "dependent self" was
transcended.

Each event which was formerly part of a pattern

would take on a new uniqueness. This would involve the resolu¬
tion of the contraries of self-improvement by a redefinition
of each particular context of interaction in such a way that
the unifying concept of "self" was not relevant.
have flexibility in punctuating events.

One would

The habits of punc¬

tuation formerly identified as "my self” would be seen to be
relative,

changeable, situational.

As they became situational,

each situation could be both more immediate (because there were
no rigid Level II premises to be protected)

and more profound

(because one’s experience was congruent with and confirmed under
standings of the most abstract and fundamental nature).
If, as I have suggested above, the creature is driven
to level III by "contraries" generated at level II, then
we mayexpect that'it is the resolving of these contraries
that will constitute positive reinforcement at Level III.
Such resolution can take many forms.
Even the attempt at level III can be dangerous, and
some fall by the wayside.
These are often labeled by psychiatry as psychotic, and many of them find themselves inhibit
from using the first person pronoun.
For others, more successful, the resolution of the c
traries may be a collapsing of much that was lezrn*
a
level II
revealing a simplicity in which hunger leads
Erectly to elting* and the identified self is no longer
in charge of organizing the behavior.
These are

*J6
incorruptible innocents of the world
For others, more creative, the resolution of contraries
reveals a world in which personal identity merges into all
the processes of relationship in some vast ecology or aes¬
thetics of cosmic interaction.
That any of these can survive
seems almost miraculous, but some are perhaps saved from
being swept away on oceanic feeling by their ability to
focus in on the minutiae of life.
Every detail of the uni¬
verse is seen as proposing a view of the whole.
These are
the people for whom Blake wrote the famous advice in the
"Auguries of Innocence:”
"To see the World in a Grain of Sand,
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand,
And Eternity in an hour."
(59)
We will talk at great length later in the study about
people who are driven out of the unifying concept of "self"
by the contraries of Learning II, but who do not achieve
Learning III where the concept of self Is no longer necessary.
These people are commonly called "schizophrenics".
It is important to note that positive reinforcement at
level III involves the resolution of contraries at level II.
This pictures the ultimate state for an individual human being
as a congruence of patterns of all logical types.

Such a con¬

gruence would eliminate the need for the process which we des¬
cribed earlier in which one has to manipulate immediate perception
in order to maintain Learning II premises.

As Bateson has

indicated, the congruence involved in resolutions of Learning II
contraries offers a return to the possibility of immediate
perception.

We will return to this notion at the end of Chapter IV

In our talk of the "resolution of contraries" we have
landed squarely In the realm of the great wisdom literatures
and teachings which humans have evolved.

It will be enough for
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now to note that this is where we are.

Perhaps a little later

in the work we can say a bit more about the terrain.
Learning III is not necessarily a description of the
sort of

awakening which is talked about when one discusses

the great wisdom traditions.

Though "resolution of all con¬

traries" and "total congruence" are certainly synonomous with
as pure a state of’fenlightenment" as a person can achieve,
Learning III can be used to describe far more modest sorts of
changes, as Bateson’s list of what might be called Learning III
indicates.

As this author has experienced it, Learning III

has involved a gradual improvement of the facility for identi¬
fying constellations of feelings and responses with contexts
which "resonate" with, or are isomorphic with contexts of early
childhood.

When such an identification of feeling constella¬

tion with context takes place, new options are available.

For

example, when a comment such as the following can be made,
"The intensity of sadness and loneliness I feel at getting
accidentally separated from my wife in a shopping center has
to do with much earlier experiences of separation and fears of
abandonment," a needless conflict ("Where the hell have you
been?"), can be avoided.
There is
this

time,

little that can be said about Learning IV at

Bateson's mention of it in the listing quoted at

the beginning of our discussion of Learning III is the only time
he ever uses the term.

When we have gone into the nature of

systems in greater detail, we may be able to put a bit of flesh
on the bones which Bateson provides.

H8
PATHOLOGY
In his explanation of levels of learning, Bateson is
talking about a specific system:
considered over time.

an individual human being

Yet the patterns which were described

as reflecting the interaction of the different levels of learn¬
ing, patterns such as the sinking of premises to higher levels
of abstraction to give flexibility at lower levels, the protec¬
tion of abstract premises in the system by the adjustment of
more flexible variables, and the possibility of gaining flexi¬
bility in the abstract patterns which define the nature of the
system by changing the boundedness of the system in relation
to the larger system of which it is a part, these descriptions
are true of any information processing system.

Bateson’s con¬

tribution has been to take the learnings about the nature of
patterns and systems which the fields of cybernetics, systems
theory and information theory have gained and to apply them to
human interaction.
Bateson’s earliest use of the sort of understandings we
have been discussing to illuminate patterns of human interaction
was in his ’’double bind" theory of the etiology of schizophrenia
which he put forward in 1956 along with Jackson, Haley, and
Weakland.

(18)

In that paper he described patterns of inter¬

action in a family which had a schizophrenic member.

This is

a slightly more complicated version of the setting we described
earlier in which the dog endeavored to discriminate between
a circle and an elipse where discrimination was no longer possible.
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The dog’s "embodying the paradox" in its subsequent behavior,
its psychosis, is a paradigm of the process involved in human
schizophrenic behavior.
We hypothesize that there will be a breakdown in any
individual's ability to discriminate between Logical Types
whenever a double bind situation occurs.
The general char¬
acteristics of this situation are the following:
(1) When the individual is involved in an intense rela¬
tionship; that is, a relationship in which he feels it is
vitally important that he discriminate accurately what sort
of message is being communicated, so that he may respond
appropriately.
(2) And, the individual is caught in a situation in which
the other person in the relationship is expressing two orders
of message and one of these denies the other.
(3) And, the individual is unable to comment on messages
being expressed to correct his discrimination of what order
of message to respond to, i.e., his cannot make a metacommunicative statement.
(19)
An example of this sort of communication is seen in the
following excerpt from the beginning of a family therapy session
with a father, mother and their 26 year old son, John, who has
been diagnosed schizophrenic.

John has been hospitalized

following an incident in which he smashed several windows in
his parents’ home. John is bitter about being hospitalized.
Therapist:
(to Mother and Father) How was your Thanksgiving?
Father:
(in a sad voice) I couldn’t eat a bite without
thinking of him. (meaning John)
John:
I want to come home.
Father:
(very angry)
And break more windows?
John in the relationship with his father is in a situa¬
tion in which it is very important for him to discriminate
accurately what sort of message a message is.
father’s
(John)
for his

He takes his

first statement to be an expression of pain that he

is away from home.
father’s pain.

He also takes it that he is to blame

He offers a solution.

The father’s
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second statement seems to tell John that he was completely
wrong about what sort of message his
was.

(father’s)

It Imputes madness and/or badness to John.

first statement
The father's

Intense anger raises the spectre of John's being rejected and
puts the continuance of their relationship In question.

Yet

the cause of this "challenge to the relationship" Is attributed
to John's behavipr.

Any metacommunlcative statement by John

is effectively preempted by this demonstration of how such a
statement would further jeopardize his relationship with his
father.

John’s response in the session was to sit for some

minutes with a glazed look in his eyes.
As Bateson refined his understanding of the "double bind"
situation, he dropped the "binder" and "victim" element of the
formulation,

(61)

Also, the name lent itself to reification.

People tended to think of a "double bind" as a thing.

It is

not a thing, even if thought of as a "thing" which one person
does to another.

The double bind is immanent in the messages

which make a relationship.

In the interweaving of contexts,

that is, of the means of classifying messages, there are embodied
inconsistencies or "tangles", to use Bateson’s later term.
If we return to the family session above, this

later

way of formulating the "double bind" can be illustrated.

Any

message proposes a certain sort of relationship between the
sender and the receiver.

The premises about what sort of rela¬

tionship one is a part of which each person uses in understand¬
ing the "meaning" of a given message are what we have earlier

called LII premises.

Each message in this family proposes a

paradoxical sort of relationship.

In the particular sequence

above, each message is taken by the receiver to propose a rela¬
tionship in which the receiver of the message is the cause of
the sender’s predicament.
cause of his sadness,

Father seems to propose John as the

John, responding to the message, assents

to the content of the message, but proposes the blame be on
the father for being the cause of his hospitalization.

He

reclassifies the relationship that the content proposes.

The

father responds by justifying himself as he proposes John as
the cause of the trouble at home which caused him (John) to
be hospitalized.

This chronic "yes, but" pattern is part of

the LII premises of everyone in the family.
punctuating an interaction into a form,

(i.e.

It is a way of
of understanding

a relationship) which inevitably denies the punctuation in the
particular Instance of anyone who shares the same habits of
punctuating.

In the old sense, John is in a double bind, but

in the more refined way of describing, John shares a pattern
of communication with all the members of his family.
tinually "binds" the other.

Each con¬

Each reinterprets any statement

by the other as blaming to himself and responds in a selfjustifying way.

The other takes the justification as blame

and continues the pattern.

Messages are continually being re¬

classified by each succeeding response.
While communication patterns may be formally similar
throughout a family system, the assumption about particular
roles within the system is quite divergent.

In the family
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above, the formal pattern, that of always assuming- one 5s
being blamed and attempting to restructure the relationship
to one In which the other is to blame, is also a description
of roles individuals take.

The need for someone to blame is

largely filled by the son’s behavior.

This makes the communi¬

cation pattern and relationship premises (LII premises/patterns)
of both parents consistent with their experience without the
marriage relationship having to be the focus.

If the parents

were to focus this habit of punctuation on each other continually,
either their marriage or their ways of understanding relation¬
ships would have to radically change.
LII patterns are the abstract patterns which describe
a whole relationship.

When one person is dominant and the

other submissive, both are learning the formal pattern of the
whole relationship.

This trait is evolutionarily necessary in

human beings largely because of the great complexity involved
in the job of parenting.

Because of the ways humans learn the

abstract form of the whole relationship even while engaging
in only one role, a person can be a competent parent with only
the experience of having been a child in a parent-child relating
system.

Laing calls the phenomenon "mapping"

(185)

and seems

to see it restricting freedom and inducing pathology in family
systems.

The

fact that paradox and therefore pathology are

made possible by the hierarchical nature of human learning does
not make this less necessary.
An example of LII patterns being maintained in a whole
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family system is seen in the common phenomenon of a family
which has a schizophrenic member generating a new sick person
when the original schizophrenic gets better or leaves the system.
Each member of the family shares LII premises which require
that the family have a sick member in order to be experienced
as

consistent.

When the sick member is removed (truly leaves,

not just enters a hospital)
maining family members.

great anxiety comes upon the re¬

This is the intense anxiety of being

in an inconsistent world, one in which one cannot understand
or give form to relationship messages.
are inappropriate.

One's level II premises

Very quickly experience in the system is

made to conform to the premises that organize It.

A formerly

"well" person has a breakdown.
An epitome of this process in which the emotional life
of one member will alter drastically to make the whole system
consistent can be seen in what we will call "emotion transfer"
for lack of a better term.
When two or more persons share the same LII premises
about their pattern of relationship, they "feel" the emotions
which express that this pattern is taking place.

wor example,

in a context of financial distress, both husband and wife
may unconsciously expect their pattern to be one in which one
person Is depressed and the other is comforting and supportive.
At such times the stage is set for what often seems to be a
transfer of emotion.
comforting.

At one moment A is depressed and B is

Shortly, through processes

neither of them can

explain and which neither is likely even to notice, A is

comforting a depressed B.

Here the LII premise in this context

is the pattern of one depressed and one comforting.

If the

pattern cannot be maintained by A being depressed, B will
gradually become so.

Often there is a great deal of unconscious

maneuvering on the part of the "down" person to effect the
switch of roles.

The "feelings" of depression and solicitation

(or any other emotions experienced in relating)

are the individ¬

ual’s expression of patterns of punctuation,LII premises, which
are the transform of the LII patterns embodied in the whole rela¬
tionship.

To put it another way, each person in a

long term

relationship will have LII premises in that context which are
isomorphic with the form of the relationship as a whole.
In discussing the double bind we begin to see the LII
premises in their manifestation as patterns of interaction.
We are in an area of human systems phenomena which seems almost
magical.
self.

Person A can seemingly take B’s depression onto him¬

Emotion seems to transfer by magic from one person to

the other as the more abstract form of the relationship is kept
constant.

One begins to understand the feeling many "schizo¬

phrenics" describe when they call themselves "Crod," "Jesus,"
or "the Virgin Mary."

It Is the experience of taking onto cnc-

self the anger or guilt of others in a family through processes
that seem magical.

The "schizophrenic's" only conclusion can

be "X must be doing it, therefore I must have supernatural
powers."
Perhaps a little more detailed description of the family
above, we will call them the Jones, will make the way LII
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premises interact in a family system more understandable.

We

have said that each of the Jones maintains a similar way of
understanding the messages of the others.

Each experiences him¬

self being blamed whenever the other describes any situation
that is

less than perfect.

Each attempts to communicate in

such a way that the relationship will be redefined so that he
can no longer possibly be to blame.

In this situation, the

punctuation which makes people feel blamed where no blame was
overtly offered introduces the message, "Someone is to blame,"
In the Jones family the youngest child turned out to be the one
to make this pattern consistent.

It is he who makes the family

relating pattern as a whole isomorphic with the punctuation,
the LI I premises of all of the members.

He (John)

feels least

secure in the relationship with his parents and so feels it
most incumbent upon himself to make things be consistent.

He

takes the message "someone is to blame" as an attribution to
himself.

He must be to blame.

know he is being blamed.
ture of other messages.
given him by his

Yet he does not "consciously"

It is only part of the logical struc¬
Since no overt blaming messages were

family until he did something "bad" to actua¬

lize them, he often experienced himself as being blamed though
he could not find the reason for it.

Ultimately he began to

experience voices in his head blaming him.
The message, ."You are to blame," is a paradoxical attri¬
bution.

At the level II it means "If we are to agree on the

form of our relationship, you are to be a Derson who is to blame."
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At Level I It means, "You are doing wrong and should change
if we are to relate satisfactorily." John gradually evolved a
way to resolve the paradox.

He did many things which overtly

made him the cause of blame in his family.

That made the

punctuation patterns of his parents and siblings logically con¬
sistent.

They were not to blame because he was to blame.

Yet

he did the things he did for reasons he couldn’t control (he
was "sick").

He was not to blame.

premises of the

This embodiment of the

family allows everyone, including John, to have

his punctuation, that someone other than himself vras to blame.
Unfortunately, such paradox in human communicating/relating
patterns is extremely costly.

John's resolution of the problem,

that he was to blame but he was not to blame for being to blame,
cost him just what he was trying to keep, a relationship as a
loved son to his parents.

The harder he worked to make his

family's LII premises consistent with his experience, the more
he made impossible relationships as he wanted them to be.

His

resolution of the problem cost him the ability to organize his
own experience into congruent patterns.
When LII premises embody a paradox, the person who has
learned to punctuate relationship messages in this way is
unable to participate in a coherent consistent pattern cf
relating.

This is the situation of people who are called

"schizophrenic".

In John Jones'

case, any relationship in which

he participated which was close or important to him, he organized
into a pattern in which he was "to blame".

He put a great deal
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of energy into structuring and controlling the relationships
in his life, yet he always seemed to find the other person
furious at him for behavior he felt he could not control.
A person who is "neurotic" is someone who operates on
LII premises inappropriate to the context.

He punctuates re¬

lating into patterns which are stylized, inflexible and often
unsatisfactory.

A "psychotic" person operates on LII premises

which embody a paradox and which tend toward the denial of relat¬
ing.

To be inevitably "wrong" at LII leads the psychotic

person to an inability to understand patterns of relating.

In

practice this means he loses the ability to tell what sort of
message a message is.
granted

Nothing in relationship can be taken for

and be assumed to be understood by both parties.

is no place to start.

As Watzlawick, et.

There

al., put it:

Paradox not only can invade interaction and affect our
behavior and our sanity, but also it challenges our belief
in the consistency, and therefore the ultimate soundness,
of our universe.
(223)
We have seen how the attribution, "you are to blame"
is inherently paradoxical and some of the ramifications of
this paradox in John Jones’

life.

A further discussion of

paradox in its more formal logical manifestations will help
us

lay the base for our discussion of psychotherapy and is

offered early in that section.

"Paradox" is the common denomi¬

nator of systems which generate pathology and those that generate
"health" such as psychotherapy.
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PSYCHOTHERAPY
Though Bateson himself has written very little about
the specific ways in which psychotherapy causes change, a
number of people who see him as their mentor have described
this process in detail.

Haley, Jackson, Watzlawick and Weakland

are perhaps the best known of the therapists who have used
conceptualizations derived from the Theory of Logical Types
to describe the way in which therapy causes change.

These

people have talked at length about the "therapeutic paradox"
or "therapeutic double bind".

This is a way of using hierarchies

of contextual meanings which are inevitable in communication
to create paradoxical situations similar to those which were
a part of the cause of the patient’s dilemma.

The therapeutic

paradox, however, is aimed at giving the patient no choice but
to begin to move out of his difficulty.
The phenomenon of paradox is central to the conception
of how therany promotes change.
et.

Paradox, according to Watzlawick,

al., is "a contradiction that follows correct deduction from

consistent premises."

(22*1)

It is possible for a contradiction

to follow correct deduction from consistent premises because
of the hierarchical nature of the world of form.

In mathematics,

semantics and human behavioral communication the confusion of
the name of the class with the members of that class is basic
to the occurrence of paradox.

It is, in other words, the result

of a confusion of Logical Types.
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Consider a classic paradoxical situation.

A barber shaves

every man in the village who does not shave himself.
barber shave himself?

Do°s the

According to the situation as defined,

if the barber shaves himself, he cannot shave himself.
doesn’t shave himself, then he does.
definition of the situation.

If he

The confusion is in the

The barber is part of the identi¬

fication of a class of men, i.e., those who don’t shave themselves
and are shaved by the barber, and he is also a member of that
class, i.e,, when we are discussing how he himself shaves.
As we have seen, this doesn't work.

The solution to the para¬

dox is that there can be no such barber.
Now consider the plight of a. real barber who is ordered
by some authority which he is unable to question to perform
as the situation was originally described.

This is the inter¬

actional model which the "double bind" defines.
Haley, in his book. Strategies of Psychotherapy,(155)
which is dedicated to Bateson, analyses hypnosis and several
forms of psychotherapy.

He endeavors to show that all forms

of therapy depend for their effect on putting the patient in
some sort of paradox.

He uses as a paradigm of this process

his analysis of trance induction in hypnosis.

Hypnosis Is a

way of bringing about changes in the subject’s perceptual,
interactional and even somatic experience all through communi¬
cation.

It is certainly a focused and powerful way of one

person influencing another.
Haley says people are hypnotized by paradox.

They

cvr.
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asked to do things voluntarily and are given no choice but to
comply.

If a subject resists, he is asked to resist.

Anything

the subject does is defined by the hypnotist as being In service
of the hypnosis,. The hypnotist takes complete control of all
LII questions.

He defines the relationship completely.

renders the subject’s usual LII premises irrelevant.

This

When the

hypnotist has taken complete control of the definition of the
relationship while defining the subject’s participation as
voluntary, he asks the subject for involuntary cooperation.
"Your eyelids will be heavy, you cannot open them."
arm is to rise by itself."
Induction.

"Your

This is the second pha.se of trance

When the person responds involuntarily to commands,

Haley says most hypnotists consider the subject to be in trance.
The paradox is in the multi-leveled aspect of who is
in charge.

At first the hypnotist is in charge.

the subject’s voluntary cooperation.

He enforces

He enforces this by

defining any of the subject’s attempts to be in charge as part
of the planned Drocedure.

Prom this position, he orders the

subject to make something happen, to be in charge, but what
happens must be involuntary; the subject must not be in charge
of it.

The subject's only resolution is to experience what is

ordered as happening by itself.

This special state of disorienta-

tion is called trance.
The subject is caused by the hypnotist to reflect in
his patterns of experiencing the same paradox which exists In
the pattern of relating between the hypnotist and subject.

61
The subject is in an enforced voluntary relationship with the
hypnotist and is asked to experience voluntarily involuntarily
(enforced) phenomena.

The pattern of the hypnotic relationship

is isomorphic with the pattern of punctuation induced in the
subject.

This most important point about the form of the inter¬

action Haley does not consider.
The parallel of this process to that in the Jones family
is striking.

The paradox is in the structure of the messages

in the family.

If all is to be consistent, John is to blame,

yet John should not do the things which bring blame upon him.
He must do them and he must not control doing them.

The volun¬

tary vs. enforced nature of this pattern is considerably more
difficult to describe because of the complexity of messages
which demand and preclude one and the same response.

What is

important is the fact that the pattern of John’s personal punc¬
tuation of relationship is isomorphic with the pattern of inter¬
action in the family.

John personally perceives himself not

being to blame, but as being caused to be to blame by forces
out of his

control, in the voices which blame him.

His is a

mirror image of the family’s punctuation come back to haunt
them.

The LII premise of the family is that someone (John)

to blame.

is

Their LI premise is that John should not do things

that bring blame on him.

John’s LI

premise is that he only

does his best, he should not be blamed,

John’s LII premise

as reflected both in his voices and in his actions is that he
is to blame.
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Using the model of hypnosis, which, as we have seen, Is
formally similar to the interaction of learning patterns in
a schizophrenic family, Haley explains psychotherapy as a way
of gaining some control over the way a person "classifies"
messages.

We would say a therapist is able to use paradox to

influence a person’s LII premises.
In working with psychotic people one must initially
overcome the way in which their evolved patterns of relating
deny relationship.

Haley discusses several tactics of forc¬

ing psychotic patients into a relationship with the therapist.
By prescribing the patients "voices", catatonia or whatever,
the behaviors which deny that what the psychotic is doing is
in response to the therapist are redefined by the therapist.
Any evasion is defined as In service of the therapeutic rela¬
tionship.

As in hypnosis, the therapist uses paradox to pre¬

clude the patient’s not relating or not cooperating.
• • .it, Is. necessary to persuade or force the patient to
respond in such a way that he is consistently indicating
what kind”'of relationship he has with the therapist instead
of indicating that what he does is not in response to the
”
With a neurotic, the therapist may attempt to bring about
change in the type of relationship consistently formed by
the patient.
With the schizophrenic, the therapist must
require him to form any type of relationship. ...
When the therapist forces the patient to concede that
he is responding to him, no matter what the patient does,
the patient can no longer continue schizophrenic symptoms.
The further process of therapy is the clarification of what
kind of relationship they are having and the encouragement
of the patient in searching behavior to learn to define
t
different types of relationship with the therapist. (156)(Haley s
emphasis)
The schizophrenic operated on LII premises which are
paradoxical or self-denying.

All relating is wrong relating.
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Only non-relating is satisfactory (unpainful) relating.

For

the schizophrenic the initial therapeutic double bind is a bind
at the level of whether or not there will be relationship.
One cannot not relate to the command of the therapist and there¬
fore cannot not be in relationship and in one that the therapist
is defining.

This is an intervention at the level of interac¬

tional pattern formation.

The therapist offers options to the

patient’s relation-denying patterns by thwarting the patient’s
ability to deny relating.

By placing the patient in an inescap¬

able ongoing relationship, the therapist opens the possibility
of reforming LII premises which are consistent.

As LII patterns

are interactional transforms of LII premises, all relating
involves pattern learning.

One learns the patterns one is a

part of t1ust as one engages in patterns one has learned.

The

therapeutic intervention is, for the schizophrenic, enforced
pattern learning by enforced ongoing relationship.
In the therapeutic relationship the patient is bound to
an experience of the process of pattern formation.

In the

bind is an experiential comment on the fact of hierarchies and
paradoxes.

That this metacomment must be consciously made so

that re-formation of patterns and premises about interaction
can begin Is doubtful.

It is true, however, that people who

have been able to comment at this meta—level often have glimpsed
the resolution of the inconsistencies of their "who am I" pre¬
mises in the loss of "I” which can be involved in L HI.
will deal with this much more fully later.

We

Once the therapeutic relationship can he assumed by
both therapist and client as an important and ongoing interaction,
the form that the interaction will take becomes the central
issue of therapy, according to Haley.

He sees the therapist,

through the paradoxical structure of the therapeutic situation,
remaining in control so that the client's LII premises in regard
to several aspects of relating can be violated.
the

This gives

client the possibility of forming new LII premises about

that particular aspect of relating.

Some of these aspects of

relating which he discusses are seen in his subheadings in the
chapter describing the basic form which the various therapies
have in common:

"Domination by the Undominating," "Dead Serious

Play," "The Benevolent Ordeal," and "Resistance to Change".
While explaining all of these aspects would require too much
space, it seems useful to go through Haley’s discussion of one
carefully.

In this way one of his discussions can offer us an

onportunity for clarifying his approach and adding our own
understandings.
Haley sees psychotherapy, with few exceptions, as being
labeled a voluntary relationship.

Yet the conduct of the rela¬

tionship is often as if it were not voluntary.
The patient is advised that he is seeking help of his
own free'will and the success of the treatment depends upon
his willingness to cooperate and continue the relationship
despite difficulties which might arise.
Within that frame
work of a voluntary relationship, the therapist Indicates
that the relationship is compulsory by insisting that th
patient not miss appointments and defining his attempts
end treatment as resistance to change.
From the patients
point of view, he Is being posed a paradoxical defini’-.on
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of the relationship:
it is compulsory within a
voluntary frame. (157)
Where the relationship is not voluntary, as with many
hospitalized people, Haley sees the therapist forcing the
relationship only until it can be assumed that it will go on
without force.

Then the therapist, by such strategies as mov¬

ing the patient to an unlocked ward or changing to outpatient
therapy, begins maneuvers to redefine the relationship as volun¬
tary.

Once this is achieved the above description applies.
While Haley’s analysis of this asoect of the therapeutic

relationship is concise, he does not relate this analysis to
therapeutic change very well.
This issue continues to be central as the patient is
continually faced with it throughout treatment.
The resolu¬
tion of the problem is the end of treatment. (158)
He then goes on to show that the same "issue" is reflected
in the patient’s unclarity as to whether the therapist is volun¬
tarily treating him or is compelled to do so.
At the other end of the relationship, the patient is
always somewhat uncertain whether the therapist is seeing
him out of choice or as a paid duty - does he choose to see
him or is it compulsory?
...The interest and concern of the
therapist appears within a framework of a lack of sharing
any other aspect of social life together.
The patient has
difficulty clarifying the interest or disinterest of the
therapist and so the voluntary or compulsory nature of the
relationship. (159)
Here again Haley offers an analysis which is potentially
enlightening but can say only that the patient's "difficulty
clarifying" the relationship raises the voluntary/compulsory
issue which is somehow therapeutic.
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Finally, Haley relates the voluntary/compulsory issue
to the life history of people seeking help.

He demonstrates

the relevance of the issue, but says nothing of how such life
experience leads one to interact in therapy or other situations.
"A major problem, particularly for psychiatric patients, is
whether people associate with them because they wish to or be(ause they must."

(160)

This questions arises for children in

relation to their parents,

for parents in relation to their

children and for married partners in relation to each other.
In this area resides the problems of dependency, threats
of abandonment, and fears of separation.
If the issue be¬
comes a major one, a child [or any person in a relationship]
might test the definition of the relationship by running
away or by creating difficulties to see if his parents [the
others in the relationship] really want him. (l6l)
Using our language we may be able to shed a good deal
of light on what is happening in the aspects of relating Haley
describes.
People in therapy have often been described as coming
from families which are excessively bound together or excessively
distant.

In these families we can say that at Level II they

are not voluntarily together.

This message is part of either

the idea "we are so close because we cannot be apart" or "we
would not be together at all if not bound into being a family
by accident of blood."

Within both families the members are

treated as if they do what they do because they want to.

LI

is that what a family member does is his own fault.
The transform of this pattern for any Individual’s exp^r^-

ence is:

LI - "I control what I do, I should do better." and
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LII - a symptom or gambit of whatever kind that is involuntary
and usually aimed at making certain adjustments in the rela¬
tionships in the family.

Since the relationship is involuntary,

strategies which change relating patterns are involuntary.
Therapy reverses this pattern.

A patient is not allowed

out of the set that this is a voluntary relationship.
pattern is one of voluntary relating.

The LII

The LI pattern is one

in which the patient has many demands made on him. Each time
the patient does or does not comply with the demands, the metamessage or LII message is reiterated.

He is choosing to comply

or not to comply.
The individual transform of this pattern of relationship
for the patient gradually comes to be one which makes symptomfree relating possible.

The LII premise involved can be stated:

"One cannot make relationships happen.
both people.

They are voluntary for

I am voluntarily in my important relationships."

This means that at Level I a person can say, "I have a real
right to negotiate how a relationship will be.

I can have

conscious intentionality in relating."
This same principle holds true for the other aspects of
relating involved in psychotherapy.

The formal pattern of the

therapeutic relationship provides a corrective change in the
individual’s pattern of experiencing and participating in
relationships.

Haley realizes this, though he does not stress

it.
The change which occurs In psychotherapy would seem
to be discontinuous; although a patient may improve gradually,
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he appears to change in discontinuous steps.
At one moment
he is in distress and in the next he feels relief.
Typically
he suddenly feels more casual about aspects of his life which
were grimly serious to him. . , .Usually the patient shows
a great flexibility in his strategies with other people.
Presumably the shifts in his organized relationships have
Induced a shlftTn his classification system. (162)(mv emphasis)
Haley's language, largely derived from Bateson's work,
allows us greater breadth in describing the psychotherapeutic
situation by giving the possibility of seeing it as an inter¬
active system.

These insights are carried on with only slight

revision by Watzlawick, Jackson and Beavlns in their discussion
of the "therapeutic double bind"

(225)

and by Watzlawick, Weak-

land and Fish in their discussion of "reframing" and "secondorder change".

(227)

Our language, derived from somewhat lat°r

work by Bateson offers the possibility of saying more specifi¬
cally what is happening in the therapeutic relationship and why
that would involve change for the client.

Our language also

offers a way of assessing the limitations of Haley's.
In hypnosis and psychotherapy the LII questions, the
questions of what form the relationship will take are in the
hands of the therapist, if Haley’s analysis of several different
therapies Is correct.
client.

The

The LI premises are in the hands of the

client is told, "You decide what to do." or

"Keep doing what you’re doing."

This hierarchy is reflected

in the punctuation of the client, most of whose immedia^
experience remains the same, yet gradually it seems to Lavdifferent meaning.

The therapist is able to intervene through

this paradox to make a change in the subject’s LII premises.
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It should be pointed out that this isomorphic relation¬
ship between the overall pattern of relating and the individual's
punctuation is a necessary feature of systems Interacting.

A

smaller system as it becomes more fully integrated into a larger
system, i.e., as it more truly becomes a subsystem, will tend
toward this isomorphic state with the form of the larger system.
The other side of the systemic coin is that the larger system
will be affected in its form by the incorporation of any sub¬
system.

On the level of LII the theranist has offered a. set

structure for the larger system which will adapt toward integra¬
tion of the subsystem, i.e., the client, but will maintain its
essential structure, inducing restructure in the subsystem.
The subsystem of the client's punctuation is rendered ada.ptable
by the paradoxical set up of the therapeutic relationship which
renders the client's previous LII premises unworkable.

The

client is in a system in which new punctuation will have to be
evolved.
The significant shortcoming of Haley's analysis, especially
when stated in systems terms, is that the therapist as a subsystem,
however congruent his punctuation is with the structure of the
larger system, should be considered.

Haley, the dominant,

proponent of an interactional point of view, in the last analy¬
sis

leaves the therapist out.

Not only is the therapist as a

subsystem not discussed, the tenuousness of the ability o^ a
subsystem to control or structure a larger system once that system
is operative is not dealt with.

The therapist offers a certain
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pattern of relating, yet once that system is begun, he has
little power to restructure it.
process.

He is a subsystem in a larger

It may not be coincidental that Haley, Watzlawick,

Weakland and other therapists who use the "theranist in charge"
model practice mostly short term modes of therapy.

The longer

a system runs, the more it is a product of the totality of its
subsystems.

The longer a therapist works with a patient, the

less the therapist is in charge of the total LII form of the
relationship.
In this chapter we have introduced much of the episte¬
mology which is embodied in our language as well as the few
terms which are unique to it.

In our final restatement of Haley

we have begun to use the language to discuss psychotherapy.
There has been no clear demarcation between the development
and the use of the language generally, as such demarcation is
impossible.

As we go on discussing psychotherapy, the language

will be continually elucidated in the context of its use and
so will be in a continual process of development throughout
the rest of the work.
In the next chapter we will examine the work of a man
who first gave Western therapists consistent access to the re¬
structuring of maladaptive LII premises/patterns:
Freud,

Sigmund

In the following chapter we will return to questions

of the whole system of therapeutic interchange and to a possible
curative transform of the whole system for the client, Learning

III.

FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS:

PARALLELS AND PARADOXES

If the language and modes of thinking we have been
developing so far are truly useful, they will have their use¬
fulness in the possibility they offer for discussing phenomena
which have been previously described extensively in other
language systems in ways which are newly Illuminating.

It

would seem that one of the best possible tests of the language
would be to compare it to another language, one that Is already
fairly fully developed and useful to many people to see if our
language offers the possibilities we are describing.

The most

fully developed and widely used language of psychology, psycho¬
therapy and psychopathology is that of psychoanalysis and the
most penetrating exposition of it is in the work of Sigmund
Freud.

In this

chapter we will be talking about Freud's language

of therapy; its development, potentials and limitations, all
within the understandings derived from Bateson's work.

It will

be our thesis that Freud was an observer £ar excellence of
pathology, therapy and human Interaction in general, but that
he was

limited by the intellectual approaches available to him

in his ability to build a language which fully did justice to
the honesty, depth and accuracy of his observations.

In develop¬

ing this thesis, we will begin with a discussion of Freud’s
habits of mind.
Freud, according to Ernest Jones, his most noted biographer.
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was a man who felt compelled toward philosophical speculation
and who thoroughly distrusted this compulsion.

He spent

several of the early years of his work engaged in the study
of the structure of various cells.

Only gradually did he evolve

away from minute scientific research toward the other end of
this spectrum:

metapsychology.

If Jones is correct, Freud

felt a great deal of uneasiness about the direction of his
intellectual evolution and constantly looked to the "hard
sciences" for an antidote.

Though later in his life he was

to warn his students away from too much "fascination with
endocrinology", it was a warning he learned to give from his
own experience.

Everything in his own training had steered

him toward such a fascination.
In medical school Freud was most Influenced by his
teacher Brucke who lived and taught in accordance with a pact
he

(Brucke) had made with other famous German scientists

whom the best known is Helmholtz).

(of

The pact was that they

would endeaver to:
Put into effect his truth:
"No other forces than the
common physical-chemical ones are active within an organism.
In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by
these forces one has either to find the specific way or
form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical
method or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the
chemical-nKysical forces Inherent in matter, reducible to
the force of attraction and repulsion."
(loO) (my emphasis)
Freud was trained In this the best medical tradition
in the world when he was becoming a physician.
tion of scientific excellence.

It was a tradi¬

He learned, as seen above, that

where one encountered an unexplained phenomenon, one always
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sought for an explanation in terms of "forces" and of "attrac¬
tion and repulsion."
his

-It was natural, therefore, that later in

career when he encountered the unexplained phenomenon of

a cure for hysteria, Freud turned to his earlier training for
guidance in developing an explanation.

This cure which involved

patients talking about events which preceeded the onset of their
hysterical symptoms, and finally reexperiencing the emotion
associated with these traumatic events had been discovered
accidentally by Breuer.
It [cathartic abreaction] brings to an end the operative
force of the idea which was not abreacted in the first instance,
by allowing its strangulated affect to find a way out through
speech. (107) (my emphasis)
Freud discovered that physical symptoms could be "caused"
by memories, by "ideas".

For an explanation of this, he turned

to the fundamental laws of the world of substance, the "physical"
world.

To him ideas must have "forces" in order to have

physical effects.

Psychoanalysis as an explanatory system was

built to explain the fact■ that ideas can act as forces in
people’s bodies as well as their lives.

Freud used "energy"

and "forces" as a bridge between the fundamentals of science
and the behavioral data he observed.
this he made a fundamental error.

Bateson believes that in

He and the other scientists

of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should have
turned Instead to the fundamental laws of form, of "ideas."
"The conservative laws of energy and matter concern substance
rather than form.

But mental process, ideas, communication,

organization, differentiation, pattern, and so on, are matters

of form rather than substance(66)
In order to relate our language to Freud's we will begin
by following some of the development of his language with particu¬
lar attention paid to the notion of transference.

We want

initially to look over Freud's shoulder as he attempts to clarify
his notions of what is happening in the therapeutic interaction.
We will gradually insert more and more of our own language into
the process so that the correspondence between the two ways of
speaking can begin to be built.

Where the opportunity arises

on other more isolated points to compare ways of speaking, we
will take it.

Where a paradigm can be used as a small example

of the whole correspondence, it will be used.
Later we will examine the analytic

situation, using

many of Haley's ways of approaching the structure of therapy.
Be>yond a building of a corresoondence between languages, we will
want to use our language as fully as possible to illuminate
the ways in which psychoanalysis is helpful in promoting thera¬
peutic change.
In the article, "Hypnotism and Suggestion"

(1688)

(103),

at the beginning of his career in psychology, Freud is already
at the crux of the issue he will be wrestling with all his life.
He is describing the "connecting link between mental and physio¬
logical phenomena of hypnosis.

.

."

(10*0

He engages quite

honestly the fact that suggestions are both physical and mental.
He is candid that consciousness cannot be localized.

He seems

to generally believe, however, that mental phenomena occur in

75
the cerebral cortex while physical phenomena are products of
the rest of the nervous system.

Every phenomenon must have

a specific cause and a specific place of occurrence.
In discussing the two sides of the issue of the origin
of hypnotic trance, he sets out sides very similar to those
today on the origin of psychotic phenomena.
One party, whose opinions are voiced by Dr. Bernheim
in these pages, maintains that all the phenomena of hypnotism
have the same origin:
they arise that is, from a suggestion,
a conscious idea, which has been introduced into the brain
of the hypnotized person by an external influence and has
been accepted by him as though it had arisen spontaneously.
On this view all hypnotic manifestations would be mental
phenomena, effects of suggestions.
The other party, on the
contrary, insists that some at least of the manifestations
of hypnotism are based upon physiological changes, that is,
upon displacements of excitability in the nervous system,
occurring without those parts of the brain being involved
whose activity produces consciousness; they speak, there¬
fore, of the physical or physiological phenomena of hypnosis.
(105)
Freud sees this as an either/or situation.

He inter¬

prets the first point of view, one which looks for an inter¬
active etiology of specific hypnotic phenomena , as demanding
the conclusion that therefore all behavior of a patient under
hypnosis is

caused by the doctor.

This would make them random,

merely dependent on the idiosyncracies of the hypnotist.

Yet

he knows and states emphatically that hysterical nhenomena
(which are manifested under hypnosis)

are governed by laws.

He never considers that these laws might be the laws of inter¬
action patterns.

He only understands laws in "physical”

phenomena, so he has to opt for "displacement of excitability,"
for the quasi-physical half of his dichotomy.
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In 1904 Freud was clear about what In his therapy was
»

curative:
...The transformation of this unconscious material in
the mind of the patient into conscious material must have
been the result of correcting; his deviation from normality
and of lifting the compulsion to which his mind has been
subjected. (Ill)
Yet bringing the unconscious material into consciousness is
difficult.

The "bringing of this unconscious material to light

is associated with
the patient’s

’pain"’.

"resistance."

(112) So the process is impeded by
And he continues,

If you succeed In persuading him to accept, by virtue of
a better understanding, something that up to now, in conse¬
quence of this automatic regulation by pain, he has rejected
(repressed), you will then have accomplished something towards
his education..,. Psychoanalytic treatment may in general
be conceived of as such a re-education in overcoming Internal
resistances." (113) (his emphasis)
Freud was very conscious of the process which we have called
"protecting central premises."

That central premises

(LII)

change slowly, painfully and not at the drop of an interpretative
hat, Freud was already very aware.

"Resistance" Is his term

for naming this truth about human change nrocess.

Yet In this

article he is very fuzzy about what causes someone to overcome
this resistance

(or in what cases may the person cease to resist).

So far he can only speak of "persuading" a person by offering
a "better understanding."

This is not very satisfactory,

and Freud doesn’t remain with this limited description for long.
By 1910
was

(114)

Freud’s description of how psychoanalysis

curative had evolved toward a more interactional model.

The importance of "resistance" In therapy had been centralized
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and the interaction in the therapy room ("transference”) was
riven a prep-nant but unelaborated mention.
You know that our technique has been transformed in impor¬
tant respects.
At the time of the cathartic treatment we
set ourselves the aim of elucidating; the symptoms, then
we turned away from the symptoms to discovering- the "com¬
plexes," to use Jung’s indispensable word; now, however, our
work is aimed directly at finding out and overcoming the
"resistances," and we can with justification rely on the
complexes coming to light as soon as the resistances have
been recognized and removed,... The mechanism of our cura¬
tive method is indeed quite easy to understand; we give the
patient the conscious idea of what he may expect to find,
and the similarity of this with the repressed unconscious
one leads him to come upon, the latter himself.
This is the
intellectual help which makes it easier for him to overcome
the resistances between conscious and unconscious. Incidentally,
I may remark that it is not the only mechanism made use of
by the analytic method; you all know [he is lecturing to
analysts] that far more powerful one which lies in the use
of "transference." (115)
In this article Freud mentions the possibility of inter¬
actional gain for someone by a flight into neurosis
through illness).

(advantage

He says that when the tenets of psychoanalysis

are more generally understood there will be fewer neurotics be¬
cause the interactional gains

from being neurotic will be lessened

as a greater number of people understand the dynamics of the
disease.

He has to admit, though, that in some cases becoming

neurotic is the least destructive response people can have given
their life situation.

The context as a factor in the meaning

of symptoms is here recognized to be potentially much more
important than intra-psychic process.
In another article in 1910

(116) Freud repudiates

the mere naming of the unconscious material as having "as little
effect on the symptoms of nervous disease as distributing menu
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cards in time of famine has on people's hunger,"

(117)

Both

^^imed interpretation and distributing menu cards for hunger
are examples of intervention at the wrong Logical Type.
Since, however, psychoanalysis cannot disnense with making
this disclosure to patients, it prescribes that two condi¬
tions are to be fulfilled before it is done.
First, by
preparatory work, the repressed material must have come very
near to the patient's thoughts, and secondly, he must be
sufficiently firmly attached by an affective relationship
to the physician (transference) to make it impossible for
him to take fresh flight again. (118)
Transference here seems to be thought of as that attachment
which makes a Datient assent to an interpretation of the ohysician
or continue in therapy in the face of realizations which he would
otherwise renress.
In his 1912 article, "The Dynamics of the Transference,"
Freud begins by describing transference In very similar terms
to Bateson's.

He talks about early learned patterns of relat¬

ing which later are manifested in inappropriate contexts,
structuring those contexts in as much as is possible to fit
expected "impressions."
Let us bear in mind that every human being has acquired,
by the combined operation of inherent disposition and of
external influences in childhood, a_ soeclal individuality
in the exercise of his capacity to love — that is, in the
conditions which he sets up for loving, in the impulses he
gratifdes ’by it, and In the aims he sets out to achieve in
it.
This forms a "cliche" or a "stereotype" in him, so to
speak (or even several), which peroetualiy repeats and re¬
produces itself as life goes on, in so far as external
circumstances and the nature of the accessible love-objects
permit, and is indeed itself to some extent modifiable by
later impressions. (120) (my emphasis)
In Bateson's
tuating experience

language one might say that habits of punc¬
(LII)

are brought into any context.

A
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neurotic

person might be said to be protecting habits of

punctuation which are particularly limiting and usually in¬
appropriate for the context.

He therefore must adjust immed¬

iate perceptions of the context (in this case the interaction
with the therapist)

a great deal to fit the patterns which he

has come to expect and to act on in interactions.

As the re¬

lationship with the therapist becomes more and more important,
patterns learned early in other important contexts, usually
in the context of the family, will be brought to bear.

Yet

these patterns of relating are not and cannot be conscious to
the person (see discussion of L.II above).
Freud’s words are:
The peculiarity of the transference to the physician lies
in its excess In both character and degree, over what is
rational and justifiable — a. peculiarity
which becomes
comprehensible when we consider that in this situation the
transference is effected not merely by the conscious ideas
and expectations of the patient, but also by those that are
under suppression or unconscious. (121)
When Freud attempts to account, here, as in earlier
articles

for the way the transference prevents the patient

from seeing what is happening in his life which the doctor
is describing in his interpretations, he has nowhere to turn
but to an "impact of forces" model.

Bateson would say that

the ways in which LII patterns govern a person’s interaction
with the therapist and structure the persons immediate percep¬
tions, are the necessary ways in which an information processing
system protects these more general and abstract premises from
too precipitous a change.

Such a change might destroy the
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coherence of the whole system by making more abstract premises
Incongruous with more Immediate perceptions.

Freud's account

Is more visually exciting, but', ultimately, less satisfying.
Wherever in our analytic delving we come upon one of the
hiding places of the withdrawn libido, there ensues a
battle; all the forces which have brought about the re¬
gression of the libido will rise up as "resistance" against
our efforts in order to maintain the new condition. (122)
Resistance can only be thought of by Freud in terms of
forces and impacts, in Newtonian terms, while the following
of the "stream of associations" "back" to the most early patho¬
genic experiences is thought of in obviously special terms.
It is an extended elaborate and very comfortably concrete mixedmetaphor.

It is reminiscent of the theme of the quest, the

journey to a goal fraught with opposing forces, obstacles which
must be overcome.
In describing how this process of resistance and trans¬
ference actually occurs in the analytic situation, Freud's
language seems to encompass both the metaphor of the analyst
as knight

arrant riding into the enchanted lands of the patient's

unconscious and a description of the experience which is so
finely observed as to be still quite useful today.
Now as we follow a pathogenic complex from its representa¬
tion in consciousness (whether this is a conspicuous symptom
or something apparently quite harmless) back to its root in
the unconscious, we soon come to a place where the resistance
makes itself felt so strongly that it affects the next associa¬
tions which has to appear as a compromise between th- dema
of the resistance and those of the work of exploration. (123)
This "compromise" association which is the expression
of the complex as allowed by the "resistance" always takes the
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form of an association transferred onto the physician.

"We

conclude from such experiences that this transferred id°e is
able to force itself through to consciousness in rreferenc0
to all other possible associations, just because it also
satisfied the rresistance*"

(124)

Freud is saying that in the psychoanalytic relationship,
when a person is expressing an earlier "complex" of feelings
and way of relating, he always seems to couch this expression
in his way of relating to the therapist.

We might describe

the whole process by saying that as one moves from an inquiry
of a L I idea or bit of behavior toward the earlier learned
and more abstract patterns of punctuation, L II, which give it
meaning, one moves toward unconsciously enacted patterns or
unconsciously exoerienced premises which must find their mani¬
festation in the interaction between client and therapist.
While to someone thinking in Bateson’s terms, this seems per¬
fectly natural, it seemed inappropriate to Freud in 1917.
The

fact that the therapist must be dragged into the person's

expression of his complexes can only be the work of the "re¬
sistance", and once the therapist (or should we say "knight")
is

challenged personally, the battle is joined.
This struggle between physician and patient, between
intellect and the forces of instinct, between recogni¬
tion and the striving for discharge is fought out almost
entirely over the transference—manifestations. (125)
Yet even while he maintains h5.s

ference is

feeling that the trans¬

a servant of the resistance and that the analyst is

In unending combat with the resistance, Freud is too perceptive
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an observer and too honest a reporter not to include a final
note which seems to confirm our model, that it is only by inter¬
acting- in his old inappropriate patterns in the therapy situa¬
tion that the Inappropriateness of these patterns can be experi¬
enced and options developed.
It is undeniable that the subjugation of the transferencemanifestations provides the greatest difficulties fcr the
psychoanalyst, but it must not be forgotten that they, and
they only, render the invaluable service of making the
patient’s buried and forgotten love-emotions actual and
manifest; for in the last resort no one can be sla.in in
absentia or In effigle. (126) (his emphasis)
In the essay on the "On Beginning the Treatment"

(1913)

Freud begins to talk about manipulating the treatment situation
in order to encourage the most helpful transference.

He speaks

of the necessity of establishing a positive transference before
the therapist begins offering interpretations which might be
painful to and resisted by the person in analysis.

The right

kind of transference happens when "...the physician becomes
linked up with one of the images of those persons from whom
he

(patient) was used to receive kindness."

(129)

In our system of speaking we would say that the thera¬
pist endeavors to set a context in which the person will respond
in the ways he has
setting.
in his

for interacting In a nurturing, benevolent

The therapist attempts to provide a context marker

behavior which will allow the client to choose from the

set of alternatives he has in a nurturing situation.

These

alternatives or ways of interacting will in all likelihood
be those learned very early in life since the nurturing situation
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is primarily associated with early childhood.
Freud says that the transference is often enough to
overcome the symptoms of the disease but that "this is merely
temporary and lasts only as
tained."

long as the transference is main¬

Peal psychoanalytic cure, however, comes only when

"the Intensity of the transference has been utilized to over¬
come the resistance."
We might say that the therapist has originally set a con¬
text in which the interaction premises of the client are appropriate.
Therefore the blocking, splitting or otherwise structuring of
experience to fit a very limited set of premises about relation¬
ship is not necessary.

Yet this in itself provides no reworking

of these premises, no Learning II.

It is only in the develop¬

ing and elaborating of the relationship that old patterns become
inappropriate and can be experienced as such.

If Bat«son is

right, that a person’s immediate perception Is structured or
organized by his L II premises, then this should be even more
true

of a person’s memory of experiences.

A person would re¬

member events in a way that conformed to his present patterns
of ordering perception.

In cases where the memory of an ex¬

perience seemed to be not amenable to reconstruction because
the most basic nature of the experience contradicted present
L II premises, one would expect the experience to be forgotten
completely.
This is exactly what Freud describes as happening.

In

most cases he says the true experience is "repressed" by the

substitution of a "screen-memory", a memory which has been
re-worked to leave out painful elements.

In only a few cases

is the whole experience repressed, though in the early work
with hysteria this was thought to be the rule rather than the
exception.

Should one, however, wish to describe the way

early learned patterns of punctuation are involved in later
contexts, the term "memory" with its connotation of an event
or scene consciously remembered is quite inappropriate.

Freud

had no other term and lacked the concept of hierarchy in pattern
learning, yet he was very aware that what he observed was
"memory" of a unique sort.

He clearly supports our description

of L II premises in their behavioral manifestation as abstract
patterns of interaction embodying early-learned experiences of
the structure or "rules" of interaction.

Transference is simply

the attempt by the patient to act on these archaic interaction
patterns when they are no longer appropriate in the new context.
...we may say that here the patient remembers nothing of
what is forgotten or repressed, but that he expresses it
in action.
He reproduces it not in memory but in his be¬
havior; he repeats it, without of course knowing that he
is repeating.
For instance, the patient does not say that he remem¬
bers how defiant and critical he used to be in regard to
the authority of his parents, but behaves in that way toward
the physician.. .as long as he is under treatment he never
escapes from this compulsion to repeat; at last one under¬
stands that it is his way of remembering, (130) (his emphasis)
In speaking about the relationship of transference,
repetition compulsion and resistance, "Freud says "The greater
the resistance the more extensively will expressing in action
(repetition) be substituted for recollecting." (131)

We would
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say that the more abstract the interactional pattem/premises
touched in therapy, the more the client's whole system of premises
would be made incoherent by its quick change, the more immediate
experiences of interaction will be adjusted to protect this
premise/pattern, the more the premise

pattern is unconscious,

the more it will have to be made manifest in action because
it is unconscious and cannot be commented upon.

Because these

premises are so strongly evoked in a context in which the analyst
refuses to participate in the relating pattern in the way that
the client expects, the client is able to experience the whole
form of his LII premises.

This occurs unconsciously at first

as in the nhenomenon which Freud called "repetition compulsion."
The client acts out his old relating patterns at the very point
when he is blocked from remembering experiences of similar
relating.

In analysis he is able to experience the inappropriate¬

ness of these patterns.

Gradually as Learning II takes place,

as relating begins to have different meaning to the patient,
he is able to consciously state the LII patterns on which he
formerly operated.

This is accompanied usually by a rush of

memories which could not be remembered earlier.

Because LII

has occurred, old experiences now "make sense", i.e., take
on coherent form.
Obviously, in its present state, our way of speaking
is not as simple or as clear as Freud's, yet it does not require
speaking in terms
compulsion)

of reified "things" and "forces"

(resistance,

in conflict, the inadequacy and inconsistency of
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which we have already discussed.

The concrete, tangible nature

of Freud’s language invites metaphoric excess, as in the follow¬
ing:

"The past is the patient’s armory out of which he fetches

his weapons

for defending himself against the progress of the

analysis, weapons which we must wrest from him one by one."

(132)

In a lengthy article near the end of his career, "Analysis:
Terminable and Interminable", 1937, the great variation in ways
of thinking about psychoanalytic "cure" which Freud brought
together in what seemed to him a consistent and coherent intellectural approach is very apparent.

He unashamedly uses his most

quantitative, Newtonian, "impact-of-forces" language side by
side with his most subtle descriptions of form, context, and
meaning in psychoanalytic cure.

In this article, Freud’s

habits of thought are carried to their most clear and logical
ends.

Some of the inadequacies of his language can be apparent

to us simply by our having access to other ways of thinking
about phenomena, but many are apparent only because of Freud’s
honest and clarity in setting out his thought and with it the
inconsistencies and inadequacies of which he was himself often
aware.
In describing the "defensive mechanisms" of the ego in
dealing with the instinctual demands of the id, Freud says that
the ego mediates between instinctual demands and external reality.
To give in to these demands would be to place oneself in a posi¬
tion of approbrium in relation first to society around one and
later to the internalized expectation of society, the super-ego.
He involves the "pleasure principle" as over-all heuristic device
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in saying that repression and other reworkings of one's instinc¬
tive demands are all done in the service of avoiding "un¬
pleasure ."
The psychical apparatus is intolerant of unpleasure and
strives to ward it off at all costs and, if the perception
°f reality involves unpleasure, that perception — i.e.
the truth — must be sacrificed. (139)
Freud believed that this applied equally to one's percep¬
tion of "internal" and "external" reality.

Freud's description

of this process begins to parallel Bateson’s description of Level
II premises quite closely.
Moreover these [defense] mechanisms are not relinquished
after they have helped the ego through the difficult years
of its development.
...the adult ego with its greater
strength continues to defend itself against dangers which
no longer exist in reality and even finds itself impelled
to seek out real situations which may serve as a substitute
Tor the original danger, so as to be able to justify its
clinging to its habitual modes of reaction .... The' crux
of the matter is that the mechanisms of defence against for¬
mer dangers recur in analysis in the shape of resistances
to cure. (1*10) (my emphasis)
To restate in our language:

the premlses/ratterrs of

punctuating Interaction, LII premises, which one learns early
In life continue to structure ones experience of interactions
and hence the type of interaction in which one engages, i.e.
they continue to be self validating in later life.

In therapy

the client naturally attempts to structure the interaction to
fit his ways of finding meaning, of punctuation.
Freud goes on to say that patients whose analyses go
very easily, who achieve facile Insight often prove to have
achieved less permanent changes than people for whom analysis
is much more difficult.

We would say that for some people the
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interactive process of analysis with their specific analyst
requires little modification of their LII premises.

Their

role, vis a vis the analyst is "familiar" in the sense of not
beinp new and in the sense of being similar to family experience.
For other people, these specific analytic situations require
a change in LII premises in order for them to make sense of
what is happening.

Freud also knew that the process of an

analysis depended on the specific interactive system established
between patient and analyst.
Amongst the factors which influence the prospects of an
analysis and add to its difficulties in the same manner
as the resistances, we must reckon not only the structure
of the patient1s ego, but the personal characteristics
of the analyst. (141) (his emphasis)
Here we are still talking in terms similar to "habits of reac¬
tion" which Freud used earlier.

Freud, however, uses the

notion of differences in "adhesiveness of libido" in explain¬
ing the phenomenon.

He is in a middle ground between explana¬

tions involved form and those using substance, and the direction
in which he is going for an explanation with which he can be
comfortable is unmistakable.

"Habits of reaction" is not enough

of a "thing" for Freud to stay with for very long.
Finally in dealing with the fact that for some people
in diagnostic categories with which analysis has had great
success, the therapy makes no difference at all, preud turns
to the training and habits of mind he learned some sixty years
earlier.
Nothing impresses us more strongly in connection with the
resistances encountered in analysis than the feeling that
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there
a force at work which is defending Itself by all
possible means against recovery and is clinging tenaciously
to illness and suffering....If we consider the whole picture
made up of the phenomena of masochism inherent in so many
people, of the negative therapeutic reaction and of the
neurotic’s sense of guilt, we shall have to abandon the
belief that mental processes are governed exclusively by
a striving after pleasure.
These phenomena are unmistakable
indications of the existence of a power in mental life which
according to its aim, we call the aggressive or destructive
instinct and which we derive from the primal death instinct
of animate matter.
(142) (my emphasis)
Freud, when he was shown beyond any doubt that people
will repeat patterns that are familiar to them even when these
patterns lead inevitably to pain, found his basic premise that
all behavior is motivated by the desire for pleasure or the
avoidance of unpleasure shaken at the foundations.
see that he had already explained the phenomenon.

He couldn’t
In his

descriptions of the ego’s defending itself against dangers
which no longer exist and even seeking out dangers he uses
the term ’’clinging to its habitual modes of reaction."

All he

lacks is the concept of a hierarchy of "modes of reaction."
He could then explain why it was more important to maintain
one’s habitual modes of reacting (of giving order to experience
in interaction)

than to simply achieve pleasure or avoid pain

in immediate interaction.

Freud couldn’t think about the

difference between LI and LII.
Lacking the notion of hierarchy in patterns of response,
Freud adds to his one major heuristic principle (pleasure)
another opposing one (death instinct).

While this

language is, as we have said earlier, far more developed,
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more tangible and more easily "experienceable" than ours,
it can be seen here that however murky our formulations are,
they are fundamentally more elegant than Freud’s.

We do not

need to compound heuristic devices once the approach is developed.
We have been trying in this chapter to show that Freud's
language for describing what he saw in the therapv he did
would have been better served had he had available to him some
of the concepts developed in the preceding chapter.

Now we

shall try to use our language to show that the therapy Freud
was evolving to help the people he treated can be illuminatingly
understood as a gradual refining of the use of paradox.
Haley alone (163)

and with Donald Jackson (178) has

already described in quite careful detail the paradoxical
nature of the formal structure of the analytic relationship
as it is practiced today by "classical" analysts.

This work

is a refining and specifying of some of the approaches presented
at the end of the last chapter in discussing psychoanalysis.
In the latter article, the authors quote a modern text which
outlines the eight absolutely necessary elements in the prac¬
tice of analysis.

After quoting the list which includes regu¬

larity of time, recumbant position, complete reliance on free
association, etc., they point out:
Granting these conditions, and leaving aside whether they
can be completely carried,out, the question could be raised
whether transference responses by the patient to this situa¬
tion are irrational, inappropriate and regressive, or
whether any other type of behavior is possible given these
conditions. (179) (their emphasis)

Host of the article is an elaboration of this point.

The

point is well made and deserves the attention of anyone who
wants to see the case clearly stated that what was once under¬
stood as intrapsychic phenomena of the patient in therapy can
be every bit as sensibly described as interactional phenomena
when the therapist is included in the account.
always

The point Haley

fails to emphasize and occasionally overlooks completely

is that in order to make sense of the change that the patient
experiences, both the interactional and intrapsychic aspects
of therapy must be talked about.
In the last chapter we made a first attempt to use
Bateson's

language to talk about both intrapsychic and inter¬

actional aspects of therapy.

We tried to show the formal inter¬

action of the two, that one is a transform of the other.

Now

we will try to further demonstrate the potential of this
language in the context of the therapy of Freud.

We will

attempt only to show the potential of this approach.

An

exhaustive treatment would be an enormous task.
We have already dealt at length with Freud's language
about therapy and its development.

Now vie will try to talk

about his technique and the refining of paradox.
Nineteenth Century Europeans and Americans, especially
women, often found themselves in a difficult, even paradoxical
position regarding their thoughts and feelings.

There were

many thoughts or feelings, most notably sexual ones, which
"good",

"pure", "righteous" people were not supposed to have.
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Unfortunately, the prohibition against thinking sexual thoughts
enforces an Inevitable high level of sexual concern or interest.
In the logica]

structure of the prohibition is a continual con¬

cern with these thoughts.
prohibition is in force.

The issue is alive as long as the
Consequently, in farr.iles where sexual

issues were of greatest concern, children learned the prohibitions
most intensely.

These children and adults were the most tor¬

mented by the inherent paradox In their LII premises.

Much of

what they inevitably experienced, they had to not experience.
Among these were the hysterics Freud and Breuer treated. They
were people caught In the same position as the person in hyp¬
nosis who is told he is to keep still and his arm is to rise*
They developed bodily symptoms outside their control.

The symptom

served to help resolve the paradox, at least temporarily.

It

was a way of experiencing and remembering an incident which
otherwise

could not be experienced or remembered because it

did not fit any of the person’s ways of organizing or giving
form to experience.
Breuer discovered accidentally that when Anra C. in her
self-induced hypnotic state talked through and experienced
the emotions of the event just preceding the first appearance
of a given hysterical symptom, the symptom disappeared.

We

have said that "emotion" is the experience of fully participat¬
ing In a relationship of a certain form.

It is the internal

and interactional signal of certain LII premises being in fore...
For Anna 0. the experiencing of these emotions gave options to

93

the usual paradoxical premises she lived with.

She could

remember the thoughts and feelings she had had to forget.

In

her hypnotic state she could experience alternative LII patterns.
This allowed a context in which a "repressed" experience could
be remembered because it could be given form.
It is possible that this intense anxiety which seemed
to be associated with the memory of a repressed incident might
be the anxiety of experiencing one’s LII premises to be in¬
appropriate or inconsistent when confronted with a powerful
experience to which the hysteric was unable to give meaningful
form.
The initial drawback of Freud’s technique was the use
of hypnosis.

Anna 0. had used an hypnotic state as a frame

within which she could experience angry or slovenly thoughts.
This was her "condition seconde", her other state, to which
she repaired in the evening and in which she could experience
the angers and disappointments of the day.

It was her process,

not Breuer's.

Afterwards she always remembered clearly what

had happened.

When Freud tried to use hypnosis to the same

ends, his results were never quite as complete.

The person

often did not remember later the experience under hypnosis.
They may have experienced LII premises under hypnosis which
were more congruent with their Level I experience, but the
amnesia later indicated that Learning II had not occurred.
Perhaps the greatest single refinement of Freud's
technique, the most perfect tightening of the paradox for
helping the hysterical neurotics he was treating was the
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introduction of free association.

Ernest Jones calls the

discovery of free association "a most decisive step in Freud's
scientific life, the one from which all his discoveries emanated."

(181)
Perhaps Freud's clearest and most complete exposition
of free association which he called "the fundamental rule of
psychoanalysis" is in the following; passage from The Interpreta¬
tion of Dreams :
As we fall asleep, "involuntary ideas" emerge, owing
to the relaxation of a certain deliberate (and no doubt
also critical) activity which we allow to influence the
course of our ideas while we are awake....As the involun¬
tary ideas emerge they change into visual and acoustic
images.
In the state used for analysis of dreams and
pathological ideas, the patient purposely and deliberately
abandons this activity and employs the psychical energy
thus saved (or a portion of it) 5n attentively following
the involuntary thoughts which now emerme, and which —
and here the situation differs from that of falling asleep —
retain the character of ideas. In this way the "involuntary"
ideas are transformed into "voluntary" ones. (10F) (his
emphasis)
For a 19th century hysteric,Freud is prescribing the
symptom.

He orders the person to have involuntary thoughts,

any thoughts, no matter how repulsive.

If the person attempts

to operate consistently with the LI I premises he has been operat¬
ing on, if he screens out bad thoughts, he is violating the
"fundamental rule" of the treatment.

While anything the person

says is acceptable, his old ways of classifying messages and
relationships are rendered inoperable.

He has to develop new

LII patterns if he is to remain in therapy.
Psychoanalysis developed into a broader more comprehensive
technique as Freud worked with a wider range of neurotic peonle
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and their symptoms.

The development of the notion of trans¬

ference shows Freud’s gradual incorporation into the treatment
of more and more forms of patients* behavior.

Not only was

anything a person said, no matter how abhorent in other contexts,
taken to be part of the prescribed treatment, gradually any
behavior which the patient showed toward the analyst, no matter
how^ obnoxious, became defined as part of the treatment.

All

LII patterns a oatient might use for defining and organizing
the relationship with the analyst were invalidated by the
analysts definition of them as transference, a necessary period
of acting archaically on the way to recovery.
The main instrument, however,.for curbing the patient's
compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive force
for remembering, consists in the handling of the trans¬
ference.
We render it harmless, and even make use of it,
by according it the right to assert itself within certain
limits.
We admit it into the transference as to a play¬
ground, in which it is allowed to let itself go in almost
complete freedom and is required to display before us all
the pathogenic impulses hidden in the depth of the patient’s
mind.
If the patient does but show compliance enough to
respect the necessary conditions of the analysis we can
regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the neurosis
a new transference-colouring, and in replacing his whole
ordinary neurosis by a "transference-neurosis" of which he
can be cured by therapeutic work.
(133)
We will offer here only one further elaboration on
Freud’s technique.

It is another step toward refining and

specifying the paradoxical situation to make it most appropriate
to specific people.

In his article, "Turnings In the Ways of

Psychoanalytic Treatment" in 1919 he described one of the "new
developments toward which our therapy is tending.'
ing about the best treatment for compulsives.

He Is speck¬
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I think there is little doubt that here the correct
technique can only be to wait until.the treatment itself
has become a compulsion, and then with this counter conrulsion forcibiy to suppress the compulsion of the disease.
C135)
The symptom becomes the treatment.

It is perfect

paradox.
As we will discuss at much greater length in the next
chapter, Freud in his writing: about therapy was concerned
solely with LII issues.

He was attempting to help the patient

bring more and more of his unconscious fantasies and repressed
experiences into the conscious sphere of the "ego".

Patients

who did not have an "ego" that could be reworked in analysis,
i.e.

psychotic patients, were not good candidates for hi§ therapy,

though he hoped that someday his therapy would be extended to
this group.

In Chapter V we will see how John Rosen used

Freudian personality theory to explain the effectiveness of
his therapy for schizophrenics, but had to violate most of
the basic rules of analytic practice to be effective with
these patients.
Freud’s therapy had several distinct characteristics
from our point of view.
1.

Level II premises of the client as they are manifested

in patterns of communication were rendered inoperable through
the uses of free association.
2.

Level II patterns of interaction which the patient was used

to fostering were precluded in the Interaction, between patient
and analyst by the structure of the interaction and by the
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analysts avoidance of ’'countertransference" feelings or acting
out.

All behavior of the patient to restructure the relation¬

ship Is defined as part of the treatment.
3.

Level II premises of the client were forcefully invoked

in the powerful (i.e. parental)

stance taken by the analyst

toward the patient.
4.

In the acting out of his LII premises In the paradoxical

structure of the analytic situation, where all behavior was part
of the cure to be learned about but no behavior gave one control
of the situation, a patient could experience the whole form cf
his LII pattern.
5.

In the promotion of insight into the form of one's abstract

patterns of interaction was a paradigm of the LII premises
inherent in the analytic situation, premises which the patient
thus gradually came to adopt In place of his inappropriate
(pathogenic)ones.
Point # 5 certairilv requires an elaboration.

Freud

had no method nor inclination to describe the LII premises
inherent in the analytic situation.

When he did describe

these premises he spoke only in intrapsychic terms.

The change

to be brought about in analysis was the bringing into the
conscious realm of the ego the unconscious
id.

fantasies of the

In this way one’s unconscious wishes could be accepted

without either being acted upon or overly reacted to (by one's
repressive super-ego).
one's life.

One could have rational control over

Insight is a paradigm of this model In that it
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is "control" over 8 pattern through meta-comment on the pattern.
This model of cure through the understanding and accept¬
ing of one’s unconscious wishes is a metaphor in intrapsychic
terms for the LII premises

fostered by the analytic situation.

The analyst is in the position of the ego.

He encourages all

of the early-learned Interaction patterns of the patient and
accepts them all.

He is not judgmental because he is not defensive.

None of these patterns has power over him.

He has complete

personal integrity throughout the process. Insight puts the
client in the analysts role vis a vis his own patterns.
It should be remembered that In learning the abstract
(LII)

form of an interaction a person learns the form of the

whole interaction.

It was stated earlier that this is evolu-

tionarily necessary for an organism as

complex as human beings

so that an adult can know how to be a parent having only
experienced the interaction in the role of a child.

It is

far too corolex a task to be left to trial and error.
In analysis over a period of time a patient learns
(LII)

the

form of the whole interaction.

When he leaves the

analytic situation these LII premises, largely unconscious,
offer an approach to life in which one can take the position
of the analyst in relation to one’s own sexuality and in rela¬
tion to other people.

One can be accepting, non-judgmental,

and ultimately not controlled by one’s urges or the gambits
of others.

One can have personal integrity.

In the next chapter we will discuss the way in which the
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ultimate integrity of the self, the ego, may leave one in
a paradoxical position at a still hieher level of abstraction.
Eor now we will say that Freud offered neonle freedom fror th°1r
continuous need to keep their minds "clean",

from the Jr

need to deny the highly sexual nature of their experience.

He

gave them a way of accepting their repressed fantasies and
experience without having to "give in" to them.
a person’s being able to control his life.
gift

He fostered

This was no small

for the driven people he worked with.
In this chapter we have tried to delineate the habits

of mind embodied in Freud’s language so that his language could
be clearly and effectively used as a contrast to our own.

Since

a language is an epistomology in operation, it was necessary
to trace the development of Freud's epistomology as we traced
the development of his

language about psychotherapy.

In trac¬

ing the development of Freud's language we also traced the
development of his therapeutic technique.

This meant we had

an Opportunity to use our own language to understand his
therapy.

A language and epistomology, if they are to be truly

useful, will offer fresh access to the familiar.

We hope in

our discussion of Freud that this has been the experience of
the reader.

FREUD, BINSWANGER AND LEARNING III

One of Freud’s students and close friends was also
one of the most Incisive critics of what we have to this point
been labeling the "impact of forces" aspect of Freud’s model
of human personality and of psychotherapeutic change.

Ludwig

Binswanger, the founder of the existential school of psycho¬
analysis, "Da.se in analysis," said that his teacher had failed
to take Into account the most fundamental aspect of what it
is to be human.

While we have criticized Freud’s language

for not being parsimonious in that it needs to compound "basic
principles"in order to explain a phenomenon such as "repetition
compulsion," we have only hinted in the vaguest way that his
language might leave some basic part of human experience un¬
discussed.

In Binswanger’s criticism of Freud, we have a

critique of this limitation to which we also must answer.
In this chapter we will try to give a summary of
Binswanger’s criticism of Freud and to refine and extend our
own language in the light of these ways of understanding.

We

will also attempt to show the relationship of Binswanger’s
approach to our own, though there will not be the attempt to
"translate" his language into ours as was done in our chapter
on Freud.

His language provides a contrast to our own.

In

seeing the different potentials of the two languages we will
have our first clear picture of the limits of our own language.
100
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In our understanding what our language cannot do, we will be
on firmer ground In using it for what it can do.
The critique of Freud by Binswanger with which we will
be concerned is entitled "Freud’s Conception of Man in the
Light of Anthropology."

(72)

It was composed as a commemorative

address on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday.

We will

follow the argument of Binswanger's essay rather closely befor°
beginning our discussion of its relation to the rest of our
language system.
Binswanger says that the impetus for a coherent body
of scientific work is its basic "idea."

To him the word is

a much larger one than it is usually taken to be.

Far more

than a "notion" of an "original thought," it is to him a unique
confluence of culturally and historically specific modes of
apprehending and ordering the phenomenal world which in the
unfolding experience of a specific person are made into a new
form.
The idea behind a scientific work combines the unique
personal-psychological and cultural-historical conditions
that made it nossible with the timeless mission it has to
accomplish In and for the world, namely, the service of
Truth. (73)
An "idea" in Binswanger's sense is generative form.
It gives new apprehension of the world, new understanding, ne^
congruence between formally Incongruous exnerience, new refine¬
ment of perception, new meaning.
The idea behind the work of Freud, according to Bins¬
wanger, is a conception of man which Binswanger calls "homo

.
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natura".

It is an idea of "primal man".

Because it is an

idea, we are not talking about an historical "primal man,"
whether we speak of philogenetic history of the species or
of the ontogenetic history of an individual from "primal"
infant to adult.

"This primal man is not the source and fount

of human history, but Is, instead, a requirement for naturalscientific research."

(7*0 Freud’s idea Is bom of and is gen¬

erative within a soecific realm of thought.
The reductive dialectic used by Freud to construct
his theory of man is, to the last detail, that of natural
science.
In it, his faith that he is discovering something
about the reality of the world finds its proper support,
and with it his sense of awe before the mystery and power
of life tirelessly spurs his work forward.
Freud was not
one to limit his concern merely to the direct object of his
investigations without at the same time being profoundly
aware of the intellectual tool that was his method.
He him¬
self has given us an excellent description of its most essen¬
tial prerequisites.
He speaks of seeking Identity between
differences.
Psychoanalytic investigations show "that the
deepest essence of man is instinctual impulse, whose elemental
nature is the same in all men and which directs him to the
satisfaction of certain primal needs .**(75)
This search
common causes,

for Identity beneath differences,

for the

leads the natural scientist to pay attention to

observed phenomena only when these may lead to some more funda¬
mental force.

As Binswanger puts it, "Natural science never

begins with just the phenomena; Indeed, its main task is to
divest the phenomena of their phenomenality as quickly and as
thoroughlv as possible."
ently:

Freud says it only slightly differ¬

"In our method, observed phenomena must take second

place to forces that are merely hypothesized."

(76)

Thjs is natural scientific knowledge, and to Freud If
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Is the only knowledge.

It consists, in Freud's words, of

"the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observa¬
tions."

Blnswanger points out that the intellectual manipula¬

tion of discrete bits

(observations)

limits one to a certain

kind of knowledge.
We can now characterize the idea of homo natura mor°
preciselv by saying that it is a genuine natural-scientific,
biopsychological idea.
It Is a natural-scientific construct
like the biophysiological idea of the organism, the chemist's
idea of matter as the underlying basis of the elements and
their combinations, and the physicist's idea of light, etc.
The reality of the phenomenal, its uniqueness and independence
is absorbed by the hypothesized forces, drives and the laws
that govern them. (77)
Binswanger carefully sets out the elements of Freud's
conception of man, its

foundation in "bodiliness," the role

of the instincts in translating bodily needs Into psychical
ideas and then into action, the notion of the "wish" as the
form taken by Instinct in the psyche, the mechanism of repression
in response to the constraints of civilization as translated
through the family, and the operation of transference in
psychotherapy In correction of pathogenic repression.
the greatest respect for many of Freud's
possible by this conception of man.

He has

contributions made

Of Freud's relating of

certain motives and behaviors with certain regions of the
body, he says,

"It was ^reud who first gave us a genuine

s omatography of exnerience based on natural-scientific observa¬
tions and constructs.

This Is an accomplishment whose anthro¬

pological significance cannot be sufficiently highly esteemed.
(His emphasis)

(78)
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Binswanger has high regard for the elegance of Freud's
mechanistic view of man.
Dreams Freud's

He quotes from The Interpretatlon of

formula for the action of the derivatives of

unconscious material in consciousness.

"It is as though the

resistance of consciousness against them [the

'derivatives']

were a function of their remoteness from what was originally
repressed,"

Of this Binswanger says:

No one at all familiar with the problems he dealt with
can fail to realize what an enormous concentration of scien¬
tific research and thought was required before even one
sentence in the language of mathematical functional equations
could be formulated concerning the psychic life of human beings. . . . One might even formally express Freud's whole
life work by stating that the idea of homo nature can lead
to the possibility of expressing psychic processes in a
mathematical functional equation.
Freud succeeded In demon¬
strating mechanism at work in what was apparently the freest
reaches of the human mind, thereby creating the possibility
of mechanically "repairing" the mind (with the psychoanalytic
techniques of unmasking and annulling repression and regression
by means of the transference mechanism). * (79)
That Freud should have demonstrated the workings of
"mechanism" in the "freest reaches of the human mind," Binswanger considers potentially helpful in that it enables one to
go forward with a therapy to deal with conditions which earlier
had been inaccessible to remediation.

That Freud would, as

he did, extend his model of mechanism to all of human experi¬
ence, Binswanger finds destructive.

#Binswanger makes a reversal in this statement.
He seems to
say that the possibility for an effective therapy came from
Freud's model of man when the opposite is true,
Freud's model
began as a natural-scientific explanation ^or the effectiveness
of his therapy, though as his career went on each informed
the other.
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The mein result of our Investigation has be«n to establish
that ^reud’s idea of homo natura Is a scientific construct
that is only feasible IT 1^ is based on a destruction of man's
experiential knowledge of himself—a destruction,that is, of
anthropological experience. (80) (his ernhasis)
The word "anthropological" is pivotal here a.nd requires
some discussion.

It is an important word for Heideggar which

Binswanger appropriates.

Ernest Angela translator of Blnswanger,

gives a good brief description of it.
Binswanger uses this word not in its usual American
meaning, which is cultural anthropology, the comparative
study of races, mores, etc., but rather in its strictly
etymological sense, that is, anthropology as the study of
man ("anthropos") and specifically ... the study of the
essential meaning of and characteristics of being human. (70)
Anthropology is a superior science of which Freud’s
natural scientific approach to human beings can only be a part.
That Freudians would claim a primary status for their approach
is the argument Binswanger seeks to counter.

He points out that

the homo natura model can be helpful to anthropology in that
it shows how much can be accomplished by a unified intellectual
approach to human beings.
experience "mechanism"
what is

He welcomes whatever amount of human

is able to subsume for this leaves

left more firmly in the camp of "freedom".

He appreciates

the way in which natural science offers unitary morphological
principles to be found throughout the differences between individ¬
uals or in forns taken by a single Individual, but sees this as
only half an understanding of tha phenomena.
In Freudian "doctrine", the main stress is placed
not upon existence as change, but upon ^hat which persists
and remains amid change, the instinct.
But anthropology
must attend to both the unitary primal form within change
and the multiplicity of change as genuine metamorphosis. (81)
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This

commitment to fundamental morphological principles,

to hypothesized
changes

forces

or drives

robs human beings

of their "being"

space

and time.

ently

contextual and this is

But there is

Heidegger's

"something,"

unchanging1 throughout seeming

"Dasein,"

in any particular

"being there," is inher¬

unaccounted for in natural science.«

according to Binswanger, which continually

bursts the bounds of natural science.
split implied by natural science

In the subject-object

and the subsequent slavish

attention to the object, ther^ is

always

one element

"bracketed

out".
Limiting ourselves to Freud, we need only open one of
his works at random
to come upon this "something."
We see
him, for example, writing of the construction and operations
of our psychic apparatus, or our psyche as that precious in¬
strument by means of which we maintain our lives; we see him
writing about our psychic life, our thoughts.
With all these
possessive pronouns. what is being spoken of is a being that
is presupposed as self-evident, and that is just as selfevidently being bracketed out, namely, existence as ours.
(82) (his emphasis)
In most psychological terminology the

"self"

small objectified entity which is somehow owned,
"my-self".

This

or "Super-ego,"
hypothesized
with the
"self"

self has the same sort

a rather

in the term

as

"Id,"

"Ego,"

a reified entity developed according to certain

laws.

For Binswanger the

"existence" which is

"self" is

any one person.

is the hav^-er and the had,

"myself",

of status

as

is

"having"

While natural science

"leads

determinations,

to the perception,

i.e#,

tion of man in his

actuality,"

linked

Binswanger's

the being that says

the existence which makes
away

closely

"my" in

and "had" meaningful.

from ourselves towards theoretical
observation and destruc¬

anthropology provides

another way,

107
a way "which concerns itself with the conditions and potenti¬
alities of the Dasein as ours, or—what comes to the same thins_
that concerns Itself with the possible kinds and modes of our
existence." (83)

(his emphasis)

Anthropology, by offering a way of comprehending the
modes of human existence, offers to the scientist a fundamental
anproach so often unutilized, the approach to an understanding
of "scientist" as a mode of human existence.
offers an understanding of being as

Taking this approach

"scientist," as "seeker,"

"shaper," and as "spokesman for scientific truth in and for the
world."

And as one understands a specific existence in its

world, a particular mode of being which is a mode of constituting
"world" in the apprehension, the seizing and giving form to
presenting phenomena, all in a certain fashion or according to
a certain "idea", one gains a step toward the elucidation of
the "operation" and "structure" of "being" itself.

So rich an

approach is taken by few scientists, perhaps because in what
they gained they would also seem to lose.

To avowedly approach

"scientist" as a mode of being is tacitly to acknowledge that
there are other, equally valid modes of being.

Human being may

be scientific, artistic, religious, etc., each with its own
forms of reason and with its own access to truth.

A scientist

who understands the interactional nature of his mode of existence,
who has Insight into his ways of knowing, as well as what is
"known",

can no longer claim primacy for scientific knowledge.

Each of these modes of apprehending being represents
an essential form of human existence.
When one form takes

m
on the role of Judge over all the others, then the essence
of man Is leveled or reduced to one plane.
Even though,
therefore, the picture of man formed by natural science*
encompasses all regions of human being, it is unable to rive
unmediated articulation to the intellectual and linguistic
forms peculiar to these regions and is thus unable to exnress
the way man lives within each of these repions. (84)
Natural science cannot give unmediated articulation of
these regions because it seeks both distance and depth. It s«*«ks
distance from its object, to be "objective" in its approach to
nhenomena, and it seeks to plumb the depths of structures and
forces which underlie the phenomena.

Others modes of apprehend¬

ing being, particularly the artistic and religious modes can
more closely approach "unmediated articulation" in these areas.
In talking about science, art, ethics, and religion Binswanger
seems to use the terms "modes of apprehending being," "forms
of existence,"

and "forms of reason" interchangeably.

They are types and modes In which the Dasein exists,
and in which it understands, interprets and expresses
itself.
The fact that all these forms of existence are
possible reveals to us the historicity of the human Dasein;
their actual realization reveals its history. ... As far
back as 1883 Dilthey wrote: "... The Individual always
experiences, thinks, and acts within a historically condi¬
tioned communal sphere."
This is but a corroboration of
what we already knew, namely, that the construction of
every scientific picture of man must begin with a destruc¬
tion of his historicity, i.e., with that which man, as
historical Dasein in the "structural context" of experience,
expression, understanding, and meaning, can objectify. («5)
(his emphasis)
Here Binswanger’s language seems to parallel our own.
"Structural context" is a term for all the important elements
in the "historicity" of each person.

Thus, man inevitably

encounters a world "laden with meaning."

This is his "structural

context of experience, expression, understanding and meaning.
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Yet

only that which can be stripped of meaning,

"components"
i«s, ,

reduced to its

and finally reassembled to form some new meaninr,

that which can be treated "obiectively,"

car. be

approached

by natural science.
By
means the

"historicity"

in the above quotation Binswanger

ability of the existence to elaborate its own coherent

form through time in fee interaction with its

"meaning environ¬

ment ."
Binswanger’s

critique

of Freud's

view is not only thoroughgoing,

it is

also loving.

Freud's

own person and history

aspects

of human existence which were

ectual system.

(Freud was

scientific point of

lacking in Freud's

intell¬

flattered, honored and unconvinced
delivered.)

life's work might be said to have been the

apprehending of modes
in terms

finds

an eloquent expression of the

when he read the essay shortly after it was
Binswanger's

He

of existence of people otherwise described

of mechanistic pathology

(psychosis

and neurosis)

through his use of the work of Heidegger in illuminating the
processes

and structures

of "being"

in its most general

and then attenuating to explain this work to others.
attempt he borrows

In this

from Heidegger a language which is hardly

translatable into English, much less
system such as

sens®,

ours.

into another language

In an incredible work of power and

Intricacy of thought Heidegger attempted to delineate the
phenomenological structure of being,
In-the-world."

(166)

or in his phrase,

"being-

To do this he had to revivify and even
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generate whole language structures, at least for the English
speaking reader.

He wrote a rather lengthy book In an attempt

to reclaim the potential meaning and resonance of .just one word:
"being."

(167)

In Being and Time he used at least five different

rigorously conceptualized words to express the differences of
meaning which are unwittingly lumped under the word "history"
in English.

Most of the nuances and shadings of Heidegger's

language are understood and intended by Binswanger as he applied
the language to his existential analytic studies.
In the richness, complexity and difficulty of Heidegger's
aind Binswanger's language when comnared to the rather straight¬
forward clarity of Freud’s language is an example of the diff¬
erence which the logical type from which one approaches human
beings makes.

Binswanger maintains that Freud misjudged the

logical type from which he is able to speak.
have

Freud would

his natural scientific point of view be the most funda¬

mental explanatory outlook possible on human belng.

Binswanger

says that In fact Freud's approach is merely one mode of exis¬
tence among several equally primary possibilities.

This may

seem to he the efforts of a pupil simply going his teacher one
better by claiming to have a meta-view to his teacher’s view,
but one should understand that Binswanger’s view is fundamentally
less arrogant than Freud's.
the phenomenological mode.

Binswanger stays always within
This means that he always has before

him the knowledge that one can never learn about the human situation
or human experience from outside it.

The subject—object,
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knower-known relationship is ultimately inappropriate in this
case, however much it may facilitate knowing* in certain areas.
Binswanger, with the language of Heidegger, is abl® to Illumi¬
nate aspects of human existence which Freud cannot approach
because he

(Binswanger) has a humbler but more accurate assess¬

ment of what is possible.

The difficulty of Blnswanper’s

language reflects the complexity of speaking within the rhencmenological mode without the simplifying objectivity of natural
s cience.
In the title of this

chapter we listed Binswanger and

Learning III together as if there were some sort of comparability
between Binswanger’s critique of Freud and the understanding
implied by Bateson in the concept of L III.

This implication

is certainly intended, yet in order to say how they are com¬
parable, we will need to first go a bit more deeply into L III.
In speaking about L II in Chapter II we claimed that
the specific Interaction patterns in the psychotherapeutic
situation provided a corrective change in the habits of punc¬
tuating relationships of the client.

We Identified the formal

structure of these patterns as L II patterns which found their
transform in L II premises of the client.

We further said that

the L II premises brought by the client to the therapeutic
situation were mostly transforms of L II patterns of his
early in life.

family

We said that this was a necessary systems

phenomenon, that elements

capable of learning in an ongoing in¬

formational system must eventually come to embody some transform
of the formal structure of the system as a whole.

L III is an
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example of the same systemic phenomenon at one greater level
of abstraction.
Every person has Level III premises whether or not he
has ever achieved the change of these premises which we would
call Learning III,

Level III premises are formal transforms

of the most abstract patterns of relationship embodied in the
culture as a whole.

The Level III premises of most people born

in Western culture are transforms of a basically purposive
approach to "environment" which is embodied in the culture,
Bateson has written extensively about the personal and ecologi¬
cal consequences of a culture in which the immediate purposes
of man, singly or collectively, are final determinants of so
many actions,

(8,

38, ^3,

^6, 60, 62, 63)

One of the clearest

and most enjoyable statements of this point of view Is in
Bateson’s reworking of a very familiar story.
There was once a Garden.
It contained many hundreds
of species--probably in the subtropics—living in great
fertility and balance, with plenty of humus, and so on.
In that garden, there were two anthropoids who were more
intelligent than the other animals.
On-one of the trees there was a fruit, very high up,
which the two apes were unable to reach.
So they began to
think.
That was the mistake.
They began to think purposively.
fey and by, the he ape, whose name was Adam, went and got
an empty box and put it under the tree and stepped on it,
but he found he still couldn't reach the fruit.
So he got
another box and put it on top of the first.
Then he climbed
up on the two boxes and finally he got that apple.
Adam and Eve then became almost drunk with excitement.
This was the way to do things.
Make a plan, ABC and you
get D,
They then began to specialize in doing things the planned
way.
In effect, they cast out from the Garden the concept
of their own total systemic nature.
After they had cast God out of the Garden, they really
went to work on this purposive business, and pretty soon the
topsoil disappeared.
After that, several spcies of plants
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became "weeds" and some of the animals became "pests";
and Adam found that gardening was much harder work. He had
to get his bread by the sweat of his brow and he said, "It’s
a vengeful God,
I should never have eaten that apple."
(39) (his emphasis)
The myth tells both the story of the beginnings of an
essentially purposive culture and of the purposive approach to
the world which would be natural to the members of the culture.
Conscious purpose inevitably requires a subject-object split.
I (subject) do so and so (verb) to that (object).

It is likely

that the development of language had some role in the evolution
of this purposive culture as digital language is essentially
purposive.

That conscious purpose and language are inextricably

linked can be seen in any noun.

A hammer is only a "hammer" in

as much as it has a role in a purposive system.

Otherwise it

is steel and wood in a very arbitrary configuration.
is the assumption of power over the thing named.

All naming

It is not

accidental that the God of the Hebrews had several names by
which "tfe" was known but that no one could say the true name
of God.

To "take the Lord’s name in vain" is to assert one’s

power over the deity.
The language that one is forced to use in Western cul¬
ture has the purposive nature of the culture firmly fembedded
in it.

This language forces conceptualizing which is inherently

paradoxical.

Here Bateson comes to our aid in helping to unearth

the paradox.

Whenever someone says, "I", he is in paradox.

He is a member of a class describing the class as a whole.

When

"I" is used strictly in its denotative significance, when it only
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signifies that what is said is about the person speaking, the
paradox is not carried through in the rest of the sentence.
However, when "I" is connotative, when it has specific descrip¬
tive sorts of overtones to the speaker, the paradox is likely
to ramify into the rest of what is said.

The paradox is more

apparent when some of the other ways we express ourselves are
highlighted.

"Ourselves," for instance, is an example.

Anyone

who says "I", can say "myself", yet which is the being that owns
this self?

The term implies two entities, an owner who says

"my" and a "self" which is owned.

All people in Western culture

who use their language with no sense of being somehow violated
by its most usual structures are in the same position as Freud
with respect to Rinswanger’s critique.

He said that Freud

bracketed out the being who was the subject in phrases like,
"our psyche" or "our consciousness".

The being that says "I",

"myself", etc., is bracketed out of all Western language.
as it is usually used is a concept, not an experience.

"I"

The

experience of being, which is the experiencing being, is lost.
Even the language we must use to describe the loss process is
overly tangible as we speak of "splitting" or losing "half"
the person.

No language does justice to human being as process

and none can describe the injustice of conventional language.
We have spoken of L XI premises as being those unconscious
early—learned habits of punctuating interaction into meaningful
sequences which are best named by descriptions of "character".
A person is "dependent," "aggressive," "happy,

a ^rue ---
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(fill in family or religious name)1', etc.
tions of L II constellations.

These are all descrip¬

The search for identity is a

search for clarity of and perhaps a name for ones L II premises.
A great emphasis on L II premises is natural in a purposive
culture.

Where there is a clear subject and object distinction,

both require extensive definition.

So in a purposive culture,

people may have Intense concern with "who" they are because
they each are a discrete definable entity set apart from their
environment.

These extensive L II structures all are embedded

in a paradoxical L III set of premises.
Learning III would be a corrective change in the usual
Level III premises of people and the culture.

It involves any

increasing of the facility for corrective change in L II
premises.

A person Increases his ability to have options of

L II premises as the unconscious definitions of his character
become less

fixed.

This is movement toward more comfortably

standing within the system that is a person in his environment
rather than constituting purposive systems of which one is the
definor.

It Is

ceasing to embody the highest logical type in

one’s experiential world.
The fact that we are contrasting standing within the
system to a purposive approach to one’s environment does not
mean that the person who stands within is not an agent in the
system of which he is a part.

On the contrary, when one does

not have specific definitions of one’s "seir" to protect or
specific purposes to impose on one’s environment, one is able
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to experience one's agency in the larger system much more clearly.
One can more completely be_ what one is doing because one is
not bound to a particular definition of the doer (oneself).
At the most abstract level it may be possible to experience
one's agency in the immediate interaction of the creation of
form and meaning that is perception.
The manner in which L II premises can structure and
limit perception highlights the interactive nature of perception
itself.

It is the sense that the perceiver has of himself which

is being protected by the limitation of perception.

Perception

is restricted because greater complexity of perception is a
transform of greater complexity of perceiver.
In speaking about L III we have spoken of a corrective
change at Level III allowing a return to "immediate" perception.
This is not meant to imply that Learning III allows one to
perceive in ways which have no redundancy.

It means that one

Is able to return to the Interaction of perception with premises
about perception which do not have to be rigidly protected,
which can evolve and which are complex enough to allow for a
great complexity of perceiving.

This is the direction of the

gain as one moves toward a non-paradoxical stance at Level III.
What Is the experience of functioning with non-paradoxical
L III premises?

Watzlawick, et.

al., in talking about Level III,

try to approach the existentialist's language.
Only from this level can it be seen that reality is
not something objective, unalterable, "out there," with a
benign or sinister meaning for our survival, but that for
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all intents and purposes our subjective experience of
existence is reality—reality is our patterning of some¬
thing that most probably is totally beyond objective human
verification. (226)
When a communication theorist who has a language to talk
ab°ut human interaction tries to use that language to articulate
human being, the results are usually inadequate.

We can talk

very well about patterns and patterns of patterns, but when we
seek to stand within human existence-in-environment, as Watzlawick
does, we still find outselves talking about it.

He denies

’’objective" viewpoints, but can only affirm the opposite of the
same logical type:

"subjective".

This, incidentally, is ever

the problem that Humanism encounters.

In its countering of the

evils of science and objectivity it offers only the often
laughable opposite.
For a language which can offer an alternative to the
subject-object dichotomy, we must turn back to the phenomeno¬
logical mode.

Here is an understanding of non-paradoxical L III

premises which Bateson’s

language can point to, can, as it were,

describe the logical structure of, but cannot nearly adequately
articulate.
Binswanger in speaking of how we can know without ob¬
jectifying says we must let the thing "sneak for itself," express
itself "as it is".
-

However, the "as it is" contains one more fundamental
ontological and phenomenological problem; for we finite human
beings can acquire information on the "how" of a thing only
according to the "world design" which guides our understanding of things.
Therefore, I have to return once more to
__
Heidegger'S thesis of the existence as "being in the world.
.

118

^/hat I want to emphasize here is only the identification
of being-in-the-world and transcendence; for it is through
nhlS-,^nat,we can understand what "being-in-the-world" and
world
signify in the anthropological application.
The
German word for transcending is Uberstieg (climb! np- over or
aMVu’4.!!OUI!uting);
An Ubtpstleg requires,first, that toward
which the Uberstieg is directed and, secondly, that which
is uberstiegen or transcended; the first, then, toward which
the transcendence occurs, we call "world,"whereas the second,
which is transcended, is the being itself (das Seiende selbst)*
and especially that in the form of which a human existence
itself "exists". In other words, not only "world" constitutes
itself in the act of transcending—be it as a mere dawn of
world or as objectifying knowledge—but the self also does
so. (71)
While Bateson*s language is as impoverished as most when
compared to Binswanger’s in the discussion of the phenomenological
structure of being, pathology and therapy, we can use his language
to talk about what Binswanger is doing.

By using the phenomeno-

Iqsrical mode, Binswanger is standing within the process he describes.
The process he describes is of a higher logical type than his
descrlptlons of it.

This is a reversal of the usual relation

of language to what is spoken of and partly explains the necessity
for such a great concern with language which both Binswanger
and Heidegger show.

Binswanger is refusing to assert his views

as the highest logical type in his phenomenal world as is implied
in the subject-object approach to phenomena.
"non-objectifying."

His approach is

It should be remembered that this is not

the opposite of "objectifying," not "subjectifying," it is of
a completely different logical type.

*Seiencl is a noun which can be translated as "a being" and has
elsewhere been rendered by the constructed word "essent." (168)
It is "that which is," "that which manifests itself in being
(sein)".

That Bateson’s language, built from the study of form
is so close to, we might say isomorphic with Binswanger's in
the crucial area of man's relation to his world, may be because
Bateson, as any good systems theorist would, always took his
own theorizing into account as part of the system.

In any one

instance, for example, in discussing schizophrenia, the role
of the "discusser" may not be mentioned, yet, because in other
contexts the formal relation of human knowing to what is known
has been carefully attended to (Chapter II above)

and the formal

relationship between human knowing and schizophrenia carefully
elucidated, ultimately the subject-object split is not invoked.
But though it is a system which attempts to account for the
theorizer and the phenomena together in a coherent whole, it
does not possess the phenomenological immediacy of Heidegger
and Binswanger.

It is a language about experience rather than

a language of experience.

We can go on with our system, know¬

ing we are doing no violence to the existential point of view,
but knowing also that where Learning III is taking place, it
is more likely that a language similar to that of the exis¬
tentialists will be used.

Our language will be useful in

saying what is happening there, in taking the meta-view.
This point has great significance for our discussion
of different forms of therapy.

Learning III is promoted by

a language like Binswanger’s, a language which stands within
the ongoing process of unfolding human being.
is

Learning III

fostered by a language which helps call into question the
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subject-object split, rather than assuming it.

It would

probably be a language which was eliptical, sometimes turning
back on itself to give a sense of the false assumptions embedded
deep within its structure, yet without jumping to the meta-view.
By refusing to take the meta-view and talk about how thing’s
"really” are, the language would force the staying at the logical
type of experience, forcing the user toward an experience of
his own position within the system in the room and in his "world."
Whether or not Learning III Is promoted in a given therapy
situation, assuming the client comes to the situation with the
usual L III premises of the culture described above, is probably
contingent on the therapist’s L III premises as reflected in
his premises with reference to therapy.

These would in all

likelihood be expressed in whether the therapist feels himself
to be standing within a larger process in the room to which he
can only contribute his best and by which he also will be
affected.

A belief In some innate curative force in the patient

is probably a transform of this same basic approach.

It means

that the therapist can do his best to facilitate change, but
in the end is not the causes of change.

Change is a product

of the total systemic interaction among the people in the
therapy situation.

This attitude which might foster L III

Is not necessarily a stated attitude by the therapist.

It must

be embodied In the most abstract structure of the therapeutic
interaction.
It is obvious that the therapist’s most basic approaches
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to other people as reflected in the therapeutic situation are
not the only expression of L III premises encountered in therapy.
Issues of voluntary vs. involuntary therapy, the institutional
context, and whether or not there is money paid for therapy,
while they are largely to be negotiated in the Level II inter¬
action of the therapy because they pertain to the form of the
specific relationship in the specific situation, have embedded
in them abstract assumptions about relating in general which
will effect the L III patterns of the interaction.

What exactly

those assumptions are or how "institutional” structures could
reflect less paradoxical L III premises is a question to*^ complex
for a general treatment.

Some religions of the East would

consider all these considerations as part of the webs of may a
that make up most of our social and political lives.

Maya is

defined by Alan Watts as "the Hindu-Buddhist word whose exact
meaning is not merely illusion’ but the entire world conception
of culture, considered as illusion in the strict etymological
sense of a play (Latin, ludege)."

(219)

For the time being,

we can say that whatever the most abstract formal implications
of the contextual conditions to the therapeutic relationship,
it is likely the experience of options within these structures
can best be reflected in a therapeutic relationship whose most
abstract premises are not exactly isomorphic with those of the
context.

This could be possible in the existential clarity and

compression which is in the nature of the relating of two people
and which is different from the more amorphous relationship
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of one person to his ’’contextual world’’.

In the process which

is relating is a possible clarifying of ’’being”.

It can be

experienced that there must be two in order to relate yet In
the systemic nature of relating the line between the two is
arbitrary.

Experienced over a long period of time with a

therapist whose premises about relating are congruent with
the actual systemic nature of relating, it gradually "sinks in"
for the client.

Premises about relationship (L II)

as they

are worked out, made explicit, and no longer needed, gradually
give way to the meta-experience of relating In general (L III),
The meta-experience of relating, that relating transcends "I"
and "you", allows for the immediate experience of relating in
which "I" is Irrelevant.

Abstract premises become congruent

with most immediate experience.
The word "congruent" may still need further explanation.
We use it to mean "of compatible form,"

Congruence of premises

means one’s premises about interaction of a given level of
abstraction are compatible with one's premises at a higher or
lower level or with one’s premises of the same level evoked
by a very different context.

A schizophrenic person's para¬

doxical LII premises are not reflexively congruent, i.e. not
compatible with any coherent way of organizing experience.
John Jones operated on L II premises that he was not to blame
and that someone In his family was to blame, most likely himseli
In sudden religious conversion often a person experiences a
sudden change at Level III which is not congruent with his
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habits of punctuating interactions, L XI.
world is made anew.

The person is no longer his old self

struggling to get ahead.
ever) ,

For a while the

He is a "child of Christ" (or what¬

Yet if this position of standing within the greater

world system, experienced by the convert as his being surrounded
by the love of God and as a kinship with all other people, is
not supported by a change in form of interactions in which the
convert participates, i,e,, by L II change, he will gradually
revert to his old L III premises.

The people who originated

the practice of cloistering converts were no fools.
Therapy promotes congruence between various levels of
abstraction of premises

learned.

As premises become more con¬

gruent, greater complexity of experience is possible.

With

neurotic people, complexity of experience is curtailed in order
to maintain a restricted congruence, a congruence between
restricted premises and experience.

Psychotic people often

find themselves awash in complexity because they have lost any
congruence of experiencing as the paradox inherent in their
L II premises gradually ramifies throughout their experiencing.
All experience is potentially significant because they have
lost the ability to discriminate what is relevant from what
is irrelevant for them,
"Congruence" and "complexity" are our distillations of
the two most fundamental, or, if you will, most abstract concepts
in Bateson's approach,

Bateson himself attaches no special

significance to either of these specific words and might object

to any distillation to fundamental principles.

It should be

noted that these are fundamental for understanding.
not

They are

fundamental principles such as the nleasure principle or

death principle which propel, as it were, the events of one's
life.

Concepts of this level of abstraction are self-validating

organizing epistomological principles which are useful within
a whole language system such as we have developed here.
ing on their own, they are useless cliches.

Stand¬

Within the language

system they can lend more understandable form to the language
itself as well as to the phenomena discussed in the language.
As we turn away to assess our progress to this point we
discover that at least in its first exposition, our language
is

comnlete.

It has not developed Into a small set of terms

nearly as much as it has been an expression of an epistomology.
The numbered levels of learning or pattern formation have been
practically our only shorthand.
have taken it about as

In the present chapter we

far as it will go for understanding

an individual in the process of developing it.
In the next chapter we will talk about several forms
of therapy using the understandings we have developed so far.
There will naturally be some refining possible as specific
systems are considered.

If what we have been attempting is

a truly useful enterprise, many of these systems should open
before us
ways.

for examination and comparison in newly illuminating
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THE LANGUAGE AND OTHER THERAPIES

We have talked about our language a great deal In the
process of constructing it.
to put the language to work.

In this chapter we will attempt
We want to use the understandings

we have developed so far to assess different systems of psycho¬
therapy.

By ’’assess” is meant an attempt to make clear what

a psychotherapy is attempting, how it goes about accomplishing
its ends, and what about the process is "therapeutic."
We will try not to lose sight of the fact that "a psycho¬
therapy" is a very misleading concept.

The term is simply a

descriptive distillation of the process between two (or more)
people.

It may help to keep this in our minds if we use the

name of the person who developed the system of psychotherapy.
Instead of saying what "Direct Analysis" would do, we will say
what John Rosen would do.

It should be understood, however,

that we are discussing the formal aspects of the interactive
process described by John Rosen.

We do not want to speak in

a way that causes the person of the therapist to be lost, but
we must speak in terms general enough so that the therapist
need not be a specific person.
Further along in this chapter, after we have discussed
three therapies using the language as it has been developed
so far, we will attempt to extend it just a bit further,
ing the identification of premises about interaction with
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patterns of interaction which we made much earlier, we will
attempt to anply our numbered hierarchy of levels of learning
not only to the psychotherapy of an individual, but also to
the therapy of a family system.

Since every attribute of the

interaction between levels of learning has at one time or
another been identified as a basic systems phenomenon, we have
been talking about the individual as a system all along.

Our

hierarchy should be equally applicable to another system, such
as a family.
Using our discussion of Freud*s therapy as a model, we
will discuss the following therapeutic systems:

Gestalt Therapy

of Frederick Peris, "relationship therapy" of Jessie Taft,
Direct Analysis of John Rosen and Network Therapy of Ross Speck
and Carolyn Attneave.
being exhaustive.

None of these discussions will approach

There will be aspects of any given therapy

which cannot be discussed clearly because they are undecidable
in the literature.

There may be a great discrepancy between

what is written about a therapy and the way the process takes
place in practice.

We will only work with what is written.

There will not be an attempt as there was with Freud to discuss
the theory behind the therapy extensively in our terms.

The

purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the potential of our
language for assessing very different therapies built on very
different theoretical foundations in the same consistent set
of terms and understandings.

If the potential of our language

can be clearly demonstrated, the work of this thesis will be
largely completed.

2?
Gestalt Therapy
Gestalt Therapy, as explained by its originator,
Frederick Peris, is centered on the words "now" and "how".
I_ maintain that all therapy that has to be done can
only be done""in the now"
Anything else’ Is- Interfering.
And the technique that lets us understand and stay with
the now is the "awareness continuum," discovering and be¬
coming fully aware of each actual experience.
If you can
stay with this, you will soon come across some experience
which is unpleasant.
For instance, you get bored, or feel
uncomfortable, or feel like crying,
(1B9) (his emphasis)
In therapy or in any other setting a. person has diffi¬
culty staying in the "now".
word "how" becomes relevant.

As these difficulties arise the
A person is asked to focus on

how he keeps himself from being in the now.

Each time a-person

leaves the now, the question of how he is doing this puts him
back into the awareness continuum.

The structure of the approach

is "unbeatable" in the sense that all one’s efforts to define
a different relationship by not following the prescribed pro¬
cedure are simply more processes for one to be aware of, in
which one can experience how one is leaving the "now".
Peris says we run away from the now in various ways, all
of which are in service of maintaining the status quo.
The status quo is holding on to the concept that we are
children. ... We are inf*antITe“Fecause we are_afraid to
take responsibility for the now.
To take our place in
history, to be mature, means giving up the concept that we
have parents, that we have to be submissive or defiant, or
the other variations on the child's role that we play. . . .
Maturation is the development from environmental support
to self-support.
The baby is entirely dependent on environ¬
mental support.
As the child grows up, it learns more and
more to stand on its own feet, create its own world earn
its own money, become emotionally independent.
(190) (his
emphasis)
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The neurotic, according to Peris, is clinging to the
position of the child. In his investment in the past or anxiety
about the future he maintains himself in an immature, emotionally
dependent position.

The neurbtic is a person, as we said in

discussing Freud, whose L II premises are inappropriate in his
present context which calls for "mature" functioning.
Peris approaches L II premises through their manifestaIn the structuring of immediate perception by requiring
the client to continue in "new awareness".

We have talked at

great length about the way one's L II premises structure
one's perception of one's world.

When Peris requires a person

to stay attentive to immediate perception, he forces them to
a reworking of their patterns of perceiving.

By doing this

the person's usual L II premises are rendered inoperable.
. . . most psychotherapies are trying to get to the deepest
depth.,We are trying to get to the outermost surface.
As
every need,
every unfinished situation emerges, we are
being controlled by this emergent need and have to get in
touch with the world to satisfy this need.
We use our
senses to observe, to see what is going on.
The world is
opening up.
This ability to see is health.
Conversely,
the neurotic can be defined as a person who can't see the
obvious, as in Anderson's fairy tale where only the child
points to the obvious—that the king is naked. (191)
As L II premises are rendered inoperable one begins to
struggle to reestablish one's punctuation of relationship.

In

his approach to this phenomenon, Peris is very similar to Freud.
All behavior is acceptable because all behavior is defined as
relating to the patient himself.

He is not confusing, blocking

or otherwise sidetracking the therapist, according to Peris.
He is doing these processes to himself.

Peris is simply there
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to help him experience how he does this to himself.

Freud

defines all behavior as transference, as not really aimed at
the therapist, but at some person from the patient’s early
life.

Peris defines this behavior as aimed at the patient

himself.
For Freud, the definition of behavior as "transferred"
from its proper object allowed him to accept these gambits as
part of the necessary therapeutic process. Peris places patients
in a similar paradox.

Every gambit can be part of the therapy

because the patient is doing it to himself.

This is brought

home as the patient is asked to play all the roles in a given
relationship in which he is attempting to play only one.

A

patient who is determined to be smarter than the therapist
might be asked to be both the more intelligent patient and
the therapist.

This playing of roles in a relationship gives

a quick and powerful experience of the total form of a particu¬
lar L II premise.

This is especially powerfully carried out

in working with dreams, which Peris does a great deal.

As was

referred to in Chapter II, Bateson sees dreams as iconic repre¬
sentations of patterns of relationship between the dreamer and
other people or between the dreamer and his environment.

They

are often L II patterns representationally and metaphorically
experienced.

Peris uses dreams as a way,of facilitating ex-

p erience of a total L II pattern by having a person enact the
different elements of the dream.

In this way the message that

one does what one does in therapy to oneself is reinforced in
that all aspects of the dream are seen as a representation of
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oneself rather than as pointing to referents other than the
dreamer.

The whole of the L II pattern is evoked in the dreamer’s

experience.
The role of the therapist in Peris’ view is one of great
freedom in relating to the client.
by Peris’ use of paradox.

This freedom is guaranteed

He defines his role not as

trying

to change people but as a person helping people to better experience
what they already are.
or wants to be?

And who best knows who the patient is

Peris again avoids the trap.

The patient knows

best.
The more you refrain from interfering and telling the
patient what he is like or what he feels like, the more
chance you give him to discover himself and not be misled
by your concepts and projections. (192)
When the patient attempts to involve the therapist as
a causer of change or as a fixer of his troubled life, Peris
says the therapist must firmly demur.
And you must be very careful to teach your patients
to differentiate between reality and their fantasies,
especially the transference fantasy—where they see you
as a father or someone who can give them the goodies.
Make
them look again and again to see the difference between
this father and you until they wake up and come to their
senses. (193)
With his role protected by the paradoxical definition
of therapist, Peris is free to be spontaneous in dealing with
a patient.

He is able to "trust the wisdom of the organism":

himself.
So, if you feel compelled to
your patients say, esnecially if
hypnotize you, put you to sleep,
the end of the session or of the

listen to all the garbage
they are trying to bore you,
you will be exhausted by
day.
But if you allow

yourself to withdraw when there is no interest , you will
find yourself immediately involved again when something
of interest occurs, (194)
The therapist stays in the now, in his own awareness
continuum.

He is able to be spontaneous because he is not bound

to the patient by obligations in the structured definition of
the relationship.

In this way Peris is able to be a model of

non-neurotic functioning, as he defines it, in the therapy
situation, just as Freud was able in the analytic situation to
model non-neurotic functioning as he defined it, where Freud
kept personal integrity, Peris is spontaneous.
Peris sees neurosis as a five-layered process.
is the phoney layer, the role playing layer.

First

This is the way

people typically first present themselves in therapy. When the
phoniness of their approaches becomes clear, the phobic layer
takes over.

This is the state of reaction of what we are, the

investment in ’’should not’s”.

After this layer is the impasse,

the feeling of deadness, of inability to move.
the implosive layer,

Next

carries

full of energy but energy in tension,

inward directed and fostering no movement or creativity.
is the explosive layer.

Finally

Here one explodes into grief, joy,

orgasm, or anger.
When Peris sees as the layers of a neurosis are certainly
the stages of a typical therapy as he has observed them.

In

the first two stages we see a person working with his old L II
premises.

First he attempts to behave the way he is used to.

Secondly he experiences the other role In most of these relationship
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taken by his parents.

Thirdly comes the impasse.

He can’t go

on with these inappropriate patterns, but he has no others to
organize his relating.

He feels dead.

As the relationship con¬

tinues without his being able to organize it, he feels greater
and greater tens5.on«

Finally the tension is released in an

explosion of spontaneous expression.

There have been lots of

cues all the way along in the "now" orientation of the therapy
that spontaneity is the solution to the bind the patient has
been in.
The L II pattern embodied in the whole therapeutic inter¬
action is one in which person is struggling to be in control,
yet completely tangled up (even talking to himself) while another
person is in complete control and is able to be quite spontaneous.
As a person gradually takes on the L II premises embodied in
the whole interaction to help him make sense of experience when
his original L II premises are no longer viable, he gains an
alternative to his position as a tangled up person struggling
to define the relationship.

Everything in the structure of

the interaction pushes him to learn this pattern quickly and
then to risk trying the spontaneous role.
In our discussion of Freud we listed five ways in which
analysis

caused change in a person’s punctuation of experience.

It is surprising how these same five categories are applicable
to Geatalt Therapy with only a change of- technique in the way
they are approached.

From our discussion so far we can
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say that Gestalt Therapy promotes change in the following
ways:
1.

L II premises usually manifested in the patient's

thinking (internal dialogue)

and communication are rendered

inoperable by the requirement that he remain in the "now".
2.

L II patterns of interaction which the patient is used

to fostering in his relating are precluded by the redefining
of these attempts to foster particular ways of relating as
things the patient does to himself.

All behavior of the patient

to redefine the situation is defined as part of the treatment.
3.

L II premises are invoked in the patient's enacting of

his dreams and as a result of trying to remain in the "now".
They are manifested in "how" the patient exhibits his inability
to remain in the present.

These are the patterns structuring

his perception which prohibit more immediate sensory awareness.
4.

In the enacting of all the roles in a given relationship

or dream, the patient is able to experience the whole form of
the particular L II pattern/premise.
5.

In the building of tension toward an explosion of

spontaneity, there is the experience of a paradigm of the L II
pattern embodied in the whole interaction, L II patterns which
the patient is likely to adopt as a way of giving an organiza¬
tion to perception of relating which was lost when his

former

patterns were experienced as no longer viable.
We have talked exclusively about L II in relation to
Gestalt Therapy because it Is difficult to ascertain how much
L III issues are a part of the therapy. There are some indications

that they are not usually a part of Peris' therapy.

He Is

leary of working with psychotic people, i.e., people who
lost the ability to form L II premises.

While he approaches

the role quite paradoxically, Peris as therapist often seems
to be the controller of the therapeutic interaction.

This

makes him seem not to be "standing within" a larger process
in the room.

Phrases he uses to describe a mature person such

as "emotionally independent" sound like the phrases of a person
who understands the ultimate form of relating in ways very
similar to those described in Chapter IV as usually embodied
in our culture.
Yet the practice may have been very different.

Peris

in many places in his talking about relating uses language
which is quite different from the usual L III premises of the
culture.

The orientation to present awareness is an orienta¬

tion away from "self" awareness and toward systemic awareness.
The trust in the wisdom of himself as total organism rather
than in just his conscious understanding is one expression of
a willing participation in a larger system.

There is certainly

L III wisdom embodied in the tenets on which Gestalt Therapy
is based and a potential for learning L III in the therapy
itself.

If ultimately Peris was true to his word, that he was

not the change agent in the room, if over a long enough period
a patient was able to experience Peris'

trust in the wisdom

of tfie organism that was the therapeutic interaction as well
as his ability to be spontaneous in the interaction, then Gestalt
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Therapy would have been,

for the patient, not only an experience

of other more satisfying ways of punctuating relationships,
but a less paradoxical experience of the most fundamental nature
of relating.
Peris developed a therapy which uses easily descrlbable
techniques.

Because these techniques are dramatic and easy to

describe, the therapy lends itself easily for analysis of the
way in which it fosters Learning II,

The way in which Gestalt

Therapy fosters Learning III is much more difficult to describe
because it depends so much upon the specific therapist and the
degree to which he is able to stand within the greater process
of therapy which is implicit in many of Gestalt Therapy's
theoretical tenets.

It is just this characteristic of this

therapy, the ease with which one can discern techniques which
the therapist uses In fostering Learning II and the subtlety
of the Learning III approaches in the therapy which might make
it a therapy which people who had little sense of Learning III
concerns would practice.

As with psychoanalysis, one would

be an effective Gestalt therapist without reflecting the
Level III wisdom which is often stated in the theory on which
the therapy is

founded.
Relationship Therapy

In the Introduction to her book, The Dynamics of Therapy
in a Controlled Relationship, Jessie Taft talks about the
changes in her conception of therapy over twenty-five years of
practice.
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It has developed from the notion of reform of the
other” through superior knowledge of life and Dsycholorv
a eoncept closely allied to that of scientific control in
the field of emotion and behavior, to my present acceptance
of therapy as presented in this volume, a therapy which is
purely individual, non-moral, non-scientific, non-intellectual,
which can take place only when divorced from all hint of
control, unless it be the therapist’s control of himself in
the therapeutic situation, (212)
This sounds like the testimony of a person who has gone
from a Learning II approach to therapy to one that is more
■

centered around Learning III concerns. Yet it is the "testi¬
monial" ring in the words which is likely to make one forty
years later a bit skeptical.

We will take what she says seriously,

but proceed cautiously.
We said in the last chapter that a L III approach to
therapy would probably be manifested in the therapists "stand¬
ing within" a larger process in the room rather than maintain¬
ing himself as the curer of the patient.

We said that a firm

belief~in a curative force within the client is probably a trans¬
form of the above premise.

We also said that there will

probably be some disjunction of premises between the cultural/
institutional context of the therapy

and those developed

in the relating system in the therapy room.

This disjunction

offers options at the most abstract level in one's functioning
in a cultural context, or, put another way, one's context is
redefined to Involve the most fundamental elements of human
existence rather than the more paradoxical premises discussed
in the last chapter which are encountered in the culture.
Taft's approach fits the above description remarkably
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closely.

She starts her book with a discussion of the therapists

limitations.

The therapist has no power to cure the client

and can only wait for the client to make use of his (the
therapist’s) skills.

She dismisses out of hand all duress in

bringing a patient to therapy as a contradiction in terms.
Therapy under coersion is impossible.
My knowledge and my skill avail nothing, unless they
are accepted arid used by the other.
Over that acceptance
and possible use, I have no control beyond the genuineness
of my understanding of the difficulty with which anyone takes
or seeks help, my respect for the strength of the patient,
however negatively expressed, and the reality of my acceptance
of my function as helper not ruler.
If my conviction is
real, born of emotional experience too deep to be shaken,
then at least I am not an obstacle to the person who needs
help but fears domination.
He can can approach me without
the added fear and resistance which active designs for his
cure would surely produce and can find within the limitation
which I accept thus sincerely, a safety which permits him to
utilize and me to exercise all the professional skill and
wisdom at my command.
On the other hand, the person who
seeks the domination of another in order to project his con¬
flict and avoid himself and his own development by resisting
the efforts of the other to save him, is finally brought to
a realization of the futility of his striving, as he cannot
force upon me a goal which I have long since recognized to
be outside my province and power. (213)
Taft is quick to point out that accepting one’s limitations
in therapy is not a call for passivity.

Far from it.

As I conceive it, the therapeutic function involves
the most intense activity but it is an activity of attention,
of identification and understanding, of adaptation to the
individual’s need and pattern, combined with an unflagging
preservation of one's own limitation and difference. (214)
Taft sees two closely connected themes, or perhaps meta¬
themes, as being central to all therapy:
and the issue of union vs.

separation.

the issue of time
Both themes to her are

experienced in the relating of any one hour as well as in the
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whole course of therapy.

Each hour Is a limited amount of time

to be used which mirrors the most profound fact of human limi¬
tation and mortality.

The gradual development of the patient's

ability to accept this limitation in its immediate and more far
reaching significance is one of the main characteristics of a
"successful" therapy.
Time in itself is a purely arbitrary category of man's
inventionj but since it is a projection of his innermost
being, it represents so truly his inherent psychological
conflict, that to be able to accept it, to learn to admit
its likeness to one's very self, its perfect adaptation to
one's deepest and most contradictory impulses, is already
to be healed, as far as healing is possible or applicable,
since in accepting time, one accepts the self and life with
their inevitable defects and limitations.
This does not
mean a passive resignation but a willingness to live, work
and create as mortals within the confines of the finite.

(215)
The limitations of the therapist in Taft's approach to
therapy are isomorphic with the limitations with which the
patient must wrestle.

She is constantly struggling to be fully

alive and active in the therapy situation while understanding
that she has no power for force a change, beneficial or other¬
wise in the client.

This is an exact mirroring of the issues

she sees the client (and any human being) wrestling with in
terms of the time limitations of each hour and of therapy as
a whole.

Within these limitations, this microcosm of the

general human condition, the nature of relating can be explored
and experienced intensely.
Relationship therapy is an opportunity for the patient
to experience, step by step, his own habitual ways of relating.
It is also a process in which the most fundamental nature of
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relating, inherent in whatever style the patient brinrs to
the experience, can be highlighted and tried out.
Taft sees two basic aspects involved in relating.
is the experience of union,

One

first exemplified in intrauterine

experience and later possible in the dissolution of the usual
ego bounds possible in human relating.

The other is the experience

of separation, of individuality, of independence; the experience
of oneself as "an autonomous creative will."

In the recognition

of both these impulses and the understanding of the ambivalence
in which a person experiencing both is caught there is a possi¬
bility for a therapist to aid a patient in more clearly ex¬
periencing both.

When a patient begins to feel warm toward Taft

she may accept this emotion with a. verbalized understanding
that the opposite emotion is likely just as real and just as
present.

This, she feels, allows the person to stay with one

emotion without having to invoke separation reactions in response
to a therapist’s overly warm response.

Thus the patient is

able to continue toward union, to extend and deepen the experience
of both aspects of relating.
The reason why these experiences in relationship which
I have called therapeutic, work healingly for the individual,
is that there is present always in every human being under¬
neath the fear, a powerful, more or less denied, unsatisfied
impulse to abandon the ego defenses and let the too solid
organization of the self break up and melt away in a sense
of organic union with a personality strong enough to bear it
and willing to play the part of supporting whole.... That such
an intense emotional realization of one human impulse should
arouse equally intense fear goes without saying.
It is the
final overcoming of fear, fear of loss of the self, and fear
of the loss of the other, to the point of taking the exper_enc..
regardless of the consequences, that constitutes the first
victory for therapy. (216)

The therapist need have no worry that the intensity of
the union of the therapeutic situation will lead to the patient'
permanent dependence on the therapist.
The patient does not need to be warded off, except as
he demands response in kind or carries his impulses to
unacceptable union.
He will not cling forever unless he
meets counter-resistance in the therapist.
His own will to
selfhood which has been held in abeyance during this phase
of domination by the love forces, will now of its own* accord
begin to restore the balance and initiate the movement which
leads to separation.
The therapist has only to recognize
it, to admit its
rightness and reality which the patient
is too confused by guilt to confess it openly. (217)
When we read Taft's description of union in a. greater
system and the subsequent promotion of the separation of each
person in the system as the essence of therapy, we are reminded
of our own words in Chapter II describing the basic form of
immediate perception.

"Because there is a perceived outline,

there is difference.

Because there is perceived difference,

there is relationship.

Because there is relationship, there

can be perceived meaning."

It would seem that the union/

separation model of therapy is isomorphic with the most basic
form of human perceiving.
Separation will be difficult, but it is a part of the
therapeutic process every bit as important as the building
toward union in the feelings of the client.
pushed.

It need not be

It will come organically as the patient gradually

returns, or perhaps,

finally comes to an individuated "ego".

The overcoming of the fear aroused in union allows new risks
in independence.

The therapist eases the process by accepting

it, by recognizing the strivings

for separation in the patient

and thereby lessening the guilt which these striving?arouse.
This long course of therapy is mirrored in every hour.
Movements toward union and separation are constantly being made
by the client.
In every hour there will be minor yieldings and minor
withdrawals.
Underneath these shorter surface movements
the patient as well as the therapist feels a deeper current
which flows with a different time span but with the same
Interplay of conflicting tendencies.
The week has its own
ebb and flow, Just like the hour and yet there is a general
trend in terms of a still longer span, which carries the
love impulse to its climax of acceptance and brings the ego
strivings to the final point of rejection of the supporting
relationship and assertion of the independent self. (218)
In our paraphrasing of Taft we have necessarily taken
on some of her testimonial tone.<

It seems inevitable when one

is so clearly speaking of L III concerns.

We have, nevertheless,

tried to carefully report her approach to therapy and we will
now i?ry carefully to say in our language what she seems to be
doing.
One of the most striking features about her approach
to therapy is that even with extensive case material supplied,
it is hard to say exactly what she is doing.

There are minor

instances of technique such as the supplying the negative side
of a patient’s ambivalent feelings toward her so that the patient
can continue longer In the positive side.

There are also nu¬

merous instances of her explicitly stating her limits.
be here foryouat 10 on Thursday."
Tuesday."

"No, I cannot see you

"No, only from 10 to about 11."

with children.)
a technique.

"I will

(She is working

These hardly give one a coherent picture of

1>\2

All we can make of Taft’s therapy Initially is how it
is directed at Learning III.

She certainly stands within a

larger process in the room and sees the potential for healing
as in the patient and in the process between them.

In the

absolute shunning of pressure on the patient to be in or continue
in therapy, she sets up a disjunction from the way relating is
presented culturally in families and institutions.

The patient

is not required to be in the relationship, and there are no
criteria for success as a member of the relating duo.

In her

talk of the patient's experiencing a dissolution of ego bounds
as part of the coming to a more integrated individuality she
describes the L III premises which we said were not paradoxical
and were a change from those usually presented in the culture.
Yet where is the technique and what happened to the patient's
L II premises?
Because her therapy is oriented to Learning III, Taft
never had a particular goal for a patient and so never has a
describable technique for getting someone to the goal.

She

refuses to participate in the patient's attempts to quickly
define the relationship, yet she does so only because she also
cannot and will not supply a. definition.

If her descriptions

are accurate, each definition arises out of the process of re¬
lating and precludes predetermined technique as it is usually
practiced.
The L II premises embodied in the whole relationship
involve two people both subject to human limitations, struggling
to make a relationship.

One of the people is much clearer about

her limitations and therefore can be understanding and clarify¬
ing for the other, should he wish it.

To gradually internalize

the form involved in this whole relationship is to use a punc¬
tuation isomorphic with the most abstract na tnre of relating.
Both people in the relationship are in the same human situation,
and this is emphasized in the way Taft presents herself in
therapy.

The paradoxical position of a therapist who refuses

to be a therapist is supported clearly and consistently by her
most basic beliefs about human interaction.
The fact that Taft sees each hour as involving the same
issues as a long course of therapy and that she takes each hour
for what is possible in it, always acknowledging the patient's
right to have that hour be the last one, means the premises
she works on in the moment to moment interaction are isomorphic
with the premises which inform any particular therapeutic
relationship, which are also isomorphic with her own most deeply
held premises about relating.

One can't find the L II elements

In her therapy because they have the same form as L I interactions
and the L III premises-r
We have shown how other therapists promote change in
a patient's way of organizing and experiencing relating by
five clear methods:

violating a patient's usual communication

patterns, precluding the patient's organizing the therapy rela¬
tionship according to his old L II patterns, envoking his L II
patterns, allowing the patient to experience the total form of
his L II patterns, and providing a paradigm of a new pattern of

relating or premise for punctuation in the situation itself.
It is

like3y that all these aspects of therapy are present

in Taft’s work.

A therapist who believes as she does that he

is limited in his relating with another person, that he cannot
exert any force to "cure" the other beyond his own acceptance
of the other and of the inevitable limitations inherent in
relating, will have no plan or set of behaviors which the
patient must live up to.

This is a paradoxical approach when

expeienced by a patient committed to the usual L III perspec¬
tive.

The patient will expect the therapist to be the fixer

of his

(patient's) troubles.

to do to feel better.

He will expect to be shown what

He will find a therapist who accepts

whatever he does, yet who offers no prescriptions.

With such

a therapist the patient will not be able to structure the
relationship according to his old L II premises.

That this

would render unworkable his usual communication patterns seems
probable.

That it would invoke his L II patterns more strongly

as he attempted to order the relationship in familiar ways
and that he might find the space or freedom in such a situation
to experience the total form of his L II patterns is likely.
That there is a paradigm of a more congruent way of ordering
relating in Taft’s approach to each interaction or each therapy
hour has been stated above.

So, though we cannot offer the

specifics of her technique, we can speculate that someone
watching her work would be able to identify the five charac¬
teristics of therapy which we have elaborated.

Further, we
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can tentatively say that any therapist operating on nonparadoxical L III premises would be found

to

embody the same

five characteristics in his therapy.
Jessie Taft, at least In her writing, presents an
approach to therapy basically congruent throughout.

She does

not talk about what diagnostic categories of people she works
best with.

Such language would be contradictory to her whole

approach.

We imagine that she could be helpful to anyone, but

that for someone who had lost the ability to form relationships
at all, a psychotic person, the process might be very slow.
Also,

for someone who actively denied relating by refusing to

come for sessions, she could not be helpful at all.

In the

next section, we will examine a form of therapy, involving
Learning III which offered fast return to productive relating
for even the people most removed from any ability to relate
coherently.

Direct Analysis
In the late 19^0’s a psychiatrist named John Rosen
began to have remarkable success in bringing back from psychosis
the most regressed schizophrenic patients of mental hospital
poDulations,

His therapy, Direct Analysis, was discovered, he

says, by his own unconscious.

He did what care naturally in

dealing with schizophrenic people, operating on the faith
that schizophrenia was a psychologically induced illness

(a.

radical view for that time)

and that the unconscious of the

therapist must give him his

cues for what to do in therapy, for
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only in his unconscious did the therapist share any experience
with the psychotic.

There was a period of a few years when

Rosen was practicing his therapy and having success, but had
still not evolved a theory to explain what he was doing.
The term "direct analysis" originally described the
direct interpretations by Rosen of the "productions" of the
psychotic * s unconscious.

He offered psychoanalytic interpreta¬

tions of the metaphoric speech of the patient as the patient
spoke.

When he began to amplify the technique a

bit he kept

the term "direct" because it "characterizes my whole attitude
toward the psychotic — the forcefulness, closeness and lack
of formality."
The theory upon which this therapy is based is classic
Freudian psychoanalytic theory.

Rosen uses many of Freud's

characterizations of dreams and dream process for his approach
to the expressions of schizophrenics.
of unconscious

Dreams are expressions

forbidden wishes disguised through the various

dream processes as innocent images.

The innocence of the

images in which the wishes appear keeps the dreamer from
awaking, according to the theory.

Rosen says the psychotic

is in.the same situation and he seeks to "wake up" the sick person
by "unmasking the real content of his psychosis."
Rosen emphasizes that direct analysis is a therapy for
resolving the psychotic stage of a person's illness.

After

having a few patients experience relapses following direct
analytic treatment, he began to routinely have patients undergo
more standard analysis

following their recovery from their acute

psychotic period.

He says that these analyses are generally

quicker and easier than others because the psychotic has experi¬
enced so much of the unconscious and has gotten so many insights
from the direct analytic portion of his treatment.
In discussing the development of his own insights into
psychotic process, Rosen discusses what might be called a
regression in the series of Freudian stages referred to by his
interpretations.

He originally took much of the highly sexualized

talk of his patients at face value and made direct genital and
oedipal interpretations.

He found that he was a bit more success¬

ful with interpretations involving anal cruelty, explosions, etc.
’When he finally began to make most of his interpretations
couched in oral language, greatly utilizing the image of the
baby at the breast, he felt he had found the best way of reach¬
ing a psychotic person.
Psychotics live immediately under the shadow of thfe
breast.
This is able to tell us two things:
first, the
presenting aspect of their psychologic life is again the
earliest infancy and, second, the nature of the breast upon
whom they are so dependent threatens their life. (200)
Psychotics ,according to Rosen, are the victims of "bad
breasts", of unloving mothers in their earliest infancy.

Direct

Analysis is simply a way of correcting for this situation by
giving the sick person the experience of good mothering by the
therapist.
The governing principle of direct analysis is that the
therapist must be loving, omnipotent protector and provider
for the patient. Expressed another way, he must be the
idealized mother who now has the responsibility of bring¬
ing the patient up all over again. This duty must be under¬
taken because the patient has been forced, under heavy psychic
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become
hold further that
o whether or not
tions which allow

again for the moat part an infant,... We
the unconscious of the infant is copnizant
its mother has the unconscious qualifica¬
her to be a benevolent mother. (201)

Again we see Rosen stressing the unconscious of the
therapist.

To him this is the most important element.

It is

an element which is not available to the therapist through
scientific training.

Only a therapist whose unconscious is

so secure that he can launch whole-heartedly into a relationship
whereis cast as all loving and all protecting without any
need for reciprocation from the other and without danger of
losing his sense of his own personal organization and boundaries
can be successful for any length of time doing Direct Analysis.
The patient can tell whether or not one can give oneself whole¬
heartedly.

The process is between a therapist who is able to

be spontaneous and a patient who has no control.
Rosen dives into relating with a psychotic person.

No

amount of slovenliness or uncooperativeness on the part of
the patient deters him.

No amount of sexual or destructive

imagery of the patient^directed at him or at others shakes him.
His message is, ”1 am in control.

I will not let anyone harm

you and I will not let you harm anyone.
make me reject you,

You do not need to

for my love is nourishing, not poisoning.

And besides, you have no choice,

for my love is not contingent

on your behavior."
He will do whatever it takes to force the patient into
relating with him.

With the first patients whom he treated

with this method there was no other possibility of treatment
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than forcing a relationship, and treatment for them was truly
a life or death decision.

Working with people in "catatonic

excitement" or "catatonic exhaustion", a condition reached by
people who will literally die of fright in their schizophrenic
confusion, Rosen listened to their ravings looking for the figure
with whom the fear was associated.

He took on the role of

that figure establishing his credibility and power by correctly
interpreting back to the patient the feelings involved in his
disjointed speech.

He then could assure the patient that he

knew of his sins but that the punishment which the -patient feared
would not be carried out.
Later with other sorts of patients he used other methods
to establish a relationship.

Many of the paradoxical methods

described by Haley for forcing a relationship with a schizo¬
phrenic patient were first used by Rosen.

He would share a

patient's paranoia or delusional system until the bond that
allowed the patient to drop his delusions was established.
Usually there came a time in a treatment when the
patient focused upon Rosen the hatred which he had been unable
to experience in the relationship with his mother figure.

Often

at that time Rosen used attendents and camisol to enforce his
message of benevolent control, but occasionally only his own
physical strength and quickness enforced his message and saved
his own life,
Rosen modeled a L III premise in his therapy which was
non-intellectual, totally consuming and thus non-paradoxical.
He gave himself up to the process in the room, to his urge to
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help the psychotic and to the Interplay of the "unconscious"
between himself and the patient.

He was a Freudian violating

the most sacred rule of Freudian therapy.

He took the systemic

aspect of the relating of the therapist and patient as the
therapist experiences it, the countertransference, and founded
his technique upon it.

To him a psychotic person cried out

fdf'a strong benevolent mother.

This was what moved within him

when he was around a psychotic and so this is the way he
responded.
His therapy was only for the "rescuing" of peoole from
psychosis.

When this was done he carried on what to him was

a classic analysis with people.

Once relating was enforced,

he could help people rework their L II patterns/premises so
that they could relate non-paradoxically.

Rosen’s own ideas

seem to have been very similar to Freud’s at this stage, so
Learning III was mostly involved in allowing people to begin
to relate again.

Once this happened Rosen seems to have offered

a model of relating in the world which embodied the usual L III
paradox.

In order to clarify this idea it will be necessary

to go more deeply into Rosen's view of schizophrenia

and

into how schizophrenia and Learning III are related.
Rosen's model of schizophrenegenic situation being the
baby at the breast can also be described in the terms of the
double bind.
As it becomes

(20*0

A child at the breast Is taking nourishment.

full and satisfied It feels more and more acutely

the tension Its presence is

causing the mother.

Instead of

relaxing from the relief of the tension of hunger, it becomes
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more tense.

The more things should be made right by satis¬

fying hunger, the more they feel somehow wrong.
child feels

full, the more empty it feels.

The more the

It is bound in

opposing communications of different logical types from which
it cannot escape physically or communicatively.

We are describ¬

ing the development of a premise about relating, that all relating
is poisonous and thus is potentially life destroying.
We have come to the same paradoxical premises about re¬
lating which we developed in talking about the Jones family
in Chapter II.

In that discussion we were able to show that

when the formal patterns embodied in the communicational
habits of all the family members were played out in the family
as a whole, the inherent paradox in these patterns became
focused "in" one member of the family who found that he could
only be coherently a part of his family pattern by losing the
coherence of his own punctuation.

To relate, for John Jones,

meant to be the one who was to blame, to destroy relating.

To

him all relating was poisonous, it took away any coherent sense
of himself as he responded in the blame-provoking ways which
made sense only to someone watching the whole family as a system.
Rosen*s baby at the "bad breast" is a powerful, graphic
metaphor which embodies the relationship experience of the
schizophrenic.

We have talked earlier about the way in which

L II patterns rework memories.

Rosen offers schizophrenics

a memory which has great power because it exactly fits their
L II patterns.

It gives a name and coherent pattern to the
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incoherence of their experience.

Unfortunately, Rosen and

many other theorists about schizophrenics have no insight into
the metaphoric aspect of their model,. Many believe in literal
"bad breasts".
The great religions of the world deal in transforms of
our metaphors

for particular L III patterns.

ultimate patterns as humans can know them.

These are the
Some may speak of

the absense of the self, of the void one exneriences when one
experiences congruently with the most basic patterns of being.
They might speak of ultimate paradoxes.

"Each in all, all in

each." Each being is completely systemically defined in nature,
but there must be individual parts to have a system.
tion only through union, as Jessie Taft might see it.

Separa¬
In all

these systems the possibility for true knowledge a human being
has is in having his patterns of experience more and more con¬
gruent with the most fundamental patterns of being.

Inside

and outside become arbitrary when the same form is found both
"places".

Ultimate human

coherence is possible only as part

of a larger coherent pattern.
group of people around R.D.

It is a commonplace among the

Laing in London that one door out

of the morass of schizophrenia is through this sort of knowledge.
For the trapped schizophrenic, the "buck" stops at him¬
self.

Because of his L II premises, his experience is that of

incoherence.

If there is to be coherence in the order of things,

he must make it.

In this he is

forced against the paradox at

L III which we described in Chapter IV.

If he makes coherence,
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his own coherence is the highest logical type he can experience.
He must create the world anew.

He can never stand within a

greater order,

for all the order he has stood within in his family,

was disorder.

The average person can live a "happy", "produc¬

tive" life with basically paradoxical L III premises.

The

world has a congruence, even if he feels no part of it,even
if it is object and he is subject.

For the schizophrenic this

is not possible. There is no congruence, except what he makes
himself.

And this pushes him again and. again against the

paradox of "I".

Any order he makes

cits him off from systemic

involvement in a coherent world.
Rosen offers an escape.

Not only does he offer direct

interpretations which begin to make sense of the patient's L II
premises, he enforces a relationship which for a time removes
the patient

from his paradoxical stance at L III.

Rosen's "I

am In control" means the patient no longer has to be. The form
of the relationship Rosen enforces is isomorphic with a nonparadoxical stance at L III.
The power of this intervention used by Rosen is demon¬
strated Ip a rather remarkable "cure" rate.

According to his

records close to all of the people he worked with who had not
had a great many shock treatments or a lobotomy recovered from
their psychosis.

Why then didn't his method foster many more

people working in the same way?

Possibly the level of commit-

i

ment required of the therapist was one factor,

Rosen occasionally

1

spent 16 hours continuously with one patient if he thought it
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necessary.

The investment of himself in working =with each

individual was very great.

Another reason was that, according

to a highly respected therapist who knew his work well, his
patients seemed to stay non-psychotic as long as they could keep
in contact with Rosen.

(100)

In his person he had taken on an

organizing role for people*s lives and they did not easily make
the shift

from a model of a healthy relation to their world in

their relating with Rosen to a relating pattern of the same
form in which Rosen was no longer central.
lives and he loved them.

He had saved their

Pew wanted to give him up, and this

step wasn't part of the process he had evolved.
Rosen offered an escape from psychosis through an enforced
non-paradoxical experience at Level III, allowing for reworking
of Level II premises.

Yet he did not understand Level III him¬

self,and so never knew what the relation he was modeling meant
outside of his metaphor of good mothering.

He could not say,

"This is just an example of something else.”

He was not trying

to break the bondage of "self", he was trying to allow people
to return to a strong self-concept.

But for the people he worked

with, the reorganization of LII premises depended always on
a more fundamental reorganization, one which to them, had been
done personally by Rosen, i^ifc-.likely that many never were
able to exoerience a world coherent and congruous in and of
itself.

Yet they were saved from chronic hospitalization,

shook or surgery by Rosen’s Intervention.
his people was truly a remarkable service.

What he did for
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Already, having looked at Rosen’s therapy, we find our¬
selves having to slightly revise our prediction that any therapy
which was non—paradoxical at L III would embody the five charac¬
teristics which we identified in the other therapies discussed.
Rosen does not need to invoke L II premises, for instance.
They are everywhere in the metaphoric salad of the patient's
speech.

He is not trying to facilitate the patient's experienc¬

ing the whole of his (patient's)
situation.

relating pattern in the therapy

The patient's relating pattern is expressed in the

non-communicative speech he uses.
pattern is of not relating.

For the schizophrenic, the

Rosen violates the patient's usual

communication and relating patterns in that he finds the patient's
utterances to be communicative and uses them in his enforcing
of a relationship.

Later, when the patient is no longer psychotic,

Rosen's therapy embodies the

five characteristics in the way

discussed in looking at psychoanalysis.
In working with schizophrenics one doesn't need to
invoke and let them experience their particular pattern of
relating.
list of the

One must give them any experience of relating.

Our

five aspects of therapy seems only to apply in

cases in which a person can already form some sort of rela¬
tionship, i.e., can give some order to his experience of relating.
Otherwise we see that the therapy must be directed toward enforcing
any relating, i.e., toward giving a person any order, no matter
how simple or archaic, to his relating.
is seen in the next section.

The other alternative

One could move one's focus from
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the individual to the family in order to find a system which
could function'"' in ordered ways.

Network Therapy
Network Therapy is a technique for intervening to help
a family with a schizophrenic member developed by Ross Speck,
Carolyn Attneave and others.

A discussion of the theory and

technique of network therapy affords an opportunity for us to
extend the use of our language of levels of premises/patterns
of interaction to a family as a system.

Our exposition of net¬

work interventions will be more meaningful after we have laid
the groundwork for discussing levels of learning in a family.
As was discussed in Chapter II, the interrelation of
levels of learning, phenomena such as the "sinking" of generally
true premises and the readjusting of immediate variables to
protect more "hard programmed" variables, are inevitable
phenomena in information processing systems of a requisite com¬
plexity.

We have been using these numbered levels of premises/

patterns of relating in speaking about individuals.

It should

be possible, however, to use these levels in describing other
discreet systems.
Let us consider what we call Learning I for an individual
and, therefore, what it might be for a family.

We said that

Learning I was a change in resoonse within the same set of alter¬
natives, assuming a repeatable context.

At time A a dog does

not salivate in response to a bell and at time B he does.

At

time A a child cannot interpret a given configuration of letters
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and at time B he can read the word correctly.
the change of one or more individuals’

In’ a family

response in a given

repeated family interchange, assuming the situation maintains
the same meaning for the group each time, would be Learning I.
does not mean that each family member experiences the
situation in the same way that other family members do.

It

means that each family member experiences the second situation
in the same way he experienced the first.
For an example of L I in a family we will need to offer
a repeating situation.

Let us say that in a given family the

teenage son repeatedly comes home later than allowed at night.
The father yells at him for being late.
and sulks in his room.

The son becomes sullen

The mother who had backed the father

overtly In the confontation brings the son some milk and cake
because "he must be hungry this late."

A younger sister

becomes angry at her brother for upsetting her.father and makes
sure she is very sunny at breakfast the next day to cheer him
up.
It is easy to understand how this pattern might repeat
with very minor variations.

Learning I would Involve a change

in response of any one member for that would be change in
response by the system.

This would in time alter the whole

pattern, but would not necessarily affect the ways people in
the family understood their relationship with each other.

If

the mother tired of the son’s behavior In this instance and
truly supported the father’s rebukes, the father might rebuke
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less harshly as time went on and the son, losing his ally, would
certainly modify his behavior which also would effect his sister.
The original pattern might well be acted out In other contexts,
but probably the son’s coming home late would cease to be an
issue.

Level I, then, is the level of all the patterns of

interaction the family could have without changing the way
that each understood his relationship with the other.
Learning II for an individual and for a family is a
change in the set of alternatives from which one selects a
response.

As with an Individual, Learning II in a family is

hard to distinguish by observation.

The son in our mythical

family might come home late and find no one responded.
this Learning I

or Learning

II?

Is

Have people figured a

better way of dealing with lateness or have the relating
premises in the family altered?

If the son is able to initiate

the whole sequence again by announcing,

for example, that he

was experimenting with drugs, then Learning II has not occurred.
To change the set of alternatives in a relationship is
synonomous with changing the form of the relationship.

When

this occurs a given action by one or the other person has a
different meaning to both people from its meaning in the
previous relationship.
The inevitable changes in the age and the competencies
of children in a family normally enforce Learning II.

Relation¬

ships must change form as a baby changes to an adult.

The diffi¬

culty of this L II change is demonstrated by the turmoil in
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families which often accompanies a child reaching adolescence
or reaching the age of separation from the family.
It is common that when a family is unable to shift
Level II pattems/premises when the pressure of a child's
development would normally make this necessary, maladaptive
coping patterns in service of maintaining old L II premises
lead one or more of the family members to be identified as
needing psychiatric help.

It is a commonplace in psychotherapy

that often a "successful" therapy for one member of the family
seems to result in the breakdown of another.

In these cases

the therapeutic intervention succeeded in allowing a shift
In roles in the family, but did not result in any change in
overall relating patterns, i.e., there was no Learning II
for the family system.
Learning III for an individual is a re-drawing or freeingup of the self/environment boundaries, a fundamental shift in
the approach to all relating.

It is the creating of options

within a system by temporarily or permanently redefining the
system itself.
or perm aient
the notion

Learning III for a family would be a temporary

redefining of the boundaries of the system so that
"family" would become irrelevant.

what network therapy attempts to facilitate.

This is exactly
The experience

of this particular redrawing of systems boundaries Speck and
Attneave call the "network effect."
Network Therapy was first attempted by Ross Speck as the
only alternative for a particular family in which symbiotic

,
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attachments

were so strong that family therapy seemed impossible.

He knew that only by adding other people to the system could
any options be generated.

In the course of experimenting with

larger and larger groups as an adjunct to his usual approach
to family therapy, Speck and the people who joined him in this
work found processes taking place in the larger groups of people
which they had not intended but which they later came to consider
as the main healing potential of the network approach.
The process Is difficult and elusive to describe, but
examples of It are rampant on the contemporary and histori¬
cal scene:
religious revival meetings, tribal healing cere¬
monies, and alumni or "Big Game" celebrations are time-tested
institutionalized instances; the Woodstock festival, peace
marches, civil rights actions and revolutionary militantgroup meetings are more current examples.... The network
effect is a "turn-on" phenomenon of group interaction.
Once people have made this initial change, they can never
step into the same river of human relationships again." (210)
A "social network" as Speck and Attneave use the term
is the relational field of a particular person.

That means it

is those people with whom he or his family relate or are related.
Usually it is a group of 40 to 60 relatives, friends, neighbors
and school or work associates willing to be gathered in a
crisis.

The "crisis" element in the situation is originally

stressed to heln overcome people’s usual reticence to "meddle"
in other people’s personal lives.

However, once the group is

gathered, it is hoped that bonds will be established (
re-established)

or

allowing people to continue to be involved with

each other even when the crisis is over.

The knitting of this

assemblage of people into a group is called "retribalization".
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1-v^r.r^vT et^alJ-z®-tlon we hava been cultivating is not,
therefore, a denial of the realities of today by a literal
return to some distant past,, but a way of restoring a vital
roa'Tnf
relationship and pattern that has been lost.
The
g
1 ui "etwork intervention is to utilize the power of the
lnSo^edtnetV?rk rapidly t0 shake up a rigidified svstem
in order to allow changes to occur that the members of the
system,with increased knowledge and insight into their predica(211)* W°Uld Wish t0 occur“-and for which they are responsible.
As retribalization occurs, as people begin to feel them¬
selves to be a "special human cluster", people find themselves
standing within a new system.
and relief.

There is a feeling of security

They all are at home together.

feeling of freedom

There is also a strong

and optimism. This new system as yet has no

rules or history to enforce any particular way of relating.
The rules are up to them.

People are free to act in new ways

in a new system.
Speck and Attneave have distinguished six phases in the
overall process which they call the "network effect?.
phases are cyclical.

These

In the course of a network intervention

of one to six three-hour meetings the network may go through
the process several times and each meeting is conducted so that
the group will go through the cycle at least once, ending on
the sixth phase.

The phases are:

retribalization, polarization,

mobilization, depression, breakthrough, and exhaustion/elation.
Retribalization is the making of the assembled people
into a group.

Initially it involves some of the spontaneous

sorts of interaction which occur when people who are somehow
"connected" come together.

They get reacquainted and catch

up on the news of each other’s lives.

To this is added some
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encounter-type" techniques to release tension and increase
relaxation and participation.

It is also a stage which natur¬

ally follows the exhaustion/elation stage of the process.

At

that time people tend to feel intensely that they truly are
a group and that each person truly has a place in the group.
Polarization is a stage in which the intervention team
allows the problems and deadlocks of the central family to
come out as issues of the network as a whole.

A father-son

battle is translated into a generation gap which exists in
the group generally.

By heightening the sides of different

issues, new people are drawn in.

These are their issues too.

As new people begin to participate in stale battles of the
family, these battles take on new life and new possibilities
of resolution.
The polarization process as well as the retribalization
process are aided by the intervention team's sharing with all
the network all information gathered within the network.
professional secrecy is practiced.

Mo

Secrets are discovered and

published in an effort to make the whole network into the
primary information processing system.

Part of the information

the network as a whole must deal with is the experience of the
true difficulty of the problem of the central family.

This

experience is gained through the polarization process and in
the subsequent stage.
Mobilization is the stage in which, having had a great
deal of energy aroused by the polarization, the members of the
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network are presented by the intervention team or by their own
observations with the general tasks which must be accomplished
in order to resolve the polarization.

Perhaps a child should

move out and set up a life of his own, or perhaps parents
should find a focus for their life together other than battling
with and caring for a schizophrenic progeny.

The network dis¬

cusses and focuses the needs in detail.
Depression is the stage which indicates a general mood
which overcomes the network when people have fully experienced
the intensity of the problems.

This is also a time when the

resistance of the family to the changes which are being discussed
is encountered.

People see no way out.

Breakthrough is the way out.

With the help of the inter¬

vention team who try to identify and bring together the "acti¬
vists" in the network who will really give time and effort to
the problem, the network evolves a plan.
step by step approaches.

The team encourages

It supports the input of people who

at the beginning of the evening probably never would have ima¬
gined themselves pitching in or taking a leading role in some
follow-up activity.
Exhaustion/elation follows an intense and tiring process
and is a part of further retribalization.

People feel good

about having accomplished something together.

Next time

around they may attempt even more difficult tasks.
Usually two weeks is allowed between network sessions
to allow the plans made at the previous session to be carried
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out.

This means that the network as a working unit can be the

focus of further sessions.

At each session a greater intensity

of network cohesion can lead to greater depth of family problems
experienced and greater profundity of resolutions attempted.
In the time spent functioning on its own between sessions, the
network gets practice for continuing to function after the
intervention team is gone.
of this approach.

This is one of the great strengths

The intensity of the intervention which it

takes to generate options

for the "schizophrenic" family can

be carried out without fear that the family will later be
abandoned to their own devices and perhaps to their old patterns.
The context of the family is, hopefully, permanently altered.
In network therapy the five aspects of therapy are
carried out for the family of the schizophrenic person.

1. Their

usual form of communication is rendered inoperable. Schizophrenic
families tend to be insular, cut off from outside influence.
Network therapy reverses this trend.

The team actively attempts

to spread family secrets around the network.

In the network

session, the encounter techniques such as jumping up and down,
yelling and swaying set a context of different communicationfrom that which people are used to,

2.L II patterns are not

permitted to go on as before in the family because the creation
of the larger network forces the development of new patterns
and because the network team structures the meeting very directly.
3.

The LII patterns are invoked in the beginning of the polari¬

zation stage.

The family is encouraged to act out its tangles
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before the whole network.

H.

LII premises can be experienced

in their whole form by each family member as the network grad¬
ually takes over acting out the tangles and battles of the
family.

In this way everyone, including each family member

is offered a sense of the whole pattern as each role in the
pattern is enlarged and even exaggerated.

5,

a paradigm of

the whole punctuation of the therapeutic situation is offered
in the therapy interaction.
within the network.

The family is temporarily dissolved

LIII for the family is possible in the

temporarily irrelevance of the "family" as a unit within a
whole larger system.

This gives way to more clarity, hopefully,

for each family member of his own boundaries as each is individ¬
ually offered support by network members.

Individuals and the

network are the two systems operative and concentrated on in
the later stages of the network cycle.
Learning II and Learning III for the schizophrenic
person are made possible by network therapy.

While a person’s

punctuation may shift more slowly than the network changes,
a rearrangement of all the important relationships in a person's
life makes this shift inevitable.

For the schizophrenic, not

relating to this whole network of the important people in his
life as he might be able with one therapist is impossible.
In assembling a person's whole network the premise of
a person "standing within" a system while still responsible
for his actions in the system is given tangible form.
network is the embodiment of the gamut of the person's

The
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relationship patterns.

It is his network and it needs fixing.

His relating needs re-patterning.

The work of network therapy

embodies the attempt to generate more appropriate patterns of
relating for the identified patient.
is LII for the patient.

What is done in therapy

Yet the overall approach to treating

the network as the client, of trying to realign or redefine
the family, and of seeing the patient in his total relational
context embodies Learning III for the patient.
of self vs.

The division

other is redefined by the redefinition of the unit

to be treated.

The patient's standing within a total systemic

process is demonstrated in the most fundamental possible way.
Through the network intervention Learning II for the
family as a system has been made possible.
think of each other differently.
form.

People are able to

Relationships have taken new

This has been made possible because a change in the

family at Level III has been enforced temporarily.

The

"family" as a system was temporarily lost within the larger
system of the network.

It is hoped that the network will con¬

tinue to be a viable system after the intervention team has
gone.

This means that all people and families in the system

can continue to have options at Level II because whenever they
need to, they can experience their belonging to the larger group.
In this chapter we have attempted to make apparent the
potential which our language offers for illuminating therapeutic
orocesses based on very different theoretical perspectives.
We attempted to show how the same five characteristics for
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encouraging therapeutic change could be found in all the
therapies when discussed in our language.

These five cate¬

gories certainly do not exhaust the possible fundamental unities
to be found in the multiplicity of psychotherapies.

We do not

even claim that the five characteristics we used are the best
formulations of the unities they are trying to represent.

They

are examples of what might be possible.
Should all therapies, no matter on what theory they
were based, be found to operate in certain fundamental ways
labeled A, B and C, then any new therapy could be understood
clearly as one investigated how A, B and C were accomplished
in this system.

Should one find a therapy which did not use

A,B and C, one might be very close to an even more fundamental
discovery about therapy in learning how A, B and C were not
necessary in a specific context.
In the last chapter of this work we will try to briefly
summarize our language.

We will also try to understand the

language in its being as an expression of a particular author.

SUMMARY AND CLOSING REMARKS

In this

final chapter we will try to summarize the

language we have developed so far and then make a few remarks
about the dissertation as a whole*

The work of this study

has been largely in the development and use of the language.
This

last brief summary is offered mainly to highlight the

overall form of the work and to give the reader a strengthened
sense of the unity of the different parts of the work.
In Chapter I we discussed the difficulties which the
"scientific" approach has with psychotherapy.

We said that

"science" attempts to find knowledge which is independent of
the knower and tries to reduce phenomena to component bits
which can be measured in the service of gaining this knowledge.
By "science" we did not mean a particular branch of science.
Rather, we were speaking of a general approach, widely accepted
in the behavioral sciences, which was the method used by the
critics of the "ineffectiveness" of psychotherapy.

We later

studied the characteristics of this approach in our discussion
of Freud’s "natural scientific" epistomology.

We also discussed

in Chapter I the contention of many therapists that something
is happening in psychotherapy, but that the most important
aspects of the process elude isolation and quantification.
With only the language of science, i.e., the language of
entities and forces, at our disposal, we could describe
l6'8
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psychotherapy only as a sham or a mystery.
What we have attempted to do In this thesis is to offer
an alternative to the language of entities (e.g.

"knowledge",

"variables") which might be demystifying of the process of
psychotherapy.

For our language we have used the^ work of

Gregory Bateson to help us speak clearly in terms of form
rather than substance, of processes rather than entities.

From

Bateson we got the notion of context and hierarchies of contexts
in communication.

It was these notions which helped us clarify

the interactive nature of perception and knowing.

Bateson's

use of Logical Types as an explicative model gave us a way of
aPPlying some of the truths of systems theory, truths about
the "sinking" of abstract premises by an information process¬
ing system and the protection of these premises by the manipula¬
tion of more changeable modes of experiencing, to human beings
in their systemic interaction with their environments.
When applied to the specific interaction known as
psychotherapy, Bateson's

language has allowed us to discuss

the relationship between individual perception and learning on
one hand and the form of the interaction as a whole on the
other.

We can nofa say that psychotherapy involves a change in

the way the client punctuates, i.e., gives form to or understands
relating and Dossibly a change in his most fundamental stance
toward relating and experience generally.

We have called

these changes Learning II and Learning III respectively using
Bateson's terms.

We said that Learning II and Learning III
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represent a change In premises about interaction of similarly
numbered levels, and that these numbered levels of abstraction
also apply to the only manifestation of these premises of inter¬
action:

as patterns of interaction, whether or not these

patterns are observable to another person.

A "felt" emotion

is as much a part of a pattern of interaction as a wink or a
wave.

Thus Learning II is a change in Level II premises about

interaction which are manifested in the way a person participates
in any specific relationship and Learning III is a change in
Level III premises about relating which are manifested in a
person’s stance toward relating and experiencing generally.
The identification of premises about interaction with
patterns of interaction has allowed us to discuss the interrela¬
tion of the client's levels of learning with the form of the
psychotherapy relationship as a whole.
the Jones

We saw in discussing

family that the pattern of interaction described by

Bateson and others in the first article on the "double bind"
can be better understood when we investigate this same rela¬
tionship between LII premises of the individual in a system
and the form of the total relating pattern in the system.

In

both a family and a psychotherapeutic interaction, the LII
premises of each individual and the form of the interaction
as a whole gradually come to be isomorphic.

In the Jones

family the paradoxical LII premises shared by every member
of the family, when manifested in the relating pattern of the
whole family required the schizophrenic behavior of the son,
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John.

It should perhaps be stressed that LII premises of

family members do not "cause" the family relating pattern to
take a certain form, nor is the reverse true.

Both are trans¬

forms of the same pattern and thus share the same etiology in
the history of each family member, their interactions together
and the interaction of the family as a system with its environ¬
ment .
The fact that the LII premises of each individual in
a relating system and the form of the relating pattern as a
whole will eventually be isomorphic helps us explain the change
of LII premises of a client in psychotherapy.

In our descrip¬

tion of several therapies we showed how the structure of the
therapeutic relationship both renders unworkable the client’s
old LII premises and encourages change as the client gradually
takes on the premises embodied in the interaction as a whole.
In psychoanalysis the client's LII premises as they are
manifested in his usual communication patterns are rendered
inoperable by the requirement that he free associate.

His

LII premises in the sort of relating patterns he understands
and invites by his actions are inoperable because any relating
pattern he attempts to structure in the analytic setting is
labled transference by the analyst, thus enforcing the relating
pattern which the analyst defines.

The powerful stance of the

analyst vis-a-vis the client is isomorphic with the relating
pattern of a parent with a small child.

This context evokes

the client's most early learned LII premises.

This is the

regression in the process of transference which Freud describes.
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In the unique structure of the psychoanalytic setting the
patient is not only able to experience his own LII premises
with great clarity and intensity, he is also able to experi¬
ence the LII premises embodied in the entire form of the thera¬
peutic relationship which offer an alternative, less inappropriate
and less

constricted way of punctuating experience.

The

analyst’s approach to the patient can gradually become the
patient’s approach to other people and to his experience of
relating.

As the patient gradually takes on new LII premises,

he is able to experience the pattern of his past experience
in great complexity.

Because his new LII premises are congruent

with a greater complexity of experience, the patient can give
Dattem or meaning to hore of his past and so is able to remember
lino re.
We said that Freud’s writings on therapy were not directed
toward LIII issues.

Using the work of Ludwig Binswanger we

talked about the inevitable subject-object split involved in
the epistomologv of natural science and how that left the exist ence of any human being bracketed out of the language of
natural science.

We said that this reflected the usual LIII

premises of Western culture in which any person is placed
apart

from his environment and relational field.

The shift

from Freud’s language of subject-object to Binswanger's
language of speaking in the phenomenological mode, i.e., from
within the experience of being, involves a shift in LIII
premises.

We tried to stress that our language which takes
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into account the act of theorizing; as well as what is theorized
about seems to be isomorphic with Binswanger's language of
experiencing, of "being-in-the-world".

However, In our dis¬

cussions of any particular phenomenon we are speaking about
experience rather than giving unmediated articulation to ex¬
perience.

We can describe the logical parameters of Learning III,

but we cannot begin to give articulation to this exnerience.
We can say that Leraning III is a change in the most
fundamental way of experiencing relating, involving a change
in the experience of who, in fact, is relating.

When one

experiences interaction from within the systemic process that
is relating, tinmediated by the experience of •’self" that makes
the rest of the system "other", one is experiencing in a fashion
that is congruent with the form of the most immediate act of
perception, of interacting with the stimuli' one encounters.
The experience of agency which does not require an experience
of the agent is congruent with the process of constituting
pattern and meaning in one's most immediate perception.
fore,
object

There¬

the more one's LIII premises shift from the subjectform to the form described just above, the more richly

and complexly one is able to experience one's immediate per¬
ceptual world.

The greater complexity a system emcompasses,

the more stable are its most deeply sunk,most abstract patterns/
premises of operation.
We have tried so far to summarize our language as it
was

used in Chapter V to assess different therapies.

It does

not seem necessary to summarize the brief treatment which each
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therapy was able to be given.

We endeavored to show the

potential of our language for general use in understanding
and comparing various forms of psychotherapy by showing the
way specific therapies promote change in the client's patterns
of punctuating relating and even in his most basic stance
toward experience and relating.
Perhaps to some degree the therapist is on the same
position with respect to the therapeutic interactional system
that this thesis is in in relation to the logical types of
interactional theory.

Both must ultimately be fully a part

of the system, affected by its currents, mirroring its form
in some way, and yet at the same time in a position outside,
observing the form.
In the therapeutic interaction the therapist offers
a resolution to the paradox of the patient by taking the para¬
dox on himself.

The patient had been living with a dis.lunction

of logical type in his

(their) effort to "be spontaneous,"

"be a good family," "be myself," etc.

The therapist returns

the patient to a single logical type by taking over the role
of permission giver initially.

If anything the patient does

is part of the treatment, the patient is not responsible for
the designation of the meaning of his behavior, temporarily.
Yet the theranist may now be in paradox.

He must be part of

the system and still somehow in touch with the system as a
whole.
dox.

The therapist has two ways of dealing with this para¬
He can offer some separation between himself and the
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client in the structure of the therapy.

This reduces the

paradox on the therapist by limiting the system of interaction.
Or the therapist can, through Learning III, come to an under¬
standing and trust of the process as a whole that allows him
to be fully within it.

Thus the therapist is no longer in

paradox, while still offering the patient a temporary escape
from his.
A therapist approaching therapy from a non-paradoxical
L III stance would experience his punctuation at L II in the
therapy situation to be "relative, changeable, situational" in
our words from Chapter II.

He would be likely to experience

"himself" differently in each different therapy hour.

Here

is an explanation for a phenomenon which many therapists
including Bateson (21) have noted, that the best information
a therapist has about a client is what sort of a person the
therapist experiences himself to be when relating with the
client.
The same potential paradox pointed to above is alive
in writing this dissertation.

To consciously try to describe

the laws of form in human interaction is paradoxical.

It is

trying to make a member of a class describe the class as a whole.
One’s only possibility of describing nonparadoxically is in
allowing the work to be an adequate representation of the class,
i.e., the laws of form, in the total form of the work.

This

inevitably puts it on the level of the most abstract form of
the personal experience of the author, which must equally be
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represented in the total form of the work.
It is not possible for the author to say much about the
total form of the work other than to point out Its potential
significance.

It Is one system which he must Inevitably

stand within.

It may be of Interest to the reader that the

overall plan for the work emerged almost two years before the
work was completed and long before most of the problems
discussed in the work had been thought through by the author.
Thus in the overall form of the work is a distillation of the
reading and experience of the author more abstract than is
available to consciousness.

This is the level on which much

of the originality of the work exists for though the language
and many of the insights in the thesis are Bateson's, any one
who has read the preceding chapters will realize that ori¬
ginality can take different levels of abstraction.

The ori¬

ginality of this work is in the simplicity it finds in the
complexity of the psychotherapeutic process.

For this

simplicity to be valid, it must be of an abstract nature.
"Wherever a system becomes reduced in complexity, it
loses its options and therefore becomes less and less stable."

(9*0
|

This statement by Barry Commoner can serve as an elegant

distillation of much of what has been discussed in the preced¬
ing pages.

Only simplicity at more abstract levels, i.e.,

higher logical types, of communication is viable for a
"healthy" system.
i

Any simplicity which reduces the complexity

of what is experienced, reduces the stability of the system.
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V/e have spent a great deal of time tracing the way In which
certain LII premises structure perception and therefore limit
the complexity of what kind of relating can be perceived or
remembered.

We have shown how this can lead to "instability"

in a person or a family.

We have shown how different thera¬

pists help to improve a patient’s stability by either foster¬
ing LII premises which are less constricting and therefore
allow for a great complexity of experiencing or by fostering
LI 11 so that a far greater complexity can be perceived because
it is congruent with these even more abstract premises, premises
which are isomorphic with the essential pattern of all systems.
This same distillation applies to this thesis and any
other effort to give articulation to perceived form.
is an inherent danger in simplicity.

There

In our case the danger

is that in the use of the numbered levels of learning, gradually
the terms will lose the full complexity for which they stand
when encountered over and over by a reader or when used over
and over by an author.
This degeneration is almost inevitable in the use of
language.

Originally a perceived form gives rise to another

perceived form.

The articulation of each form in language

has a sequence, a form.

Gradually the linguistic sequence or

form begins to structure the further use of language.
develops an "if ....

There

then" relationship in language which is

no longer representative of sequential experiencing, which
has no causation to it.

The linguistic form is simpler.

It
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is "logical”,

it achieves Its simplicity, its logic, its

ordered semblance of causation at the expense of the complexity
of sequential experiencing.
The language we use customarily in our day to day inter¬
acting is already quite highly structured.

What we can say

is essentially limited by this structure.
Those who have no insight into this structure and limi¬
tation are sometimes given to sorting their world according
to such simplistic dichotomies as the effectiveness/ineffectiveness
dichotomy which we discussed in Chapter I in relation to psycho¬
therapy.

It should be clear by now that since only therapists

who are able to stand within the specific relating system
which is the therapeutic relationship at a given time are able
to approach therapy in a non-paradoxical way, any assessment
which discards the specificity of

people and time in a

therapeutic relationship in favor of some more general rubric
such as "school" of therapy employed will of necessity be
paradoxical and a poor communicative vehicle.
To discuss any complexity not already inherent in
usual language, one must invent new language.

This new

language must use familiar words in new ways if it is to
communicate new complexity.

We have attempted to develop

in this work new ways of speaking about psychotherapy which
will allow us to experience in some ordered way (no experience
is random)
Yet already

a greater complexity than we otherwise could.
our language is subject to the degeneration of
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simplification.

Our only possible remedy is the awareness

of this process and our willingness to continually try each
new formulation against our own experience.

The language must

be continually used in the greatest complexity of contexts
possible if the simplicity which it achieves in its own abstract
form is to be durable and reliable.
Our language, because it is

tuilt on understandings

which seem to be true of all information processing systems
of the complexity which human beings generate, is potentially
useful in many areas of human life.

It might be a useful way

of describing the ever-increasing levels of complexity which
a child learns to organize as it develops.

We might find that

many of the developmental stages in a child’s life which in
the past have been correlated with physical development would
be better understood as a logical progression through the
levels of complexity inherent in the information which the
child encounters.

Our language might be useful in understand¬

ing and comparing the forms of various organizations and
groups.

It would certainly be helpful to be able to say what

sort of organization allowed for the greatest complexity and
flexibility in a given context.

The same way of analyzing

the flexibility and complexity allowed by systems of different
forms might make an excellent tool for discussing the necessary
operating patterns of different political systems.

Our

language in this context might offer an alternative to the
rhetoric which often makes the expositions of political systems
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so passionately cloudy.
These are a few of the many possibilities which the use
of our language might offer.

As stated above, we would have

to be ever faithful to our model of looking for simplicity
only when it allows the experiencing of the greatest possible
complexity at lower logical types.

We must also keep true

to the complexity of the phenomena which we encounter so that
our language can evolve, ever giving greater congruence to
what we experience rather than limiting experience by limiting
complexity in the defense of a rigid simplicity.
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